Chapter 2
Situational Crime Prevention and the Risks of Displacement

A tour of many of the hot spots along the East-West Corridor of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) show obvious possible applications for situational crime prevention strategies. In many neighborhoods, such as Levantille, there is only one way in or out of cul-de-sac groupings of houses going up the hillside. In some cases, look out points in one community face right down on rival gang territory. These areas have been used by gangs to target each other with impunity for shootings. Escape routes are plentiful in many of these communities due the absence of available lighting, etc., and the inability of police to pursue in patrol cars; the many places for hiding and ambush also make the pursuit on foot far too treacherous for officers. Moreover, it is also easy for gangs to run from one apartment or house to the next to escape pursuit.

It is very easy to see approaching patrol vehicles from far away in many of these hillside communities. *Shootings usually take place just after the roaming patrol occurs every 20 min, and the perpetrators escape on foot easily*.

In fact, crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) strategies have been piloted in a couple of communities along the East-West corridor previously, with some degree of reported success (although not evaluated formally). These time-limited situational crime prevention efforts sought to block access to particularly dangerous parts of the community, and create more presence in communities that had previously been isolated from the police (to date, there are some communities that the police do not even enter unless there is an emergency). As a result, citizens are slow to report crimes due to fear or a belief that there will be no sufficient response from the police. Efforts to allow anonymous reporting of crime have not significantly alleviated this situation.

According to several stakeholders, the increasing violent crime statistics follow changes in the drug trafficking problem in the country, and are the result of a very easy access to guns. Citizens, and particularly youths, see the illegal drug economies that have developed in these former squatter communities as the only viable option to support themselves. Even with increases in formal enforcement activity, this remains an unfortunate and desperate reality. In fact, some argue that even if the troubled youth were provided with access to the skills and jobs that could sufficiently sustain them (as one example of a social prevention effort), most would not

be able to leave their own restricted and isolated hillside communities to even work due to fear of reprisal from rival gangs.

The Difference Between Situational Crime Prevention and Social Crime Prevention

Although we are continuing to discuss the complexities of the T&T hot spots, the truth is that we could just as easily be describing the urban slums or favelas of Rio de Janiero, Brazil; Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, or Medellin, Colombia. The difficult balance between a need for tradition a suppression-oriented crime control strategies and more social crime prevention strategies reflects the realities of the developing world, particularly throughout Central and South America where culture, crime, and economy have become inextricably intertwined.

When Herman Goldstein (1979, 1990) first offered the field problem-oriented policing (POP), it became a necessary and important lightning rod for the push to transform policing from more reactive traditional methods of crime control towards embracing the proactive crime prevention responsibilities of the profession. To this end, it has become synonymous with many subsequent directions such as community policing, situational crime prevention, intelligence-led policing, broken windows policing, and CPTED. In the beginning, Goldstein envisioned POP as a high level approach to changing the way that policing is done; transforming the means of the organization rather than its more predominant focus on small scale activities by frontline officers (Tilley and Scott 2012), more common to situational crime prevention approaches.

Problem analysis forms the heart of the POP model; allowing the police to examine the "root causes" of the particular problem (including a wide range of issues ranging from minor disturbances to serious crimes). Importantly, even though POP was always conceptualized as a police-led model, it made real allowances for the mobilization of the agencies or stakeholders with the best capacity to address these identified root causes of the problem. For this reason, it seemed a perfect fit for the partnership and community mobilization vision of the modern community policing movement. Future chapters will also demonstrate the compatibly between Goldstein's larger original vision for POP and the evolving social crime prevention needs of developing countries.

Some scholars have argued that POP efforts have remained largely superficial (Tilley and Scott 2012), staying within the comfort level of the police with an emphasis on CPTED and situational crime prevention strategies that do not make any attempt to tackle the larger social and macro-structural root causes that are influencing community crime beyond the "opportunity contexts" for crime that can be more easily remedied through a variety of place-based policing strategies such as hot spots and broken windows policing. Serious POP activities in the challenging developing world invariably surface social causes to address if the analysis stage does not remain too superficial.

   Eck and Spelman (1987) developed the SARA model as a means to assist in the building of a simple common language for the police and their partners to conduct the problem-solving process. Although SARA (Scan, Analysis, Response, Assessment) itself remains fairly entrenched in problem solving efforts internationally, a subsequent reformulation of the crime triangle seeks to help police examine the larger complexities that will assist in the identification of adequate responses (Clarke and Eck 2007).

   The crime triangle (see Fig. 2.1) builds on the criminological perspectives that in order for a crime to occur there must be a convergence of offender and victim within a clearly defined place. Place-based strategies such as hot spots policing and CPTED can then impact the occurrence of crime by taking out one side of the triangle. For example, victim awareness strategies can make potential victims less vulnerable, or the use of CCTV and increased lighting in a high crime street segment may prevent offenders from choosing to commit crime in that particular location. Environmental changes thus decrease the available opportunities for crime; thereby preventing crime from occurring in the first place.

   In the revised crime triangle, an outer layer of "controller" is added that can influence each of the three elements of the crime triangle. Crime occurrence then is not simply the convergence of offender and victim into the same place and time; it is also the inability of the "controllers" failure to act and prevent the criminal incident (Eck 2003). For example, the victim has potential guardians that look over his or her belongings, while offenders can have handlers, such as family, teachers, and police that are cable of stepping in and controlling their activities. Finally, the location ideally has place managers that are responsible for moderating the behavior at a given location (such as a school administrator or business administrator).

Fig. 2.1 Revised SARA model for problem solving – derived from the work of Spelman and Eck

Clark and Eck (2003) argue that this revised triangle allows police to think more precisely about the causes of crime in a location: for example, strategies work with formal handlers to control the behavior of offenders in spaces; increasing guardianship will mitigate against the probabilities for victimization; and place managers can change the way they supervise their locations in ways that might reduce the "opportunities" for crime there.

It is also possible that consideration of this outer layer can facilitate a useful reflection on some of the larger risk factors outside of place that can lead to the adoption of social crime prevention approaches. For example, inadequate education and school environments can be incorporated as guardians, handlers, or place managers depending upon the unique contexts of a particular crime pattern. In both T&T and Guyana, the establishment of youth clubs as sources of alternative activities for youths and additional education/mentoring are one example of this. Recall that social crime prevention strategies focus on developing programs and policies that improve the "health, family life, education, housing, work opportunities, and neighborhood activities of potential offenders" (Rosenbaum et al. 1998). Crime is the result of larger social ills or root causes than the convergence in time and space of victims and offenders. In both Guyana and T&T, high levels of disorganization in the hot spot communities were continually cited as a major cause of the violence occurring there in addition to the low technical skills and opportunities available to youths.

It is important to point out, however, that it is too simplistic to argue that there is no consideration of "social" elements in situational crime prevention. Andresen and Felson (2009) argue that while social prevention focuses on reforming individuals through social policies, situational prevention takes individual dispositions toward crime as a given; the intent is to alter settings or conditions that effect the routines of offenders/and/or victims.

However, the "social" nature of human behavior becomes a key consideration when we recognize that crime significantly involves co-offending patterns internationally (Ibid). This is particularly true for youths. In other words, a group must come together in order for a crime to occur, and there are many situational dynamics that can make this happen. Disrupting networks of youth or interfering with hangouts (such as making them less comfortable or convenient)that offer the opportunity for co-offending then become part of situational crime prevention considerations (Andreson and Felson 2009). Youths act differently together than they do separately. However, available resources and activities in the community are also important considerations in understanding why co-offending is manifesting itself in a particular way within a particular community (or communities).

Let's be Serious: Real Consideration of the Root Causes is Overwhelming and Beyond the Scope of the Police Differences in community capacity to manage crime can themselves be due to the larger macro-structural root causes implicit in social crime prevention considerations, such as poverty, available resources, and community isolation (Weisburd 2012). "Interventions that emphasize social rather than opportunity reducing features of place should (thus) be an important part of the crime prevention at place tool box" (Ibid, p. 318). From the perspective of the police

though, even those with a strong orientation towards crime prevention, the serious consideration of social risk factors in the crime harming their communities can be overwhelming. The true realists, however, such as virtually every key stakeholder in T&T and Guyana, recognizes that they must be dealt with in order to make meaningful impacts. Weisburd (2012) offers an important way for making social crime prevention approaches more meaningful and manageable by recognizing the street segment in high crime places as a "microcommunity". According to him, street segments have their own dynamics of mobility, wealth, and social class that are related to crime and can themselves be targeted. Thus, rather than becoming immediately overwhelmed with the level of poverty and unemployment affecting youths throughout the entire East-West corridor, it is possible that targeted approaches can be offered to residents of a particularly high crime street segment, before gradually expanding efforts as resources become available. A street segment focus is also useful for targeting the patterns of co-offending amongst youths discussed above.

In this sense, T&T and Guyana clearly support what has become an established orthodoxy in crime prevention and criminal justice: hot spots are an appropriate focus for crime prevention interventions (Brantingham and Brantingham 1999; Eck et al. 2000). Identifying the crime hot spots (and even the hot spot street segments within them) are arguably the most essential parts of the problem solving analysis process. Moreover, these hot spots are overall very consistent from year to year (Weisburd et al. 2004; Braga and Weisburd 2010), a careful targeting of resources to these areas is essential, especially if it is "forward thinking" enough to address both situational and social considerations.

Returning to our continuing story of crime in Trinidad and Tobago, the East-West corridor has continued to plague the police department and other government agencies with its levels of violent crime, and other symptoms of community disorder. Peeling away at the problem still further clearly identifies certain communities such as Levantille that stand out as the "hottest spots" within the overall corridor (as a result this community receives the highest concentration of both police and other government service resource investment); looking still further, certain street segments and even apartment housing units or buildings clearly stand out over other areas. A central challenge in the T&T hot spots, however, is the natural barriers of the hillside community with poor visibility for police, lack of access, etc., making the hot spots policing strategies effective in other urban areas far more challenging. Other CPTED approaches to overcome some of these natural barriers could make a significant difference.

Risks of Displacement in the Urban Slums of the Developing World

a. "We know it works"—lack of displacement and diffusion of benefits
The research literature very clearly supports the practice of hot spots policing, as evidence by its use in a significant majority of police departments in the United

States (PERF 2008). Training and technical assistance in problem-oriented and re-
lated community policing strategies also continue to be a focus of dollars by in-
ternational development agencies, and the United States Department of State. The
evidence clearly supports investment in the exporting of this practice.

In their recent review of the research literature on hot spots policing, Weisburd
and Telep (2014), argue that although we know hot spots policing is effective,
some "place based interventions work better than others". They also conclude that
research is still needed on whether or not hot spots policing can effect police legiti-
macy (a topic we turn to in the next chapter), and whether or not the implementation
of micro-place strategies can reduce overall crime levels in a jurisdiction.

One of the most common criticisms used against hot spots policing and similar
problem-oriented policing strategies is that they will simply lead to displacement,
especially in the complexities of urban slums found in Central and South America
and other developing parts of the world, such as T&T and the Caribbean. Displace-
ment is the "relocation of a crime from one place, time, target, offense, tactic, or
offender to another as a result of some crime prevention initiative" Guerette and
Bowers (2009, p. 1333)

Here too, the research evidence is unequivocal that hot spots policing does not
inevitably lead to displacement (Weisburd and Telup 2014); however, most of the
research summarized comes from the United States and other "western" locales
such as the United Kingdom and Australia. In fact, some researchers have conclud-
ed that a diffusion of benefits may be the more likely outcome from space-based
policing practices, rather than spatial displacement (Sorg et al. 2013).

In an effort to assess which place-based policing strategies are the most effective,
Taylor et al. (2011) conducted a randomized evaluation of two commonly used hot
spots strategies: directed patrol and problem-oriented policing (POP) at hot spots
of violent crime. The directed/saturation patrols involved increased police patrol at
hot spots of violent crime, whereas the POP intervention included the analysis of
specific crime and disorder issues that led to the development of specific related
responses after an understanding of the "root causes" of the violence problem. The
resulting strategies focused on the either the offenders or some aspect of environ-
mental crime prevention. The authors found no significant effect on violent crime.
The only diffusion or displacement effect was "a 29 % increase in the count of
calls-for-service for any violence" (p. 170) in the area around the POP treatment
areas. The authors suggest this is the result of increased awareness and improved
community relations as a result of the intervention. The POP intervention reduced
non-domestic violence incidents by 33 % in the three month follow-up period to
the study. The authors discuss the possibility that the increase in calls outside of
the POP intervention areas is a result of displacement. Thus, the authors suggest
that POP interventions are more effective in the long term than interventions that
are less concerned with social problems (Taylor et al. (2011). This may be because
"offender" displacement is not displacement at all, since the offender did not adapt;
the offender was "replaced "(Reppetto 1976). In urban slums with significant illegal
economies, the removal or incapacitation of certain high level offenders without
addressing the underlying social "root causes" may simply lead to adaptations in

the organization and nature of operations. For example, drug dealers may alter their particular routes and operations.

b. Balloon effect—criminal adaptation in challenging developing world contexts

As anyone who has set foot in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or the slums of Levantille will attest, it is very clear that much is driven by such alternate economies of scale. It seems crazy to think that saturation patrols or other forms of directed patrol strategies will be able to remove the problem for significant periods of time (especially after the resources inevitably dictate their removal). As noted in the previous chapter, such strategies take the motivation of the offender as a given within the opportunity structure of a particular community. And yet, within such urban communities, it is highly likely that both the motivated offender and place-based opportunities exist well beyond the specifically targeted hot spot community. To those following this logic then, displacement would seem to be inevitable. Similarly, if the many disorganized street crews or gangs throughout an area as large as the East-West Corridor have now consolidated into principally two rival factions, how effective can targeted "pulling levers" (Kennedy 2011) or other POP hot spots policing approaches really be?

   This argument for an impenetrable drug trade and inevitable displacement is captured in the idea of the "balloon effect" (Debusmann 2009). The balloon effect argues that the police and other law enforcement are only able to move the drug trade around without any net impact (Windle and Farrell 2012). If this were true, attempts to disrupt the drug trade and related violent crime in the urban slums would be futile. Windle and Farrell (2012) nicely summarize the balloon effect metaphor as:

> The size of the balloon is the size of the illicit drug trade, the volume of air is the volume of illicit drug production, and pressure on the balloon is from law enforcement. When one part of the balloon is pushed, it expands elsewhere to an equal extent. There is no net reduction in total air, so it is a hydraulic model (p. 868).

The authors go on to note that some argue that the balloon can actually get bigger when poked as low level traffickers are replaced with stronger ones and drug market prices rise with increased risks followed by a specific targeted prevention strategy. Friesendorf (2005) argues that this is not accurate, with any displacement that is caused being the result of factors well beyond the individual actions of the police. In contrast, Sherman (1990) found a diffusion of benefits or "residual benefits" following high intensity police crackdowns on street drug markets. The crackdowns did lead to the goal of significant declines in drug dealing in the target areas. Importantly, the drug dealing levels did not immediately go back to their pre-crackdown levels because the dealers were uncertain about when or if such levels of police intervention were going to return. This led Sherman to suggest that rotating the intensity of police resources across areas would have the maximum likelihood of prolonged impact.

   The large body of work suggesting that there is no displacement, and even a diffusion of benefits, illustrates that the idea of a balloon effect is too simplistic. Even where there might be some displacement following targeted hot spots interventions

in communities suffering from drug related crime, the overall benefit may be positive as offenders are forced to change their methods and/or move to other areas where they enjoy less impunity and ease of operation throughout the community. Finally, Windle and Farrell (2012) argue that socioeconomic factors have driven the progress and development of the drug trade internationally as new opportunities and means have evolved.

To summarize, this chapter argues that a significant amount of research paints the hopeful picture that place-based policing strategies can make a significant impact on the levels of serious crime in urban communities without serious risk of displacement; in fact, there can often be a diffusion of benefits, whereby, nearby communities also see a decline in crime as offenders there also adapt to the uncertainty of when and where to expect the intensive targeting of police resources. Even if there should be some level of displacement that occurs, it is also likely that the crime will not return to pre-intervention levels, and it may be offset by the diffusion of benefits to contiguous areas. The brief has argued, however, that further research should be conducted in areas comparable to the urban slums common to many of today's developing countries; this expansion/replication of the displacement literature to such contexts must be carefully understood and taken into consideration when providing training and/or technical assistance to developing countries.

There are many different types of displacement covered in the literature, including temporal, spatial, offender, and type of crime. When conducting a meaningful problem analysis in such uniquely challenging environments, it is clear that many of the "root causes" of the crime problem involve social factors that extend beyond the opportunity structures clearly characteristic of many of these crime-prone communities that are isolated from the consistent security and presence of the police. Any "displacement" that occurs to another such community then, may not solely be the result of the implemented place-based policing strategy. The illegal economy continues to operate in other areas where there continues to be a perceived lack of other opportunity for youths and families to make a viable income. In fact, although the research evidence discussed clearly suggests that the effects of place-based policing interventions can be sustained for longer periods of time, POP interventions that target social factors as well probably have the most sustainable impacts (Taylor et al. 2011). "Situational approaches to crime prevention are difficult to sustain in poorer communities because they do not address the deeper social problems of the neighborhoods" (Rosenbaum et al. 1998, p. 213). It is also fair to argue that few approaches that only focus on social crime prevention will flourish in the face of overwhelming rates of violence and impunity. Will a well-intentioned initiative to give former child soldiers in the favelas of Rio technical skills and/or a needed sense of self-efficacy work when there is no hope for legal employment or supportive peers and family members?

c. Systemic risk factors require systemic approaches

Perhaps no other community-based initiative captures the spirit of this logic as clearly as the Department of Justice's Weed and Seed effort. Implemented as a multi-agency strategy in high crime (largely drug market) communities throughout

the United States, targeted law enforcement strategies sought to first "weed out" the overt and serious crimes and criminals through suppression-oriented strategies such as directed saturation patrols; following this, community-oriented policing approaches were to be implemented to rebuild trust and supportive relationships with the community, including the problem solving of neighborhood problems. Real "seeding" begins, however, with community-building and restoration strategies that were to focus on more of the social risk factors for prevention driving crime in the areas. For example, in the Buffalo, New York Weed and Seed initiative visited in the late nineties by this author, the "seed" efforts included the revitalization of a local library in a devastated part of the community to house job skills training and career counseling services (including computer literacy) for area youth and adults.

The national evaluation of Weed and Seed clearly showed variation in the levels of success across cities (Roehl et al. 1996). However, despite the explicit recognition of the need to balance crime control with social crime prevention strategies, in the end, the majority of Weed and Seed funds were set aside for law enforcement focused "weeding strategies" rather than "seeding" efforts (Rosenbaum et al. 1998).

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