

Chapter 2

The Nature of the Serpent in Paradise: *Who* or What is the Serpent?

In discussing the entire issue of evil, it was suggested in the Preface of this book that what is not needed in the approach to understanding the infrastructure of evil is a conclave of individuals from scholarly and scientific domains such as philosophers, theologians, and others *who* are not particularly trained or experienced in encryption/decryption techniques—especially not equipped in the knowledge of encryption codes of the human psyche. Over many centuries, these specialists claiming province in a host of domains—perhaps especially in the province of evil behavior—have given us prolific amounts of speculations and formulations on the nature of evil, and yet, it seems that the encrypted code regarding the infrastructure of evil has still not been decrypted. As cited earlier, it simply has not been enough to state the corollaries, or the clichés or the axioms of evil such as evil is of a psychopathic nature, or in evil is the lack of empathy and compassion, or even evil is bad!

In this sense, another approach to understanding the deep structure of evil is necessary.

The approach suggested here concerns the attempt to identify (decrypt) the psyche's code in the construction of evil intent and evil behavior, that is, it becomes necessary first to announce that there exists, in fact, an infrastructure of evil, and then to reveal the core components of this infrastructure.

In this volume, the decoding or decryption of the psyche's code—a code that actually obscures the presence of such an infrastructure of evil will be presented. An analysis of the Garden of Eden story—of God versus the Serpent (as it relates to good and bad, and good and evil)—and correspondingly to the “what” of understanding Paradise (“What is Paradise?”), as well as to the “what” of understanding the Serpent (“What is the Serpent?”), and then of course also in relation to understanding the “*who*” (“Is there a ‘*who*’ as in: *Who* is Paradise?”), and along with this, is there a “*who*” (as in: *Who* is the Serpent?), are issues that will be undertaken as the challenge of this particular chapter.

Acting-out

In order to effectively approach this problem of identifying the path that will lead us to the point of entering the domain of evil (with respect to its infrastructural organization), it becomes necessary for us to use a compass that will perhaps enable us to unearth, to discover the hidden codebook, the very cipher of the encryption machine named:

The Psyche's Architectural Code—
Its Engineering of the Infrastructural Components of Evil Acting-Out.

Once in possession of this encryption of this so-called Psyche's Code, we will use the essential codes of psychoanalytic understanding to decipher, to decrypt the deepest psychological and structural essence of evil—its emotional constituents, its psychological defensive supports, its level of intelligence that seems to consistently outsmart everyone, its cause(s), as well as the reason for its unusual life span.

We will use the technology and metapsychology of psychoanalysis because despite the failure of psychoanalysts as well as the seeming failure of others (philosophers, theologians) to crack the code of evil, it seems that the psychoanalysts, as the encryption experts of the psyche, *who* as suggested in the Preface and in the previous chapter perhaps will be the most likely to do the job.

The psychoanalytic path we will navigate begins with the use of the psychoanalytic compass of "acting-out." As mentioned in the previous chapter, acting-out has historically been conceived as delinquent behavior almost always incongruent with typical rules and regulations of civil living. Acting-out therefore was always seen as a condition in which individuals can do whatever they want—whatever they *wish*—either based upon an impulse of the moment or, as well, as based upon some preconceived idea of any planned illegality. As a strictly psychiatric definition of evil (as it is based solely on a person's behavior), this definition has proven to be a major obstacle in the thinking about the morphology of evil—about its most basic nature, about its cause and effect, and about its deepest encryption with respect to acting-out and overall emotional/psychological symptomatology.

However, in contrast, the psychoanalytic definition posited another approach to revealing the constituents of evil. This other approach introduced a dynamic understanding of the psyche's instrumentality utilized in understanding the psychology of *acting-out*. This structure of acting-out includes the salient idea of *repression* as the critical variable in the entire acting-out endeavor, that is, to *do* something rather than to *know* something immediately implicates the defensive power of *repression* as the most important force involved in the psyche's process that therefore enables acting-out to do its job. And what exactly is the job of acting-out one might ask? The answer (as was defined in Chap. 1) is that acting-out serves the purpose of *not to know something*. And this need of *not to know something* requires *repression*. In addition, an entire panoply of personality-functioning characteristics, including the operation of emotion (the management of particular emotions by particular defense mechanisms), is also an outgrowth of this psychoanalytic template that services the acting-out need.

As discussed above, the psychiatric descriptive definition of acting-out is one that is entirely focused on the metric of a person's behavior. However, the psychoanalytic model of acting-out portrays the phenomenon of acting-out as one that concerns: knowing, *repression*, conflict, and only finally, doing (behavior). In this sense, the *only* psychoanalytic decoding cipher (*definition*) of acting-out, as it was stated in Chap. 1, and as it implicates *repression* (as well as the vicissitudes of the *wish*), is again reiterated here:

Acting-out is the attempt to **do** something rather than **know** something.

This necessarily means that when a person acts-out the *repressive* mechanism has already been successfully activated. What the person does not want to know is the message to the self; it is a message *from* that person's psyche to the person's consciousness. It is a psyche operating out of, or away from the person's consciousness. It all means that there is something that the person feels it is better *not to know*. Hence, part of the psychoanalytic excavation here unearths a profound connection between the issue of "knowing" and the issue of "doing."

An important but subtle implication of the person not wanting to "know," and about which the psyche then engineers a "doing" thing (so as to accommodate the *repressive* force that has been activated in order for people "not to know"), can, with a bit of cognitive consideration, actually be understood as the person's *psychic cowardice*, that is, "not wanting to know" is the same as not wanting to face something unpleasant that would presumably cause the person to feel bad, or guilty, or shamed, or in some other way, defeated.

The person's psyche is the so-called location where such a connection—"knowing" vs. "doing"—becomes animated. Decisions a person makes regarding the direction of emotion, the instrumentality of defenses, or the reason, or cause for action, are filtered for protective purposes through the filigree of the psyche. Such decisions made by or within the psyche are, strictly speaking, based upon the person's general sense of what that person feels should be, or should not be, seen or known. It is actually about persona—about that person's sense, knowledge, or information that would in all likelihood create untoward anxiety were certain things to be known. It is about depressive, guilt-ridden, and angry feelings as well as about other untoward emotions such as revulsion, terror, and even simple anticipated disappointment that the psyche manages as the named protective gendarme of what its personality job description calls for. And the psyche's job description calls for the continuing message agreed upon both from the conscious as well as from the unconscious mind: "protect me."

Psychoanalytically understood, it is then in the person's unconscious mind (controlled and calibrated by the psyche) to take over and to see to it that this self-same person (through the psyche) makes all sorts of conscious decisions that are perceived to possibly avert danger and assure safety. It is a psyche, that from its "control room" controls the personality (keeping it organized and consistent), controls the person's thinking (with respect to ideological cognitive underpinnings), and more or less controls behavior (based upon what the person wants to know, and what the person does not want to know). Such personality organization can also be

viewed with respect to Freud's genetic theory that relates a person's current behavior to that person's history, all of it mediated by the particular component of that person's mind—the psyche.

Parenthetically, this complex human thinking and feeling process containing both conscious and unconscious spheres, calls into question the typical cliché that assumes that we are all free to always make choices for which we remain forever responsible. Thus, the question becomes: Are our choices really free choices and consciously completely objective? The answer, as previously discussed, is that given the vicissitudes and impact of psychological and social variables, our so-called assumption of “free choice” may not at all be free.

Therefore, in discussing and trying to understand the innermost workings of so-called evil thinking and evil doing, it is the proposal here that considers this entire discussion of evil as one that must concern the vicissitudes of acting-out. In addition, the influence of other psychological variables (as well as social context variables), absolutely and necessarily implicate *repression*. As such, in discussing evil, we must now consider the constituents of acting-out—especially that of *repression*. In other words, where acting-out is concerned, in order for people *not to know something* but rather to *repress* it, means that *repression* then becomes a vital element in the discussion of acting-out and therefore, also in the discussion of evil.

This all reveals that in order for people *not to know* certain things the person's psyche will invoke the power of *repressive* forces. And, in place then of *not knowing*, individuals will instead engage in behavior characterized by a *doing* thing that is essentially based upon trickery (*repression*), subterfuge (deceit), and deception (pretense). Thus, what such individuals *do* constitutes a deceitful trick based upon some pretense that is designed to fool others—but more actually and essentially to deceive the self. To deceive the self concerns the self-imposed crucial issue of the attempt to avoid dis-ease, alarm, anxiety, fear, dread, and danger.

Once a repressive process along with end-behavior in acting-out is completed, the person will now behave perhaps minimally in a low-level delinquent fashion that does actual but perhaps, only low-level harm to particular others (or to the self), or maximally, as in the form of massively horrible acts that hurt others—even great numbers of others.

It is in this psychoanalytic decrypted sense, that evil must be, strictly-speaking, defined as acting-out behavior.

Thus, we are now in the grip of perhaps penetrating our psychoanalytic encrypted definition of evil—or we are now in the actual grip of penetrating the universality of the true definition of evil. Acting-out behavior is different than the nature of behavior in the absence of *repression*. This means there is of course behavior that is free from contamination or free of ulterior motives—free of tricks, deceit, and pretense. Thus, evil, in addition to conscious cruelty and brutality, must also be considered a product of the psychological process of *repression*, and as stated, resulting always in acting-out. All of it also implicates psychosocial phenomena of scapegoating, sadism, needs for purification, obsessive perfectionism, continued assurance of superiority, as well as the cumulative effects of the powerful force of affiliation which, in addition to its useful application, also can be used for acting-out (evil) ends.

Affiliation is an important force because acting-out individuals will frequently need to automatically (unconsciously) reassure the psyche that *repression* will remain intact. Affiliation with a like-minded group of people qualifies as this sort of support. Reassurance is based upon such a person's elemental need to avoid tension, anxiety, and danger. In this sense, as it does in the psychotherapy session, "resistance" to change becomes the main line of defense supporting *repression*.

Evil and the Issue of Personality

Aragno (2013, p. 111) makes an eloquent statement with respect to the deleterious, and of course concrete destructive acting-out of individuals. She asks:

What has gone wrong at the heart of the fabric of their social commitment to provoke a total disengagement from human relations, and what is the marker in the potential for evil in the collapse of the human connection, for this is what we are looking at—the breakdown of interpersonal sentiments so complete as to leave a ravaged inner life and a compulsion to compensate by acting-out destructive impulses?

Of course, Aragno is considering the high intensity end of the acting-out dimension of evil. A low-end intensity level of this evil of acting-out may on the individual level include behavior of deceit, manipulation, and a skilled prestidigitation. On the more serious level of acting-out (as discussed earlier), we see torture, sadism, and a whole host of other grotesque behaviors, ending with social destruction as in genocides.

It can be readily surmised that in practical terms we are looking at a stratified phenomenon. In this sense, there are acting-out individuals *who* remain low-level acter--outers (deceit, manipulation, low-level charlatanism), those *who* remain rather in the mid-range of acting-out (stealing, threat, and aggressive behavior), and those *who* become severely socially deranged. This latter group may not necessarily become what is considered to be clinically psychotic, and yet they demonstrate clear social derangement defined in the most general "Aragno" sense as having the entitlement to create their own rules—even to the decisive point of choosing *who* lives and *who* dies. However, in the face of clinical criteria that would disqualify psychosis as a diagnosis simply on the basis of the criterion of such behavior as cruel or evil, nevertheless, it would not be hyperbolic to identify such acting-out behavior as grotesque.

With respect to personality organization, in order to assess when such evil behavior does indeed qualify as psychosis, we must look at the behavior of the person especially in concert with that person's inner life. On a nuanced closer look, it becomes clear of course that in addition to historical formative influences, such individuals are driven to diabolical deeds also and based largely upon the final form of such a person's psyche, that is, based upon how the person's inner life is structured. The usual clinical diagnostic designation given to such individuals *who* become defined as acter-outers is that of *psychopathic or sociopathic disordered personality*.

Psychopathic or sociopathic personality is a disorder chiefly characterized by what is usually referred to as the vacuous inner life. It is presumably an impoverished inner life in which much silence exists. With such an impoverished and silent inner life, individuals with this sort of psychic organization need to create a steady stream of external stimulation presumably in order to prevent panic and disorientation regarding the absence of sufficient inner stimulation. This is different from the kind of inner life that offers the security and safety of structure readily based upon the kind of inner life that is flush with abundant, engrossing, creative, and imaginative thinking and feeling preoccupation. In contrast, the psychopath will focus on a human target or a targeted subgroup (also including the strategy and tactics to aggress toward the identified victim-target) as a rather fulsome and displacement substitute either for a taciturn inner life, but actually and more accurately for a hushed and muted inner life.

Such focus on creating external stimulation as a balm for the deafening inner silence and overall impoverished inner landscape is one also based on a diseased narcissism that seeks desperate proof of one's adequacy by constant and uninterrupted compensatory acts. This is a diseased narcissism again, synonymous with Kernberg's "malignant narcissism" (1981, 1992). It means a sole focus on all of one's needs, compensatory aggrandizement (usually by devaluing specific others), and by the general acting-out of continuous self-absorption regarding one's impulse-hungers.

Since there is no such thing as unemployment in the psyche, these sorts of de-ranked individuals *who* are seeking such constant and uninterrupted compensatory acts are therefore also constantly searching for targets—all in the hope of satisfying the need for external stimulation as defined by control over the other. This is the perennial full-employment occupation of psychopaths. And even during sleep, the search is an ongoing one. Once such a diagnosis is consolidated—even at a low-level of acting-out—then it becomes rather more possible to understand what Arendt (1963) posits as the "banality of evil." Arendt intends to make the point that evildoing can be achieved by just about anyone—especially since one's psyche is drawn to compensatory and displacement behaviors. It is the question of *who* becomes homogenous with a particular punitive ideology or *who* becomes persuaded regarding any sort of a possible punitive social condition toward others. This is where Kernberg (1981) includes in this conversation about acting-out and compensatory behavior that such individuals are not merely narcissistic, rather they are actually malignantly narcissistic.

Yet, Arendt's thesis of the "banality of evil" still needs more discussion. At this point, it is important to note that Arendt's "banality of evil" is very much a descriptive and manifest definition of her observation regarding a particular phenomenon, regularly referred to as evil behavior. In contrast, the psychodynamic understanding of such "banality" is quite different than its descriptive and behavioral phenomenological characterization. This difference between the surface descriptive level of such a definition versus its presumed (or proposed) deeper well will be presented as we proceed to unfold the infrastructural essence of evil—its core—managed by the individual's psychology and exemplified by the operation of that person's psyche.

In addition, Arendt's "banality of evil" will be further analyzed at the end of Chap. 5 in the main section titled: *Psychoanalytic References to Evil*, relegated to the subsection titled: *Hannah Arendt's "Banality of Evil" Revisited and Redefined*.

The Psychopathic Personality

An examination of the psychopathic personality will reveal that such individuals have really and essentially nothing to do. And even if they are in fact dutifully employed, nevertheless they unequivocally always feel as though existing in an arid place. Because of this sense of inner and abject "absence," such individuals correspondingly seek always to be involved in projects. As Aragno states (p. 115), they are entirely compensatory so that the compensatory state reflects a truer underlying feeling of worthlessness. In order to escape this sense of worthlessness, such individuals utilize a grandiose sense of self as a main ego support. It is this particular rescue mechanism of the psyche that then propels such a person to attach inner impulses for action toward specific "larger" projects—as for example in a larger scale social act. For example, it would not be uncommon for such an individual to participate as a provocateur and/or aggressor in a genocide, or in the more close-up solitary act, as in engaging serial killing!

In addition, individuals *who* are socially psychopathic (for all intents and purposes, equivalent to sociopathic) will likely seek to form associations or to join associations with other like-minded individuals in order, with righteous indignation, to implicate still others as those targeted for elimination. Those targeted will be seen as the inferior ones while the self and the affiliated self-group will be experienced in all of its compensatory glory as superior.

All of it, the sense of inadequacy, the compensatory reaction to it in the form of grandiose and superiority rituals, and the sense of an impoverished inner life—presumably derived from a life of dramatic and almost complete thwarting of *wishes*—necessarily generates terrible acting-out impulses. In place of a normal superego, there then exists a projected punitive urge to punish others, and then in place of the expropriation of whatever can be extracted (taken) from those others, a subsequent inverted sense of justice occurs—punishment meted out to those others. Empathy is then reserved only for the self. It is a blatant diseased narcissism that permits only leniency for the self and sole criticality toward other individuals or subgroups *who* are targeted in the least for exile, and at most, for punishment—or even worse (Baron-Cohen, 2011).

Aragno (2013, p. 113), again eloquently states:

Consider then, how certain primitive defenses must contribute to the deterioration of this primary emotional connection, gradually destroying the very neural threads out of which deep human bonds are woven. For this powerful relational weave to tear there must have to be overwhelmingly negative emotions at play.

Examples of such negative emotions include: aggression, greed, deceit, defiance (for its own sake), rancor, and hatred, all of which become compressed into an underlying consistent presence of *anger*. And it is a steady-state *anger* that keeps giving. For such a cluster of feelings to exist in a repetitive continual cycle, it is presumed psychoanalytically that the psyche in turn also arranges a cluster of defense mechanisms to manage such emotions in a way that permits these emotions freedom of expression. These defenses include: denial, displacement, projective-identification, regression splitting, and symbolization. Although these are what are known as ego-defense mechanisms, it may be more accurate to identify them as emotion-defense mechanisms (Kellerman 1997, p. 323). These emotion-defense mechanisms are designed to manage emotion (in this case, designed to release emotion), or defenses designed to reinforce personality inclinations.

How defenses work to permit acting-out may be understood by the following:

Denial—Permits the individual to operate in a functional way insofar as such a person may then be only persuaded by what they want to see as in the process identified as *selective perception* as well as in the process identified as *perceptual defense*. In other words, you see what you want to see and don't see what you don't want to see.

Displacement—A defense mechanism designed specifically to enable a person to direct *anger* in a transference sense to the targeted "other." Usually it is the emotion of *anger* that is managed by the defense of displacement.

Projective identification—Seeing disavowed qualities of the self in the other that are unconsciously repudiated, and then distastefully identifying with them.

Regression—Keeps superego responses in check thus permitting impulse to be released.

Splitting—Dividing others (other objects [people]) into good ones and bad ones according to the subject's needs. Characteristic of the borderline and psychopathic personalities.

Symbolization—This particular defense is one that enables any person (subject) to identify with emblems or persons *who* seem congruent with the subject's needs.

The Serpent

It is, of course, not far-fetched to understand that the *Serpent* is the surrogate reference to evil. Whether it is the Serpent in the Garden of Eden, or whether evil as defined in dictionaries includes Serpent, devil, and even "sin"—all are essentially one and the same. A random look at any dictionary under the adjective "evil" will produce definitions or characterizations regarding statements of evil such as profoundly immoral, malevolent, wicked, depraved, and the evil-eye seen as one designed as a supernatural force to cause harm. For example, with respect to evil, one can find specific references to the "Devil" (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary* 1995). In *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology* (1995), evil is referred to with its old English "yfel" meaning, "bad, wicked, vicious." In the same *Concise Oxford Dictionary*, the noun *Serpent* is defined as "a biblical name for Satan."

In contrast, evil in the spirit of Arendt's "banality of evil" (1963) is meant to indicate that even dastardly mass phenomena can be perpetrated by ordinary individuals. In this light, the innocuous or ordinary has been theoretically connected even to vast human conflagrations such as the Holocaust against Jews, the Turkish genocide against their

Armenian citizens (of the early twentieth century), and the Cambodian carnage in the mid-to-late twentieth century. However, as noted earlier, the ongoing question regarding Arendt's concept of "banality" will be further examined as our discussion leads to an analysis of what it is that enables anyone at all to be involved in evil behavior.

The psychoanalyst Arthur Feiner (1993, pp. 285–286), also referring to Morson (1986), states that:

Evil usually results from something very simple like irresponsibility, unaccountability, or negligence, sort of looking the other way. It happens, not because we become part of a grand design, or even give in to banal desires, but because we do not pay attention, we simply do not evaluate and exert the energy to make corrections. We then become part of a grand, evil movement as an end-product.

This idea of "looking away" as an example of how one can be involved in the implementation of evil brings to mind the mesmeric idea of "misdirected attention" as the psyche's technique utilizing a high suggestibility index in persons *who* harbor hysteric impulses, largely in the service of malevolent evil-minded ends. Such a conceptualization thereby implies that engaging in activity defined as evil can perhaps also be a function of some latent hysteric personality proclivity of which high-index suggestibility is its chief characteristic. That is to say, individuals *who* can engage in evil or destructive behavior determined by malevolent *wishes* and indeed, venomous motives, may be under the influence of a self-inflicted hysteric so-called hypnosis or even a self-inflicted post-hypnotic-like suggestion. Although this is of course quite hypothetical, nevertheless it is quite likely that such a highly suggestible hysteric process is part of what is involved in the person perpetrating or partnering in acts deemed to be evil. Such individuals therefore, can be subject to joining cults, sects, or militaristic associations; some such individuals would likely be interested in gun-idolatry and would possibly also, necessarily and inexorably, be attracted to scapegoating and the locating of groups to be targeted.

In another sense, this "misdirected attention" is possibly related to taking the wrong path in life, and is referred to by the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (*who* was also steeped in Christian theology). In his book *The Symbolism of Evil* (1967), Ricoeur states:

When we have traced the roots of the symbolism of the Adamic myth back to the more fundamental symbolism of sin, we shall see that the Adamic myth is a myth of 'deviation,' or going 'astray,' rather than the myth of the fall. (p. 233)

Thus, it is the idea of "going astray" that seems related to the idea of "misdirected attention" so that according to Ricoeur, the Garden of Eden story did not mean the end of everything—it only meant that evil, or sin, or even defilement is a side effect or perhaps even an error into sin, into evil, into iniquity.

Ricoeur continues:

The etiological myth of Adam is the most extreme attempt to separate the origin of evil from the origin of the good; its intention is to set up a radical origin of evil distinct from the more primordial origin of the goodness of things.

Ricoeur then points out that the origin of evil directs one's attention to what is deemed to be "the adversary, the Serpent, *who* will become [or is?] the Devil. In addition, Eve then represents an adjunct object *who* represents "that Other, Serpent or Devil." Here, Ricoeur begins to consider sociological variables in which symbols attach to more than one object. Then in a psychologically based reference, he states that the Serpent is representative of a part self-object—"a seduction of ourselves by ourselves...we might say that the Serpent represents the psychological projection of desire" (pp. 256–257). "Seduction," of course is highly related to "suggestion," which in turn contains the important force in the formation of hysteric reactions.

The question this chapter asks is: Did the Serpent slip into Paradise or not? Our answer is that the Serpent was always in Paradise, fused with Paradise, and inextricably twinned with Paradise. Why? Because whether it is Paradise or the Serpent, it all hinges on whether the *wish* is, or is not met. And as noted earlier, even gratified *wishes* can be the province of evil-doers so that when such evil gratification is obtained, then Paradise itself becomes suffused with a Serpentine aura. Thus, Paradise and the Serpent can be seen as transfigurations of one another depending on *who* is having the *wish* satisfied—the aggressor evil-victimizer one, or the struggling victim?

Ricoeur hints at this answer by stating:

In the first place, the Serpent represents the following situation:
In the historical experience of man, every individual finds evil already there; nobody begins it absolutely. (p. 257)

"Nobody begins it absolutely." "Begins it," becomes the operative phrase. And here, with respect to the nature of evil, is the key to our entire thesis regarding the Serpent in Paradise. The point is that all of it depends on the person's *wish*. It must be remembered that the *wish* is the pleasure principle's chief derivative representative in all human affairs. As such:

When the *wish* is gratified, there is Paradise. When the *wish* is thwarted, there is the Serpent. However, now the Serpent's *wish* has been gratified so that Paradise is necessarily redefined as a Paradise needing perhaps uninterrupted pleasure of any sort. In a way, it becomes nature's triumph over God insofar as in nature pleasure gains the ascendancy especially in the face of civilized living that requires calibration of pleasure. It also seems quite importantly, that at least in God's consciousness, he *wishes* both for calibration as well as control of pleasure.

And it all pivots on whether or not the *wish* is gratified. Therefore, the Serpent never slipped into Paradise. The Serpent was always there because Paradise and the Serpent are mutually metamorphosed phenomena—one able to instantly become the other. In the case of a gratified *wish*, safety is guaranteed; in the case of when the *wish* is thwarted, danger lurks. The ultimate question is: *Who* gets the *wish* gratified—the Paradise of God (meaning that the victim escapes victimization), or the Paradise of the Serpent (meaning that the evil one triumphs)?

It becomes rather clear why Paradise hinges on the *wish* as well as on the *who*. It also gradually becomes clear that in the anatomy of evil (its framework, its infra-



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