

Chapter 2

Institutions, Institutional Change and Policy Outcomes

Abstract Institutions structure interactions, provide stability and affect actors' behaviours. How do they change? The chapter provides multiple answers to this question by reviewing several theories explaining institutional change. It starts with evolutionary models based on emergence and unintended consequences, it investigates institutions as equilibria and it analyses different perspectives on stability and change. The core of the analysis lies in a sort of theoretical flip with respect to the classic structural view. Starting with the importance of power and distributive conflict, the chapter proposes to treat institutional change as a kind of policy change. The Sect. 2.5 presents a policy perspective on institutional change, inquiring about particular actors, preferences and modes of interaction.

Keywords Institutional change · Institutions · Metropolitan governance · Transport · Policymaking

2.1 Introduction

At the end of the first chapter, I discussed some of the 'static' critiques to the relation between institutions and policy outcomes. It is now time to add some dynamics to the analysis. Studying institutional change permits adding pieces to the puzzle of institutional causality with respect to policy outcomes. The question becomes whether or not actors approach institutional change with purposive and instrumental design, searching for better solutions for policy problems.

Were an observer to randomly pick some catchwords in the literature, he or she would be able to tell that design is not high on the academic agenda. Emergence, evolution, path dependence, equilibria or institutional drifts are only some of the models and metaphors recurrent in explaining change. Conversely, when scholars talk about design, 'limits' is probably their favoured topic.

In fact, one may certainly investigate if a presidential system has greater policy capacity, but when asked why a country adopted that system, nobody would risk an answer based on capacity. For such 'grand' institutions, everybody knows

that history matters, institutional origins are not the product of creationist designs and policy goals will play a minor role. The key question, however, is whether we should change logic and believe in instrumentality when analysing other kinds of institutions. I think not—at least, not completely.

Clearly, instrumental design will seem more likely in the case of ‘functional’ institutions (for instance, MTAs). However, history, evolution, power struggles and many other factors will also have strong explanatory power in the case of such institutions.

Variables other than policy objectives are inescapable parts of the ways in which all institutions come about, and they cannot be reneged or avoided. If we aim for purposive changes to increase institutional performance in terms of policy capacity, we need to factor such variables into the analysis. To this aim, knowledge of how institutions change in real processes is key. This knowledge permits us to understand the scope for purposive design, the main obstacles to instrumentality and the strategies to be followed when approaching change. Hence, applied institutional analysis should concentrate on how designs come about and how policy preferences can be integrated into models of change.

The chapter starts with a brief introduction to evolutionary explanations of institutional dynamics. Next, I review the rationalist perspective of institutions as equilibria. According to this view, change happens when a superior equilibrium is found and actors converge on that equilibrium. The section offers a critical discussion of the rationalist model and provides the starting point for the subsequent sections.

Stability and change are thoroughly analysed in the Sect. 2.3, focusing first on path dependent models and critical junctures and then giving a brief overview of the fourfold model of institutional change proposed by historical institutionalism. The whole section permits a discussion of the role of history, of development paths and of the importance of institutional contexts in the understanding of institutional dynamics.

The Sect. 2.4 introduces distributive conflict and power. The main point for designers is that power struggles will be fundamental to understanding both institutional stability and change. Power and conflict are not only inescapable elements of processes of change, but they are also the very reason by which reforms are initiated or fail.

In the Sect. 2.5, I propose to investigate institutional change as a special kind of policy change. Such perspective permits us to characterise the policy of institutional change in terms of three main features. First, it is a policy ‘without public’, which will raise minor interest outside the closed group of decision makers. Second, lack of public, lack of knowledge and conflicts of interest may downplay concerns for policy capacity when approaching change. Finally, costs and benefits of changes will have a direct effect on decision makers, who will identify conflicts of interest as a central problem for change. In discussing modes of interaction, the section compares horizontal compromise and hierarchical direction as two polar options for changing institutions. The general hypothesis is that only by neutralising distributive conflicts institutional changes may secure the enlargement of policy capacity.

2.2 Emergence, Evolution and Institutional Efficiency

During the Second World War, about a fortnight after capture, R.A. Radford and his companions reached a transit camp in Italy. They were to remain there for one month before moving to their permanent camp. Very soon after capture, the prisoners realised that—in view of the limited size and the equality of supply (a Red Cross food parcel)—trading goods was a good way to increase their satisfaction. Exchanges started with simple barter, but in a very short time, they became more and more complex. Most exchanges were for food against cigarettes or other foodstuff, but cigarettes soon developed into a proper currency. At the beginning, people were uninterested in the goods they did not want (e.g. a non-smoker easily gave away his ration of cigarettes), but it was soon realised that goods had different ‘market’ values, independent of one’s own personal evaluation. Thus, after a while, Sikhs no longer agreed to trade tinned beef for just any kind of food but insisted on the more valuable food items, such as margarine or jam. In other words, the prisoners of the war camp quickly experienced the development of a market economy, with clear market prices and a common currency. The moral of the story lies in ‘the universality and the spontaneity of this economic life’ which ‘came into existence not by conscious imitation but as a response to the immediate needs and circumstances’ (Radford 1945, p. 190).

This story is a paradigmatic example of institutional emergence and functionalism and represents the ‘dynamic’ side of the instrumental view portrayed in the first chapter. According to this view, institutions are not consciously designed by individuals, but they emerge and evolve as a response to collective needs. For the market economy, such genealogy is classic and dates back to Adam Smith. In the case of political and societal institutions, Hume developed a similarly emergent conception to respond to contractarian approaches such as those by Hobbes or Locke. In his ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, Hume develops a notion of social institutions based on the recognition of mutual interest. Individuals will gradually learn the benefits of society and consider it an individually advantageous good (Hume 2012). Hayek was a more recent follower of this line. To him, institutions are made by individual actions but are not the purposive product of any of those actions. In Hayek’s conception, the regularity of the resulting structure is in fact an unintended consequence of the regularity of individual conducts. Institutional change comes through a decentralised mechanism of evolution, and social selection and institutions embody an environmental efficiency given by their goodness of fit (Hayek 1967).

When moving from economics to political institutions, examples of evolution, decentralised selection and goodness of fit are harder to apply. Even if proposals for evolutionary approaches to political phenomena exist (Kerr 2002), critics doubt that the concept can be applicable in more than a metaphorical sense (see Kay 2003). Formal political institutions have clear origins in individual choices and are supported by external enforcement. These characters probably limit the importance of evolutionary dynamics, decentralised mechanisms and environmental fitness.

Possibly, the evolutionary character will be a matter of degree, with institutional origins in between evolution and formal design. In this respect, contrasts between

the US and the UK Constitutions are good examples. Both are easily attributable to either design (US) or evolution (UK), but nobody would deny the importance of design for the latter, or the influence of historical and social conditions on the former.

In all cases, however, *some* design will be needed. In fact, even when practically insignificant if compared with the long histories of political institutions, individuals can only make their institutional contribution through design. Hence, even with limits, the ‘practical institutionalist’ (Ferejohn 2006) can do no better than focus on design.

2.2.1 *Functionalism and Equilibria-Institutions*

Though evolutionary approaches may not be favoured in the study of political institutions, functionalism is alive and well. Schotter (2008) gives a ‘state of nature’ example for social institutions, wondering how a society may agree on establishing the week. While day, night and the year have astronomical referents, the week is a totally man-made, arbitrary division. Curiously, although with differences in the number of leisure days, such human artefact has diffused almost worldwide. To solve the apparent puzzle, he starts imagining an agrarian society where the week has not yet emerged. Keeping the story simple, Schotter (2008) suggests that farmers produce one type of crop in the countryside near the city and need to sell it and buy other farmers’ crops. Hence, the strategic problem for farmers becomes when to travel to the city to sell their crop. In this respect, having one specific day agreed upon for going all to the city—thus establishing the week—is beneficial for all. Here comes a functional explanation for the establishment of the week, strictly connected to the individual self-interest of farmers.

Similarly, for political institutions, scholars in rational institutionalism start with the idea that institutions are efficient solutions to the problem of actors’ coordination. Rules for taking decisions—typically, voting systems—exemplify such function, structuring a variety of preferences and actors’ strategies into stable results. In fact, while equilibria based on preferences would be extremely hard to achieve (i.e., tastes are in permanent disequilibrium), institutions may induce such equilibria by constraining choices. Formal arrangements, organisational conditions and institutional practices may channel and aggregate individual preferences and simplify agreements (Riker 1980; Shepsle 1986). The solution of dilemmas of collective action is consistent with this logic (Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990). Thus, the ‘reason of rules’ has an in-built efficiency, because players—be they farmers or political actors—prefer institutionalised interactions to anarchy.¹

¹ The case for institutional efficiency has another formidable expression in transaction cost economics. The idea is that economic transactions differ in their attributes because of their uncertainty, frequency of recurrence and asset specificity. Eventually, transactions are assigned to different governance structures (provided with specific costs and competencies) in order to economise on transaction costs. Hence, institutions (i.e., governance structures) are chosen according to their transaction cost efficiency (Williamson 1996).

The question becomes how new equilibria will emerge. The establishment of the week may come out of a kind of social contract agreed upon by all farmers, or it could emerge out of coincidental convergence on a certain day, gradually reinforced by a threshold effect. In the case of political institutions, agreement is the more probable alternative.

Accordingly, institutional change will have a genuinely functional nature. Actors will compare the benefits and costs of the established institution with alternative options and choose the one maximising collective welfare. This means that, in order to pass to a new institution, a change in preferences for at least one actor will be needed. If, eventually, a new equilibrium is reached, this latter will be Pareto-optimal.² For example, a change in the forms of political participation by voters may devalue the importance of local structures and change the competitive strategies of parties. In turn, changes in political strategies can make actors agree to different electoral rules which are more efficient with respect to the new environment and party preferences.

Sealed with collective efficiency, agreements will henceforth be stable until a more efficient equilibrium is found. Shepsle (2001) provides some additional comments on institutional stability, of which two are worth mentioning here. The general driver for stability is that politicians want to have institutions just as signatories to a contract want to have the contract. In other words, they want to reduce uncertainty, cut risks and minimise transaction costs. A second reason for institutional stability is more dynamic. The very existence of institutions makes actors progressively invest in them and select strategies that factor in institutional stability. Institutional change will subsequently entail extra costs. Returning to the example above, a change from a first-past-the-post to a proportional electoral system would devalue the investments previously made in local political structures, and reduce actors' propensity towards change.

Two major critiques can be made to the functionalist view, and they will guide us through the end of the chapter. The first critique points at the dynamic of change entailed by explanations based on equilibria. The second critique regards the place for efficiency and Pareto-superior institutional change when one factors power into the analysis of institutions.

Regarding the first critique, the change dynamic of equilibrium-institutions is one that alternates moments of radical change (the passage to the Pareto-superior option) with long periods of stability (the routine workings of the institutions). The

² The example depicts a typical dynamic in which drivers for change are exogenous to institutions. In fact, institutions structure interactions and individual actions, but change derives from external shocks. This has been a longstanding criticism for such a model, but endogenous institutional preferences and change may be envisaged. At the most practical level, the management of common pool resources is one case where it is possible to imagine changes based on trial and error. This means that preferences over institutions will be endogenous to the action situation and will be derived from observing actual institutional performance. This is a point formally made by Shepsle (1986) in response to the heritability problem objected to by Riker (1980). An endogenous model of change based on self-demising and self-enhancing institutions has been proposed in Greif and Laitin (2004).

critique is twofold. First, path-dependent models challenge the idea that institutional stability will be based on efficiency. Second, the dichotomy between stability and radical change does not do justice to the varied dynamics of institutional transformation.

The second critique is easily made. If we go back to the establishment of the week, even if the preferences of the farmers are identical in desiring to have an agreed-upon convention, their preferences can conflict regarding the length of the week. As Schotter explains, there is no way to predict with certainty which length—that is, which equilibrium among the many—will be chosen or emerge. Actually, the emerged convention needs not be a Pareto-optimal solution, and it may be better for some and worse for others. Similarly, when Shepsle praises the importance of contracts and stability, he notices that, though contracts may be good, this does not hold for *any* contract.

The general point is that even if equilibria may be better than anarchy and hence comparatively efficient, they will distribute costs and benefits unequally. Accordingly, institutions will not come out through efficient restructuring, but rather, through struggles to impose individually beneficial rules. The importance of distributive conflict and the neglect of power in institutional analysis will be treated in the Sect. 2.4. Finally, starting with these suggestions, I will discuss institutional change as a peculiar type of policy change. This will entail the application of the toolkit of policy analysis to investigate the decision process by which new institutions are introduced. This last section will close the chapter.

2.3 Looking Inside Stability and Change

A central critique posed by the model above is that by equating institutions to equilibria and change to Pareto-superior equilibria, the theory is condemned to functionalism and to a bifurcated model of change.

In the following sections, I first analyse path dependence and the concept of critical junctures. Then, I move to the investigation of different models of institutional change.

2.3.1 *Stability and Path Dependence*

One can distinguish three notions of stability: simple durability, resistance to change and conditioning of subsequent results. Durability is compatible with the basic functional assumption whereby rules are efficient equilibria and rule changing occurs when a Pareto-superior equilibrium is found. With respect to policy outcomes, if rules tend to produce certain types of choices in a systematic way (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997), we would expect rule-changing whenever policy change would require it. It is according to this interpretation, in fact, that

institutional preferences can be considered sophisticated policy preferences (Tsebelis 1992).

The evaluation of the new equilibrium will not be a simple static comparison with the existing rule, but it may include the consideration of transaction and sunk costs of the investments made using the present rule. Risk aversion may be one additional source of the rule's persistence. In fact, institutional change regards repeating situations over multiple policy decisions or even multiple policy sectors, creating a high level of uncertainty. In this respect, only after failing repeatedly in the policy arena will actors take the route to institutional change (Tsebelis 1992).

Notice that this interpretation is not necessarily functional in a policy-related sense, but only with respect to the self-interest of policy makers. Unless one assumes benevolence on the part of actors and a preference function fully based on policy outcomes, stability founded on actors' self-interest is not necessarily compatible with a search for better policy results. As an example, a system affected by pathologic governmental instability may be efficient to decision makers who find it costly or uncertain to undertake institutional changes (even when those changes would increase stability).

Concerning the role for institutions in processes of change, the model relies mainly on individual agency. Institutions are not factored as independent variables for institutional change. They do not have an effect on subsequent equilibria, nor do they have an inherent ability to resist change. When actors find a new rule that is more convenient, they simply abandon the old one. In other words, though institutions shape politics, when it comes to institutional change, the relationship is reversed. Simply put, the kind of dynamic implied is one where 'institutions explain everything until they explain nothing' (Steinmo et al. 1992, p. 15).

On the contrary, path-dependent models (North 1990; Pierson 2004) depict institutions as both resistant to change and able to condition subsequent developments of institutional change.³ Path dependence implies that present events are explained by remote accidents, which progressively reinforce their effects and determine a specific trajectory of change.

In its original formulation, an inefficient technology is locked in because of the simultaneous effect of the premature standardisation of the industry, strong technical interrelatedness, scale economies and de facto irreversibility (David 1985). The story starts with the QWERTY keyboard, which has endured the passage from the old typewriter to today's computers, but with no technical reason for it. The story of the QWERTY keyboard testifies that the present positioning was developed starting from simple alphabetical order and rearranging the keys by trial and error to reduce type bar clashes. Clearly, clashes are not a problem for computers, and

³ Resistance alone is a typical character of some 'high-level' institutions whose change is subjected to robust and demanding formal procedures. More generally, the feasibility and legitimacy of institutional change will be limited by a set of conditions typically found in democratic polities (Olsen 1997). Mainly, social and political heterogeneity, divided governments, the plurality of interest groups and traditional perceptions limit the ability for and legitimacy of radical design.

the existence of several patents claiming greater type speed for alternative positioning makes the persistence of QWERTY quite a paradox.⁴ The solution lies in the effects of several conditions converging to create an inescapable path.

It is easy to notice that path dependence is a much more stringent model than a simple ‘history matters’ (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995). To be true to the theory and go beyond general metaphors, path-dependent models should exhibit at least three characteristics: sensitivity to events sequencing, contingency and determinism (Mahoney 2000).

First, early events weigh much more heavily in explaining the path, whereas those coming late may have very limited impacts. Second, occurrences in the path have a highly contingent character, such that theories cannot easily predict final outcomes on the basis of initial conditions. Third, path dependency occurs when dynamics of development are deterministic. Hence, paths enter a certain track and lock in that track by following either self-reinforcing or reactive sequences.

The moments when the path begins are known as critical junctures. These are short periods of time in which the influence of structural factors is momentarily relaxed. Individual actors will have greater room for taking decisions, and their effects will extend in time following a path-dependent dynamic (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Hence, the dynamic of change is dual, with long periods of stability where agency is downplayed through path dependence, and ‘punctuations’, which magnify the importance of agency and emphasise its long-term effects.

Given these characteristics, most long-term analyses of institutional transformations are not path-dependent in a strict sense but only explain long-term causal processes in which events cumulate and have causal power over the future (Mahoney 2000). Similarly, the possible inefficiency of present institutions due to past choices is by no means a proof of path dependence. Path-dependent outcomes are inefficient only with respect to a theoretical alternative model that performs better in some respect (e.g., typing speed). However, switching to such model would be highly inefficient in economic terms. In this respect, institutional scholars claiming path dependence should not only look for detectable inefficiencies in rules but also to *irremovable* inefficiencies. Overall, notwithstanding the importance of positive feedback in politics (Pierson 2004), it seems that a stringent model of path dependence has a limited scope for empirical applications.

2.3.2 *Historical Institutionalism and Varieties of Institutional Change*

Concerning the dynamic of change, dichotomous models based on either critical junctures or stability overlook much of the empirical reality of institutional change. In other words, punctuated equilibrium would not be a reliable model for

⁴ Some inefficient remains of QWERTY’s origins are, for instance, some letters still following alphabetical order in the second row and the curious commercial idea of having all the keys to write ‘typewriter’ on the first row.

understanding institutions.⁵ Responding to this challenge, historical institutionalism focuses specifically on the effects of apparently minor and incremental changes (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Scholars in the field take issue with proponents of both path dependence and discontinuous models of change. Their starting point is that gradual institutional transformations may add up and produce major historical discontinuities. The gradual but, eventually, complete transformation of the House of Lords in the UK from a totally undemocratic hereditary assembly to a ‘champion of individual rights’ is a perfect case in point (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).⁶

In their first elaborations, historical institutionalists proposed three sources of institutional dynamism that were not captured by models inspired by punctuated equilibrium (Steinmo et al. 1992). A first possibility regarded the case of an existing but latent institution that became salient because of exogenous factors (i.e., social and political changes). A second trajectory was given by the conversion of old institutions to new goals. The third case was that of institutions, even without experiencing change, producing different outcomes in the long run in response to new environmental conditions.

In their subsequent elaborations, these modes of change were refined and included into models that aimed to explain how different modes were produced (Mahoney and Thelen 2009). The framework distinguishes three independent variables: the characteristics of the political context (i.e., strong or weak veto possibilities), those of the targeted institution (i.e., low or high level of discretion) and the kind of change-agents (i.e., insurrectionaries, symbionts, subversives, opportunists). These variables combine to produce four types of institutional change: displacement, layering, drift and conversion.

If the political context is characterised by strong veto possibilities, more visible changes are hampered. The typical modes of change will be *layering* and *drift*. Layering is the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing rules, and

⁵ The model of punctuated equilibrium is taken after the idea of palaeontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould that if fossil records did not support phyletic gradualism, maybe the problem was not in the records being incomplete but in the theory being wrong (Eldredge and Gould 2014). Instead of having entire populations changing gradually and evenly into their close descendants (which would entail finding even chains of intermediates fossils all over the globe), evolution could instead have proceeded through punctuations, i.e., localised rapid changes in subpopulations. Punctuated equilibrium is probably the most diffused model of long-term policy change in the discipline. Borrowing from natural sciences is fraught with challenges. Both phyletic gradualism and punctuated equilibrium are patently wrong for political phenomena. It is, in fact, rather obvious that there will be not only stasis and large-scale changes but also incrementalism (with little changes possibly cumulating). Indeed, the punctuated equilibrium popularised into policy analysis stretched the concept to account for both incremental change (not only stasis) and large-scale changes (True et al. 1999; Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Clearly, this is an obvious dynamic.

⁶ To policy analysts, the claim that a series of incremental steps may possibly conduce to relevant changes sounds familiar. Incrementalism is an old acquaintance of policy analysts as the practical way of taking policy choices (Lindblom 1959; Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963). The strategy starts with a margin-dependent choice (i.e., a choice based on existent constraints) and considers a limited set of alternatives and a limited number of consequences. The model has been critiqued for being doomed to conservatism (Etzioni 1967). Bendor (1985) provided a formalisation of the model that clarified parts of its complexity and tested some of its assumptions.

layering is likely when there are low levels of discretion in the interpretation of the target institution. Using layering, one can amend, expand or downplay the scope and effects of the target institution. Drift is a change in the impact of given rules because of changes in external factors. In this case, there is no formalised change, but the effects of the institution may change over time. Clearly, this possibility is open when there is discretion over the interpretation of the target institution.

In political contexts characterised by weak veto possibilities, there is greater leeway for visible changes, and *displacement* and *conversion* will be more probable. Displacement is the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new rules. This is the kind of abrupt and radical change sometimes found in critical junctures, and it is more likely when there are low levels of discretion in the target institution. Conversion is the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment. This comes out of a different interpretation of existing rules and is favoured by high levels of discretion.

The models developed by historical institutionalism have the merit not only of providing a more nuanced view of institutional change but also of factoring the effects of institutions into specific dynamics of institutional transformation. This is important, since the new institutionalism started and developed with a clear bias towards investigating stability. Change has always been a ‘second order problem’ for scholars in the field (Hall 2009). Historical institutionalism is focusing on change and providing a place for institutions in such explanation.

Two blind spots remain in the analysis. The first is that, even if historical institutionalists recurrently refer to power and political struggles in accounting for change, their theoretical models do not factor power and power asymmetries as prominent elements of institutional explanations. Power is certainly present in their empirical analyses, but the main theoretical focus is on how institutions channel, direct or constrain power.

The second point is related. Though the institutional and political contexts and the action of change-agents are certainly relevant, processes of institutional change depend on a much more varied array of variables. In this respect, theories of the policy process may help provide a fuller understanding of institutional transformations. It is a sort of theoretical flip with respect to the institutionalist orthodoxy about institutions determining policies and means treating institutional change as a kind of policy change.

2.4 Power, Institutions and Institutional Change

Acemoglu and Robinson take slavery as a possible example of how structural features of society—e.g., the rents that power-holders can extract from the rest of society—may influence the development of good economic institutions. For instance, an agrarian society may be more inclined toward slavery because human capital in such a society is devalued (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Whether slavery was economically efficient for Southern states in the US or not (e.g., Fogel and Engerman 1971 vs. David and Temin 1979), a functionalist would say that

an institution that endured for such a long time should constitute some sort of efficient equilibrium. However, not one for the slaves.

This is an extreme example to show how institutions may be strongly favourable to some and unfavourable to others. Actually, one can argue that one intrinsic characteristic of institutions is to settle values in a stable way and hence be resistant to counter-values and draw the boundary between inclusion and exclusion (Holden 2006). This character of discrimination has great consequences for how one conceives institutional efficiency and the way by which political institutions are chosen. This refers mainly to two issues: the inherent distributive conflict over institutions and the political struggle to win the institutional battle. I discuss the issue with reference to works by Knight (1992) and Moe (1989, 1990a, b, 2005).

Knight challenges the concept of institutional collective efficiency. His main argument is that: 'Rather than conceiving of social institutions as the product of efforts to constrain social actors as a collectivity, social institutions are conceived of as a product of the efforts of some to constrain the actions of others with whom they interact' (Knight 1992, p. 19). Consequently, institutions do not experience any kind of efficiency-enhancing mechanism of selection or support. Instead of proceeding through Pareto-superior changes, they are the product of conflicts over distributional gains. Clearly, there is nothing efficient in winning the political battle.

Equilibria for solving coordination problems are multiple. In other words, multiple solutions exist to the problem of securing stable cooperation and, once enforced, all can benefit the community. For this reason, the distinctive feature of such different equilibria is their distributional consequences. Equilibria will be Pareto-superior with respect to non-coordination but need not be Pareto-optimal or distribute gains equally. Accordingly, it will be on the basis of preferences over distribution that actors will choose one specific institution or converge on it. Hence, any theory focusing on collective benefits should make explicit the mechanism by which self-interest is restrained. The same goes for policy problems.

The original point made by Knight is that distributive conflicts are not limited to intentional design, but they characterise all accounts of institutional emergence, evolution and change. Even more so, bargained institutions are not exempt from the importance of conflicts over distribution. Unless one imagines a society where all are equals, all contractarian views need to recognise that parties will not come to the contract table with equal bargaining powers. Having time or a comfortable fall-back position can make an important difference in how actors will face risk. Different resources may be important for different bargaining, but the result will always be that unequal powers will produce unequal institutions. The importance of distributive conflicts has been clearly put by Scharpf (1997) and represented graphically in Appendix 1.1.⁷

⁷ In Appendix 1.1, there is a brief note on the prisoner's dilemma and its representation in Table 1.4. It is important to notice that a prisoner's dilemma is a situation where the best strategy is to defect because you cannot be sure what your partner will do. In other words, rational strategies by self-interested individuals will conduct to suboptimal collective results. There exists nonetheless a rewarding cell—that of mutual cooperation—where you will be both better off with respect to the Punishment and Sucker's payoffs. Interestingly, on that cell, you have no distributive conflict. This means that not only there can be ways of converging to the rewarding cell, but that you do not need to resolve the additional problem of how to split the advantages of cooperation.

In a similar vein to Knight, Moe (2005) explores the ‘dark side of institutions’, i.e., power. The ‘near side’ is the positive theory of rational institutionalism, according to which structures produce stability and hence resolve equilibrium problems and collective action dilemmas. The complete disregard for power in such rosy institutional thinking is quite surprising. Coercion and power are fundamental to politics, and institutions make no exception. Thus, it makes sense that self-interested actors will try to enhance their own power in processes of institutional change and that their ability to do so will depend on the initial power they have. However, even when power is mentioned in empirical accounts of institutional change, it is not an integral part of a theory of institutions.

The first critical point regards which kind of institutions the positive theory is describing. Most institutions are, in fact, created in domestic settings of internal governance, where there is no institutional *tabula rasa* and where actors make decisions through existing rules of the game. Social contracts made by voluntary parties are rather rare. People will interact within existing institutions that they have not agreed upon and that they cannot leave. There is no agreement or exit option, which makes for a completely different account of institutions, one where winners in political battles will take decisions on institutional structures and impose them on the losers.

The second point is that institutional stories contending the possibility for compensations between winners and losers are profoundly misleading. First, not all decisions—especially institutional decisions—will create direct gains that are ready to be used by winners for compensating losers. Second, the interests of the competing parties may be zero-sum, so that no interest exists in giving compensations. Third, even when gains exist and games are not zero-sum, costs of negotiation and enforcement will make compensations prohibitive. These features make for institutional games among self-interested and opposing parties, which most probably end up in simple demarcations between winners and losers.⁸

⁸ Moe’s favourite example is that of bureaucracy. Bureaucratic structures are systems of rules that exist for all policy sectors and often accompany new policy decisions. One should expect such structures to be created according to efficiency-enhancing criteria. However, the politics of bureaucratic choice is not one of agreement, cooperation or efficiency; it is one where winners impose structures on losers.

Cooperation in structural choices only comes up between interest groups, politicians and the bureaucrats in charge of the new structure. Indeed, the cooperative agreement will be both collusive and exclusive. It will represent the benefits of the winning coalition and exclude losers, imposing that structure coercively on them. Finally, the politics game will impose several counter-efficient moves when designing the new structure. First, decision makers want to please their constituency, and there is nothing particularly efficient in it. Second, they want to protect their interests from future colonisations. Hence, they will try to insulate the agency and make their procedures cumbersome to avoid the effectiveness of future attacks. Third, if winners are not dominant, they will need to compromise over the structure, making procedures for bureaucratic action even more tangled (Moe 1989, 1990b).

Power-based approaches provide a key not only to understand change, but also to understand stability. In 1976, Herbert Kaufman wondered if government organisations were immortal. Though with mixed results (some organisations actually died), the answer was positive. The reasons favouring the almost infinite life of organisations were manifold. Among them, he reported the political game by which organisations, once created, establish constituencies and actively defend their survival (Kaufman 1976).

Political arguments on stability take a completely different stance from those of path-dependence. While the latter considers events as contingent to the path and hence downplays the role of agency, political models identify stability and possible inefficiencies in purposeful individual behaviour. Insiders will defend beneficial rules from outsiders' attacks. Given the inequality in the distribution of power and strenuous defence by those benefiting from the rule, status quo institutions will frequently emerge victorious. Stability will not be unchallenged, but attempts will fail and not emerge publicly because of agency, not because of structural determinism (as in path dependence). This is consistent with a notion of power intended as agenda control, that is, the ability to shape choice sets in order to prevent the emergence of options challenging the status quo (Bachrach and Baratz 1962).

In sum, it is hard to deny the case for factoring power into institutional explanations. Efficiency-enhancing equilibria sound rather naïve in the face of power-based interpretations. The importance of power has clear consequences on the possibility for an instrumental view of institutional change. If reformers complain for better rules, but new rules conflict with the interests of power holders, the scope for change will be clearly limited. It is, in fact, not a question of having the necessary data, time or resources to design the efficient structure; instead, it is a matter of adverse self-interest on the part of designers. Missing this point means missing the genesis of rules, the scope for reforms and the right strategies to approach institutional change.

When Wildavsky (1961) commented on the long-awaited reform of budget rules, he made a similar point: 'There is little or no realization among the reformers, however, that any effective change in budgetary relationships must necessarily alter the outcomes of the budgetary process. Otherwise, why bother? Far from being a neutral matter of 'better budgeting', proposed reforms inevitably contain important implications for the political system, that is for the 'who gets what' of governmental decisions.' (Wildavsky 1961, p. 183). In other words, not only is power unavoidable in initiating a change in the rules, but the political struggle is fundamental to understanding the scope and results of processes of reform.

The importance attributed to distributive conflicts and political struggles in institutional change will be the starting premise of the present research. However, before moving to the empirical chapters, a refined understanding of how political battles are played is necessary, and policy analysis may add this perspective to the investigation of institutional change.

2.5 A Policy Perspective on Institutional Change

In 2006, Paul Pierson put forth the case that policies entailed structure and hence should be studied as if they were institutions. This meant focusing on policy effects, that is, the structural effects of policies, instead of policy outcomes (Pierson 2006). Similarly, when Streeck and Thelen analyse institutions, they include most policies, at least those provided with third-party enforcement and stipulating rules or establishing rights or responsibilities (Streeck and Thelen 2005).

Here, I believe it makes sense to take the opposite path. Policies with institutional features are decided through the normal process of policymaking and should be studied with the tools provided by policy analysis. If institutions evolve, drift and experience conversion, they are also displaced or layered. Hence, new institutions are established and such ‘pure’ institutional changes are not decided in a different way than that of other policies. This is policymaking, even when the object is a change in institutions.

Clearly, differences between deciding on rules and deciding on policy exist. However, which differences and how they are relevant is something to be investigated. In the following, I focus on four aspects of the process of change: its actors, the preferences they will pursue, their modes of interaction, and when change is likely to happen. This focus will permit us to summarise the discussion so far and highlight the possible contribution of policy analysis to the study of institutional change.

2.5.1 *Who Cares? The Actors of Constituent Policies*

The first point of departure of a policy approach is that it does not rest on a generalised model of change. The analysis starts with the central role of the policy and with the assumption that certain policies will entail the emergence of specific actors, goals, resources and modes of interaction. Our first effort should be to understand the policy of institutional change and if it entails a specific process of change.

The classic reference is the seminal typology of distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies (Lowi 1972). Lowi distinguishes the four types using two dimensions: the likelihood of coercion (immediate or remote) and its applicability (to the individuals or the environment of action). In Lowi’s words, constituent policies ‘work through the environment, either by making services or facilities generally available or by conferring powers or jurisdictions. These are referred to as rules about powers or rules about rules’ (Lowi 1985, p. 74). In his original formulation, one of the examples given for constituent policies was, unsurprisingly, the establishment of a bureaucratic agency (Lowi 1972).

It is interesting to note that before the new institutionalism was coined, policy analysis already had a specific category for policies on ‘rules of the game’. Unfortunately, constituent policies are probably one of the least understood in Lowi’s typology (Spitzer 1987; Tolbert 2002).

The basic assumption of Lowi's matrix is the famous 'policies determine politics', or, the fact that certain policies tend to favour certain actors and styles of decision making. Lowi is mostly interested in the division of power between Congress and the President in the US. In this respect, in the case of constituent policies, national parties—able to govern diffused interests—take the lead, and changes are decided through logrolling. In a revision of Lowi's work, Spitzer (1987) adds that constituent policies are characterised by accommodative, if not collusive, political arrangements.

The idea is that these policies will not raise individual interests or mobilise interest groups and will be decided within closed government rooms among public officials. In other words, constituent policies are 'policies without publics' (May 1991). Not only will there be no strong group supporting or opposing the policy, but also there will be very weak ideas of or beliefs in the problems and solutions to be addressed by the policy. Overall, constituent policies will not raise great collective interest or conflict.

This character of 'process closure' can be investigated further by referring to the classic model of economic regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976). Stigler starts with the intuition of a market for regulation in which economic groups constitute the demand and the government the supply. In his model, regulation does not reflect public interest but responds to economic actors asking for public goods (e.g., subsidies, control over entry, price fixing and other regulatory advantages). In exchange, legislators will ask for electoral support in terms of votes and resources, but they will balance the concession of favours to minimise political opposition. Thanks to the opacity of the political system, diffused interests will have a limited ability to prevail, whereas single firms will easily reach legislators.

The model was formalised by Peltzman. Legislators will have to maximise the difference between electoral reward and electoral opposition. The importance of Peltzman's extension is that groups will compete to capture the regulator. Hence, rational legislators will try to include different groups among the beneficiaries and may not concentrate all benefits and costs over one group. This is reassuring, since any time a group of consumers will be able to raise public interest and offer votes or other resources, it will see its interests favoured by the regulation (Peltzman 1976). In conclusion, information, a strong public opinion and the participation of citizens may relax the gloomy perspectives of Stigler's model (Becker 1986).

The point is that not all policies have such electoral value for decision makers, because they do not distribute direct costs or benefits to external actors. In other words, there will not be a market for the rule and no attempts to capture, oppose or influence legislators.

Not all constituent policies—and hence not all institutional changes—are equal. Notwithstanding Lowi's typology, some will actually distribute costs and benefits outside the decision arena and will trigger political interest and a political market. Others will have no such value. A reform of the powers of the Speaker of the House will probably raise no interest whatsoever and will clearly be a 'closed-door' matter. Conversely, a reform towards federalism in a country characterised by great regional economic disparities will have a clear market (e.g., for the

mobilisation of the prospective regions trying to put forth their opposing interests in the new institutional design). Such differences permit us to understand which actors, if any, will participate in the constituent decision process and try to influence decision makers and their choices.

Take now the case of the MTA. Clearly, citizens want speedier, cheaper, more frequent transportation. Do they want a transport agency? Probably, they simply do not know. They have no idea why the agency can be beneficial or important and, if asked, they most probably see it as a waste of money. The establishment of the MTA is the typical example of a policy with no electoral value. Normally, there will be a ‘closed-door’ process. Decision makers will decide on their own, making them freer to follow their own unchecked preferences.⁹

We are left with a paradox. If politicians are modelled as self-interested and mainly look for electoral rewards by groups, why should they want the agency if it does not provide such reward? I explore the issue in the next section.

2.5.2 *What Do Designers Want? Institutional Preferences Revisited*

The types of actors described by Mahoney and Thelen (2009) are typified according to their institutional preferences, that is, their attitude with respect to institutional change. *Insurrectionaries* want to change rules completely and visibly, without following existing rules. They use strategies of displacement and are typically found in ‘critical junctures’. *Symbionts* rely on institutions not of their own making and exploit them to achieve goals other than those of the institution. Their typical mode of institutional change is making the institution drift. *Subversives* seek to displace the target institution, but they follow its rules and opt for strategies of layering or conversion. Finally, *opportunists* can side both with change-agents or against them. They do not want to preserve the institution, but they do not actively pursue costly strategies of change. Offe (2001) gives a similar classification, including, among others, institutional vandals, prophets and utopians.

The problem with both efforts is that, in being strictly focused on institutions and institutional change, they do not give a wider view of actors’ preferences. Mahoney and Thelen claim explanatory value for their classification, mainly because types of agents are connected to patterns of change. The problem is that the actor type is defined primarily on the basis of institutional strategies, so the explanation becomes circular and hardly helps in predicting change. Accordingly, a more general definition of actors’ preferences is needed.

⁹ Possibly, if establishing the MTA entails a change in the regulatory framework for local transport, service providers protected by the former system may try to capture policy makers, asking them to maintain the status quo or reduce the powers of the prospective MTA. In this case, however, the contiguity between municipalities and their pet providers would not be represented well by the capture model. In fact, the company owned by the municipality does not need to pressure for protection. It will be in the direct interests of decision makers to protect municipal companies.

According to Scharpf, actors can be characterised by their capabilities (resources), perceptions and preferences (Scharpf 1997). Scholars studying parties would say that three main interests move politicians: votes, office and policy (Müller and Strøm 1999). Votes have the widest explanatory power, also because the other two interests can be reduced to votes. Similarly, office-seeking behaviours may be pursued for direct reasons (e.g., connected spoils and perquisites) or instrumentally (e.g., for policy reasons). Policy motives are less immediate. Even though the pursuit of certain policies can be viewed as a way of obtaining rewards (e.g., the market for regulation), one needs to take votes, hold an office and finally decide on policy. The three motives are not mutually exclusive and, conversely, different preferences may cumulate.¹⁰ If we take this varied conception of preferences and try to apply it to constituent policy, which prospects have policy preferences prevailing in the process of choice?

There are three points worth mentioning: lack of knowledge, conflict of interest and process closure. I noted in the previous chapter that the instrumental view on institutions is quite weak. The uncertainty of processes of institutional change is partly given by the fact that policy consequences of new institutions are difficult to forecast. The long causal chain is not only a problem for scholars who want to unravel institutional causation, but it is also a problem for decision makers. If the policy effects of institutional change are unclear, they will certainly be discounted in the calculations made by decision makers. In contrast, partisan consequences (on office or votes) are clear and immediate. When local jurisdictions evaluate a reform of the governance of the metropolis, they can imagine what it means in terms of the enhancement or reduction of their powers. On the contrary, they are far less certain of the results in terms of, for instance, better transport. On this point, they are just like citizens. Finally, if the process is characterised by the 'closure' described above, partisan preferences will go unchecked.

The possibility to pursue one's own partisan interest on constitutional choices, however, may be limited by the so-called 'veil of uncertainty', a non-normative version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Buchanan and Brennan 1985). In order to lift the veil, actors will need to be able to value their endowments, forecast future situations and their position in those situations and try to satisfy their long-term interest by pursuing individually-advantageous rules. Clearly, lifting the veil of ignorance will not be possible in all rule-changing processes. Unless actors find themselves in a primitive social contract situation, though, they will know their present endowments, be able to calculate the effect of the norm and to imagine a range of possible results. Clearly, they can get it wrong, but if the risk is not high, they will probably try.

For example, in 1953, the Christian Democracy in Italy decided to introduce an electoral reform, which provided for the 65 % of seats to be given to the party

¹⁰ In discussing institutional innovations in the US Congress, Schickler provides a varied array of preferences. In particular, he identifies two motives that all legislators will have in common: the prestige and power of their house and the possibility for maintaining their seats. In addition to these, there will be three divisive interests: institutional power base, party interests and policy preferences (Schickler 2001).

which received 50 % of the votes. The party defended the law as a way to solve the problem of governmental stability. Conversely, opponents saw it as a clear political trick, since only the ruling party could take advantage of it. In the end, the Christian Democracy passed the law but got it wrong, since they did not manage to get the needed 50 % in the following elections. Nonetheless, they knew for certain that no other party could ever achieve that result. The moral is that you do not need to guess correctly to have a go and impose a rule with partisan preferences.¹¹

Take again the case of changing the metropolitan governance and establishing an MTA. If this is a new elected tier of government, electoral calculations will enter the reasoning of decision makers. As an example, a party strong in the metropolitan territory may agree to the reform to win metropolitan elections easily. Instead, a politician of a peripheral administration may only see the change as a substantial devolution of power to the central city. Conversely, actors in the regional government may look at a rearrangement towards metropolitan governance as a window of opportunity to expand their influence over local jurisdictions and a powerful central city. Finally, bureaucrats in the department of infrastructure of the city may see it as a challenge to their powers. Clearly, they all can get it wrong, but they are not in complete darkness when they choose which specific rule to pursue. In addition, if the future is uncertain for following partisan strategies, it is equally uncertain for policy-related motives. Short-termism—both as a strategy and as a cognitive limit—will possibly reduce the importance of policy preferences.

This is not to propose a simple model of the preferences pursued in the process. Decision makers will be able to lift the veil of uncertainty, at least partially, however. Hence, they will be able to pursue their own partisan preferences, which, in the presence of conflicts of interest and process closure, may disregard the enlargement of policy capacity. It is up to institutional analysts to investigate how distributive conflicts may be avoided and how policy preferences may be secured in the process of change.

2.5.3 A Peaceful Decision? Modes of Interaction for Reforming the Metropolis

In 1974, Wilson proposed a policy typology based on the concentration or diffusion of costs and benefits. Costs and benefits should be intended in the widest sense and can include office spoils, electoral rewards or the possibility of achieving one's preferred policy (Wilson 1974). As in the case of Lowi, the typology

¹¹ In addition, even if your partisan plans finally fail, you have produced an inefficient—not policy related—rule. Imagine a municipal service and the decision of establishing a system of competition for the market in which the municipality auctions the right to be a monopolist. Then, the decision makers decide to favour their pet service provider and add an onerous entry barrier that creates a significant advantage for the incumbent. For the sake of policy reasons (e.g., improving competition), it is not important that, in the end, the incumbent will actually take the service. In fact, even if things should not come out as planned, the municipality would be left with an inefficient rule.

is not a simple descriptive device but indicates the kind of politics that will arise when a certain policy is processed. Hence, policies with concentrated costs and concentrated benefits will see a rise in clearly identified defenders and opponents. Policies with diffused costs and interests, then, will be characterised by difficulties in the organisation of collective action and would probably generate feeble support. The mixed cases are easily derived.

How do constituent policies articulate the relation between costs and benefits? The first point is that, no matter how concentrated or diffused, decision makers will have to pay costs or collect benefits directly. As already mentioned, 'rules of the game' are in fact the rules decision makers will play and will directly affect their conduct and strategies. Hence, to take a simple example, decisions over the reorganisation of government departments or committees may not warm many hearts, but they will certainly lighten those of decision makers.

If we move to assessing concentration or diffusion, it is hard to give a univocal answer. If we follow Knight and Moe, we can imagine that processes of institutional change will be highly divisive. In other words, constituent policies will be placed in the cell with concentrated costs and concentrated benefits. They will, in fact, produce zero-sum games and fierce battles among decision makers eager to impose their control over new rules. In reality, a general answer cannot be given a priori. If one takes again the electoral reform and the opposing view of minority and majority parties, there can be many possible agreements in which both will be satisfied (e.g., a mixed system with a proportional quota). Equally, there can also be highly divisive options (e.g., a plurality or a proportional system). Hence, in distributing costs and benefits, constituent policies may vary. Certainly, actors will have their preferred partisan option and may try to impose it, but the result will be given by the interplay between the actors involved, their contractual power and the aggregation rule in use.

If one takes the case of a reform of the metropolitan governance, it is easy to imagine two polar options. First, we could have a horizontal compromise among the localities in the metropolitan area with all actors having veto possibilities and equal powers. Clearly, the chosen solution will be limited to mutually beneficial options with distributed and equally shared benefits and costs. In addition, individual localities will need to devolve part of their powers to the future metropolitan government and hence will be affected by a conflict of interest. They will, in fact, need to trade their individual benefits in maintaining their powers with the policy benefits of having the MTA. Even admitting for good will on the part of decision makers, the scope for pursuing policy preferences will be doubly limited by compromise and conflict of interest.

An opposite model will entail a hierarchical decision by a third party imposing a metropolitan government on the heads of local jurisdictions. This third-party actor is assumed to have no conflict of interests, to need no compromise and to be able to explore all possible institutional solutions, thus disregarding the partisan interests of localities. The resulting policy will have highly concentrated costs and will produce a fierce mobilisation of localities. Nonetheless, if we assume the ruler's independence, the possibility of pursuing preferences aimed at enlarging policy capacity will be enhanced.

Clearly, both models are ideal-types, and hence not to be found in real processes. The hypothesis is that the more decision processes approximate the second model, the greater the possibility for policy-oriented institutional changes. In fact, while the coincidence between the policy arena and the constituent arena will limit the scope for change, decoupling the two will avoid conflicts of interests and improve the likelihood of policy-driven institutional changes. I chose the empirical cases in Chaps. 3 and 4 in an attempt to approximate two such models. London is a case where institutional change was managed top-down by the national government, whereas Barcelona represents a case of horizontal reorganisation of the governance of transport.

2.5.4 When Will Change Happen?

In theories of institutional change, the great divide is between endogenous and exogenous change. In the case of institutions as equilibria, changes are almost exogenous. Any time external shocks change actors' preferences, actors will look for a Pareto-superior equilibrium. Endogenous change may be related to the development of new preferences induced by the performance of existing institutions (Shepsle 2006) or to self-enhancing or self-demising institutional dynamics (Greif and Laitin 2004).

Historical institutionalism accounts for both endogenous and exogenous drivers of change. Institutional origins lie in power struggles, but they do not necessarily come out as visible battles for radical transformations. Most of the attention is devoted to endogenous factors, in particular the characteristics of the political context, those of the target institution and the type of change agents (Mahoney and Thelen 2009).

Finally, power-based interpretations, although not part of a coherent research program, would stress the importance of power asymmetries and of strategies of maintenance or conquer of powerful positions. Changes will happen because of external shocks (like an election destabilising incumbents), and stability will be due to the active defence of acquired positions.

Theories of the policy process are not unified, and it would be impossible to provide a thorough summary of any of the existing models. Similarly, there exist different views on how policy change will come about, and they cover, in their variety, most change mechanisms highlighted by institutional theorists. This is particularly true for encompassing frameworks such as those by Scharpf (1997) or Ostrom (2009).

With differences, both punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 2010) and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1988) centre on a notion of policy subsystems, in which there are relatively stable networks of actors who decide recurrently on a certain issue. Subsystems could be intended as policy monopolies, entailing both a certain understanding of a problem and specific institutional arrangements that reinforce that understanding (Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Political systems are made of several subsystems that permit parallel processing of different

issues. As an example, environmental policy will have its relatively stable network of parliamentary committees, communities of experts, administrative bodies, lobbyists and so on. While routine issues will be processed by subsystems, major changes will happen when external shocks hit the subsystem or change its internal equilibria.

Is there a subsystem for constituent policies? By definition, institutional changes are not recurrent and so do not permit the institutionalisation of stable networks or recurrent patterns of decision. They can be thought of as foundational moments, where actual governing systems will be reversed. A transformation towards metropolitan governance would threaten the existing local subsystems of transport policy, and one should expect their resistance. Punctuations will happen when political attention peaks, new actors enter the arena and the problem escapes the tight subsystem network challenging the policy monopoly.

In other words, disruptive institutional change will need attention from the macro system and from actors other than routine subsystem actors. In the absence of a stable subsystem for constituent policies, we can think of the distinction between deciding change internally among the actors already in the metropolitan arena (a horizontal coordination) and those imposed by a hierarchical superior in a multi-level government setting. Such distinction replicates the discussion made above on the coincidence or decoupling of the constituent and policy arena.

A final point worth mentioning is the intuition by Kingdon (1984) that policy change will need policy entrepreneurs. Critical junctures will not come out as an automatic chain process where external shocks will invest actors who, in turn, will automatically respond to changing conditions. The multiple stream model gives great importance to the opening of windows of opportunities, when problems can be pushed onto the agenda. At the same time, windows need to be exploited and directed. Reporting the words of one interviewee, Kingdon quotes: ‘People who are trying to advocate change are like surfers waiting for the big wave. You get out there, you have to be ready to go, you have to be ready to paddle. If you’re not ready to paddle when the big wave comes along, you’re not going to ride it in.’ (Kingdon 1984, p. 173). The point for change-agents will be to recognise the opening of the window of opportunity, find a policy entrepreneur able to push institutional change on the government agenda and steer the process until a decision is reached. Specific strategies can be put forward on this respect, in order to build winning coalitions, collect the necessary resources or manipulate modes of interaction (Dente 2014).

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