

SUPPLYING WAR

Why did Napoleon succeed in 1805 but fail in 1812? Were the railways vital to Prussia's victory over France in 1870? Was the famous Schlieffen Plan militarily sound? Could the European half of World War II have been ended in 1944? These are only a few of the questions that form the subject matter of this meticulously researched, lively book. Drawing on a very wide range of unpublished and previously unexploited sources, Martin van Creveld examines the 'nuts and bolts' of war: namely, those formidable problems of movement and supply, transportation and administration, so often mentioned but rarely explored - by the vast majority of books on military history. In doing so, he casts his net far and wide, from Gustavus Adolphus to Rommel, from Marlborough to Patton, subjecting the operations of each to a thorough analysis from a fresh and unusual point of view. The result is a fascinating book that has something new to say about virtually every one of the most important campaigns waged in Europe during the past two centuries. Moreover, by concentrating on logistics rather than on the more traditional tactics and strategy, Dr van Creveld is able to offer a reinterpretation of the whole field of military history.

In this new edition with a new postscript, van Creveld revisits his now-classic text, commenting on the role of logistics in high-tech modern warfare.

Martin van Creveld is a professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His previous books include *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge, 1999), *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (2002), *Air Power and Maneuver Warfare* (2002), and *Transformation of War* (1991).



SUPPLYING WAR

Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton Second Edition

MARTIN VAN CREVELD

The Hebrew University, Jerusalem





CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA

www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521837446

> © Cambridge University Press 1977 © Martin van Creveld 2004

This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1977 Second edition first published 2004 Reprinted 2005

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Van Creveld, Martin L. Supplying war : logistics from Wallenstein to Patton / Martin Van Creveld. – 2nd ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-83744-8 – ISBN 0-521-54657-5 (pb.)

1. Logistics – History. 2. Military art and science – History. 3. Military history, Modern. I. Title. U168.V36 2004 355.4'11'09–dc22 2003069665

> ISBN-13 978-0-521-83744-6 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-83744-8 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-54657-7 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-54657-5 paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this book and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.



To Louis and Francien Wijler



CONTENTS

	Preface	page xi
	Introduction	1
1	The background of two centuries	5
	The tyranny of plunder	5
	Rise of the magazine system	17
	The age of linear warfare	26
	'An umbilical cord of supply'?	36
2	'An army marches on its stomach!'	40
	The end of siege warfare	40
	Boulogne to Austerlitz	42
	Many roads to Moscow	61
	Conclusions	70
3	When demigods rode rails	75
	Supply from Napoleon to Moltke	75
	A joker in the pack	82
	Railways against France	89
	Logistics of the armed horde	96
	Did wheels roll for victory?	103
4	The wheel that broke	109
	State of the art	109
	Logistics of the Schlieffen Plan	113
	The plan modified	118
	Logistics during the compaign of the Marne	122
	State of the railroads	128



vii	i Contents	
	Strength and reinforcement of the right wing	134
	Conclusions	138
5	Russian roulette	142
	Problems of the semi-motorized army	142
	Planning for 'Barbarossa'	148
	Leningrad and the Dnieper	155
	'Storm to the gates of Moscow'?	166
	Conclusions	175
6	Sirte to Alamein	181
	Desert complications	181
	Rommel's first offensive	182
	1942: Annus Mirabilis	192
	Conclusion; supply and operations in Africa	199
7	War of the accountants	202
	The pitfalls of planning	202
	Normandy to the Seine	206
	'Broad front' or 'knifelike thrust'?	216
	Conclusions	227
8	Logistics in perspective	231
	Postscript: Where are we now?	239
	Note on sources	263
	Bibliography	265
	Notes	277
	Index	309



MAPS

1	The operations of Gustavus Adolphus	
	in Germany, 1630–2	page 15
2	The Campaign of 1704	31
3	From the Rhine to the Danube	48
4	The Campaign of 1812	69
5	The War of 1870-1	93
6	German Railway Supply Network in Germany and France, 5 September 1914	131
7	German operations in Russia, June-December	
	1941	156
8	The North African Theatre	188
9	'Broad Front'	218
10	'Narrow Thrust'	219



PREFACE

This study owes its existence to a book, The Blitzkrieg Era and the German General Staff, 1865–1941, by Larry H. Addington, which first excited my interest in logistics. Professor Addington has also kindly answered some queries, as did Mr David Chandler and Mr Christopher Duffy, both of the Department of Military History, Sandhurst. I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Laurence Martin and Mr Brian Bond, of King's College, London, for aid and encouragement. Material for Chapter 7 was made available on behalf of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives by Lady Kathleen Liddell Hart, for whose kind hospitality I am most grateful. Some financial support during my stay in London came from the British Council.

Above all, however, I thank Rachel my wife; it was she who typed out some of the chapters, and suffered for the rest.

London, 28 July 1976

M. v. C.