PREFACE

John R. Searle, who was born in Denver in 1932, is one of the most famous and influential present-day philosophers. He studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics mainly at Oxford. Since 1959 he has been a lecturer at the University of California in Berkeley.

Searle is not a philosophers' philosopher. For one thing, the subjects he tackles and above all the way he tackles them appeal to more than just philosophers. His influence on the entire field of linguistics and cultural studies is at most comparable with that of Wittgenstein — which is apt since Searle's philosophising began with a critique of Wittgenstein. Moreover, Searle addresses more than just philosophical questions. His bold comments on freedom of speech at universities and the attempts to rewrite the curriculum at American schools on multicultural lines have shown Searle to be a brave thinker in public debates. Searle is never one to mince his words in philosophy or public discourse, and always comes straight to the point. For him, arguments are always more important than authorities. Searle often writes as if he himself began each philosophical debate. This may well seem very provocative. Then again, Searle's provocations have in fact paved the way for totally new philosophical developments on several occasions.

Searle's most important publications include *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (1969), *Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind* (1983) and *The Construction of Social Reality* (1995). These topics and above all their interfaces match Searle's three main fields of philosophy: philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy.

Speech Acts also touches on the two other fields. What is the difference between a parrot echoing a sentence and a competent speaker who wants to communicate something to us by means of uttering the very same sentence? And on what does the role played by utterances in the various contexts of the real world depend? Searle answers the first question by recourse to special speakers' intentions; the second by using various rules and institutions. In his later works, these answers are substantiated by incorporation into the corresponding basic theories. *Intentionality* provides a general theory of intentionality; *The Construction of Social Reality* supplies the corresponding extensive theory of institutions.

Searle's strengths are not limited to being a designer of new theories. He is also famous for his brilliant attacks. These are usually directed against whatever happens to be the philosophical mainstream at the time. Examples include his speech-act taxonomy against Wittgenstein's dictum of the endless variety of our language games, his thesis of the primacy of semantics vis-à-vis syntax, and against both Chomsky's view of language and the current fashionable comparisons of the human

mind with a computer, and his robust realism against the pseudo-Wittgensteinian mania which claims all facts to be linguistically constituted.

Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle have been fascinated by this type of philosophy since their student days together at Stegmüller Institute in Munich. There are many factors which prompted them to organise an authors' colloquium on Searle and his theses regarding *Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality* with the help of ZiF (Centre for Interdisciplinary Research at Bielefeld university). One of them is that they simply wanted to return to their previous joint pleasure 'with Searle' — this time with Searle himself. And this has indeed worked out — thank you, John. Thanks are also due to the DFG (German Research Council) and the ZiF, which made it all possible, and to all those who were in attendance. This volume is the product of this delightful event.

Günther Grewendorf
Georg Meggle

JOHN R. SEARLE

SPEECH ACTS, MIND, AND SOCIAL REALITY

I want to thank the *Zentrum für interdisziplinäre Forschung* (ZiF) for hosting a colloquium in my honor in Bielefeld in June 1999. This colloquium was organized by Günther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle under the title *Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality*. I want to thank Günther and Georg for the excellent job they have done. Interesting papers were given on each subject, I responded to each paper as it was delivered, and an hour long lively discussion followed. I am grateful both to the organizers and to the participants for all of the work and intellectual effort that went into the conference. I enjoyed immensely the intellectual stimulation provided by the high quality of the discussion, and I relished the opportunity to clarify, expound, defend, and in some cases modify my views.

In order to set the stage for the papers which follow in this volume, I am going to explain some features of my views on each of the three main topics of the conference. Since the order of the topics parallels the order of my own intellectual development, I will do this in something of an autobiographical fashion.

1. SPEECH ACTS

I first became interested in the philosophy of language when I was an undergraduate in Oxford beginning in 1952. I then thought that the most exciting subject in the philosophy of language was the theory of reference, and I was convinced by the general approach taken by my teacher and friend Peter Strawson. According to Strawson, we should think of referring as an action that speakers perform with language. We should think of reference not as something that words do on their own, but as something that speakers do in the intentional act of referring in the utterance of words. Though I did not realize it in those days, this approach only makes sense within the context of a much more general theory of speech acts. As a second year undergraduate I attended some lectures by J.L. Austin on the topic of speech acts, but did not find them very interesting, and stopped going after a few sessions. Little did I know that these lectures would prove influential for several years of my subsequent intellectual development. After I had received my B.A. I resumed attending Austin's lectures, engaged in long and fruitful discussions with him, and along with Strawson he became the teacher and friend with the greatest intellectual influence on me.

I wrote my D.Phil thesis in Oxford on the subject of sense and reference, and I worked out the implications of this approach in the course of that thesis. My first

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article on the subject was a paper I wrote for Peter Strawson in late 1955, "Proper Names", published in *Mind* 1958, and this later became a chapter in my thesis.

Already in my thesis I was beginning to develop the idea that such speech acts as referring and predicating can only exist within the context of a complete illocutionary act. However, it was not until after I left Oxford and went to Berkeley in 1959 that I began to develop a general theory of speech acts. I stated the outlines of my position in the article "What is a Speech Act?", which came out in 1965. This article expounded in a preliminary way the framework for the complete structure I presented in my first book, *Speech Acts*, published in 1969.

One way to see the approach that I adopted is as a synthesis and development of ideas from Austin and Grice. Austin had a theory of illocutionary acts, but it was still in a very preliminary and tentative form at the time of his death. Grice had a theory of meaning based on the idea that, in the making of a meaningful utterance, the speaker means something if and only if he intends to produce a certain effect on the hearer by getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect. I objected to various details of both Austin's and Grice's accounts, but the overall approach, namely studying speech acts in a way that treated the speaker's meaning as a matter of the intentions of the speaker in performing an illocutionary act, seemed to me entirely correct. My book took Gricean intentionalist accounts of meaning and Austinian illocutionary acts and combined them with a theory of constitutive rules and institutional facts. On this basis I tried to develop a general theory in the philosophy of language, according to which, speaking in a language is a matter of performing illocutionary acts with certain intentions, according to constitutive rules. These constitutive rules typically have the form "X counts as Y", or "X counts as Y in C". Thus, for example, such and such an utterance under certain conditions, counts as the making of a promise.

Years later, when I wrote *Intentionality* I came to see that there was a much simpler and, I believe, more accurate approach than the one Grice had used. It seems to me Grice confuses meaning with communication. By analyzing meaning in terms of the intention to produce an effect on a hearer, Grice treats as identical two distinct features of the speech act: the content and force of the speech act (the meaning of the utterance) on the one hand, and the communication of that content and force to the hearer (the production of the effect), on the other. By giving an account of meaning in terms of intentionality, and distinguishing meaning from communication, I believe I got a much simpler and more powerful theory of speech acts. I will say more about this later.

In the course of writing *Speech Acts* I published some controversial articles. Perhaps the most controversial was "How to derive 'Ought' from 'Is'" (*Philosophical Review*, 1964). In this article I attacked Hume's claim that no set of factual statements about how things are could ever entail a statement about what one ought to do, and I especially attacked it in its contemporary version, that no set of descriptive statements could ever entail an evaluative statement. The basic idea behind the article is that one can create reasons for oneself to perform an action by way of making promises. This is so, because promising is by definition the creation of an obligation. These obligations then exist objectively as reasons for an action by the speaker because they have been intentionally created by the speaker. Because

sentences of the form "x ought to do y" express reasons for action, it is possible to derive statements of this form from statements of fact about the speaker's performance of the act of promising and other such facts. Of course any such obligation can be overridden by conflicting obligations or competing reasons for action, and for that reason the claim that "x ought to do y" is always defeasible by other considerations.

There were a large number of criticisms of and attacks on this argument. I have at various times answered these criticisms. However, it seems to me that a large number of the critics simply missed the point, and indeed it seems to me that to this day they miss the point. Most critics suppose that somehow or other the argument only works if one endorses, accepts, or somehow approves of the institution of promising. That seems to me quite irrelevant to the central issue. One can have any attitude one likes to the institution of promising. The obligation to keep a promise does not derive from the institution; it derives rather from the fact that a speaker in making a promise has created a desire-independent reason for an action. The institution of promising provides the vehicle by which the speaker can undertake an obligation in making a promise. But the institution of promising is not the source of the obligation. Rather the institution of promising, and other such institutions, make it possible for rational agents acting freely to publicly bind their will in the future by acts performed in the present. To repeat, the institution is the device that the agent uses, but is not the source of the obligation. This point is still not properly understood by many philosophers, and I discuss it in much more detail in my forthcoming book, *Rationality in Action*, MIT Press (forthcoming).

After the publication of *Speech Acts* there were a number of questions about speech act theory that seemed to me to be still unanswered. Perhaps the most important concerned the classification of speech acts. How many fundamental types of illocutionary acts are there? I claim specifically that there are five, and only five, basic primitive forms of illocutionary act, or as I say using my technical terminology, five basic illocutionary points. These are, first, the assertive. In an assertive speech act, the speaker commits himself in varying degrees to the truth of the expressed proposition. Examples are statements, explanations, and assertions. The second are directives. In directives the speaker attempts to get the hearer to do something. Examples are orders, requests, and commands. The third are commissives. In the commissive speech act the speaker commits himself to doing something, to some future course of action. The most famous example, of course, is promising, but other commissives are vows, threats, pledges, contracts, and guarantees. The fourth class are expressives. In an expressive speech act, the speaker expresses his feelings and attitudes about some state of affairs specified by the propositional content. Examples are apologies, thanks, and congratulations. Fifth and finally, there are declarations. In the declaration the speaker brings about changes in the world through his utterances, so the world changes to match the propositional content, solely in virtue of the successful performance of the utterance. Examples are declaring war, pronouncing somebody man and wife, and adjourning a meeting.

The taxonomy makes a strong claim about the nature and possibilities of human languages. The claim is that there are not, as Wittgenstein said, an indefinitely large

number of different uses of language, but rather in the illocutionary line of business, there are five, and only five, basic types of things one can do with language. One can tell people how things are (assertives); one can try to get them to do things (directives); one can commit oneself to doing things (commissives); one can express one's feelings and attitudes (expressives); and one can bring about changes in the world through one's utterances (declarations). Such a strong claim about the nature of language can only be fully justified by way of an analysis of meaning. I struggled with this issue for several years in a number of different articles, and I finally got an account that I am — more or less — satisfied with, which I published in *Intentionality* in 1983.

Even before I was able to give a full justification of the taxonomy, it proved immensely useful in various ways. Daniel Vanderveken and I used the taxonomy as the basis for developing a logic of speech acts, and we published our results in *Foundations of Illocutionary Logic*, 1985. Vanderveken has then gone on to publish other books along the same lines.

Some other unanswered questions in the theory of speech acts had to do with the distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning. Often, indeed perhaps typically, in actual speech there is a gulf between what the sentence literally means as an element of the natural language, and what the speaker means by the utterance of the sentence in that particular context. Famous examples of this distinction are metaphor, indirect speech acts, irony, hyperbole, and other phenomena discussed in classical theories of rhetoric. Futhermore any general theory of language should be able to account for the use of sentences in fictional discourse, where the sentence keeps its meaning, but the the normal commitments that are carried by the utterance of the sentence are not present. Such topics occupied a number of articles I wrote in the seventies and these were assembled in my second book on the philosophy of language, *Expression and Meaning*, 1979.

I believe the key to understanding metaphor is to see that metaphorical utterance meaning differs from literal sentence meaning. It is important to emphasize this point, because many of the standard theories of metaphor in the literature claim that somehow or other words change their meaning in a metaphorical utterance. But that is exactly wrong. Precisely to the extent that the word changes its word meaning, the utterance ceases to be a metaphor. An utterance is only a metaphorical utterance in cases where the speaker's utterance meaning differs from the literal sentence meaning.

Also in the course of working on these extensions of speech act theory I began to develop an idea that I have continued to work on since, the idea of the Background. The fundamental claim I make is that any sentence only serves to determine truth conditions or other sorts of conditions of satisfaction relative to a set of background presuppositions, dispositions, tendencies, habits, and capacities generally, that are not part of the semantic content of the sentence. I will say more about this later.

2. MIND

Perhaps the biggest lacuna in my theory of speech acts was that I used a number of fundamental notions, such as belief, desire, and intention, that were simply

unexplained. I just took these notions for granted in explaining the nature of language. But that was like borrowing money from the bank. Eventually I knew I would have to write a book explaining the intentionality of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc., and I undertook this project in the mid 70's, but it did not reach publication until 1983. The most difficult and for me the most exhausting philosophical analysis I have ever undertaken was the book *Intentionality*, in which I try to advance a general theory of intentionality and show how it relates to language.

As a student in Oxford I was brought up on the Ryle-Wittgenstein view that we ought really to think of these mental verbs — "believe", "desire", etc. — not as standing for mental states or processes, but as having some other sort of function in the language. After much reflection, I simply could not make this approach work. There is no question that sentences about intentional states such as belief and desire, if true, correspond to certain sorts of mental facts. But what sort? After much banging of my head against the wall to try to get an account of intentionality, it suddenly occurred to me that I already had a theory of intentionality in my theory of speech acts. Paradoxically, the great breakthrough came when I realized that the fundamental notions in the theory of speech acts, specifically the distinction between illocutionary point and propositional content, the notions of direction of fit and conditions of satisfaction, carry over exactly to the theory of the mind. It should not seem at all surprising to us that the structure of linguistic acts and the structure of mental states should be similar, because one of the chief functions of language is to express our thoughts and feelings, and even when we are performing speech acts whose primary function is not to express our thoughts and feelings, such as assertions and promises, we nonetheless express an intentional state in the form of a sincerity condition. Language and mind go hand in hand.

The parallelism between the structure of speech acts and the structure of intentional states proved to be quite striking. So, for example, just as a typical illocutionary act divides into the illocutionary force plus the propositional content, so characteristic intentional states divide into the type of state plus the propositional content. Thus, just as I can assert that you will leave the room, or request that you will leave the room, or predict that you will leave the room (three types of speech acts), so I can believe that you will leave the room, desire that you will leave the room, and hope that you will leave the room (three types of intentional states). Furthermore, just as speech acts have a propositional content that determines their conditions of satisfaction, truth conditions in the case of belief, obedience conditions in the case of the command, fulfillment conditions in the case of a promise, so, intentional states also have conditions of satisfaction: truth conditions in the case of belief, fulfillment conditions in the case of a desire, etc. Furthermore, the notion of different directions of fit applies both to speech acts and to intentional states. Just as the assertion has the word-to-world direction of fit, and the request has the world-to-word direction of fit, so, in a parallel fashion, the belief has the mind-to-world direction of fit, and a desire has the world-to-mind direction of fit.

The methodology that I had used for analyzing speech acts was to analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful and non-defective performance of the act. But to carry that methodology over to intentional states revealed an interesting asymmetry. Precisely because intentional states are states and not acts,

GÜNTHER GREWENDORF

HOW PERFORMATIVES DON'T WORK

1. PERFORMATIVES AS STATEMENTS

Opposing the so-called "descriptive fallacy", according to which non-descriptive utterances are mistakenly conceived of as straightforward statements of fact solely on the grounds that they have the form of statements, Austin (1962) points out that there is a class of utterances which, despite looking like statements, do not state anything at all and are not true or false, but — in the appropriate circumstances — constitute the performance of an action "which would not *normally* be described as saying something". As linguistic actions they are subject to the so-called felicity conditions. Austin calls this class of utterances "performatives" and gives examples like those in (1):

(1) a. I bequeath my watch to my brother.
    b. I order you to go.

He tentatively contrasts performative utterances with constative utterances which are typically used to make statements, refer to facts, and depending on whether or not they accord with the facts are true or false. As for the performatives, he distinguishes between explicit performatives like those in (1) and implicit performatives like those in (2), which do not contain a performative formula but nevertheless constitute the performance of an action even if it is not indicated explicitly which action is to be performed.

(2) a. My watch should be given to my brother.
    b. Go!

Austin then shows that the criteria by which he had characterized the class of performatives equally apply to the class of constatives, and that the criteria by which he had characterized the class of constatives equally apply to performatives. Therefore, the tentative distinction between constative and performative utterances cannot be sustained. Since constative utterances are at least implicitly performative (and can also take explicit performative shape), Austin concludes that every utterance is performative and that, therefore, the notion of performativity loses its classificatory value.

Austin's conclusion has been subject to intense debate. Several authors (among them Black 1969, Walker 1969, Wiggins 1971, Schiffer 1972, Warnock 1973,

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Holdcroft 1974) have tried to show that his arguments were not strong enough to destroy the distinction between performatives and constatives. Moreover, if the characteristics of performatives apply equally well to constatives, he might as well have just come to the conclusion that every utterance is constative. After all, this is in fact the position taken by David Lewis (1972) who claims that non-declarative sentences like e.g. *Be late!* can be considered as paraphrases of corresponding explicit performatives and argues that the latter can be said to be true if and only if the speaker successfully performs the action denoted by the performative verb.

The view that performatives are statements, which is advocated by most of the recent analyses of performatives,[1] plays a crucial role in two prominent attempts at solving the basic problem of performatives: "How can saying make it so", as asked by Austin, or, to put it in Searle's words, "How do performatives work"? To make these questions more explicit we can say that the puzzle about performatives is simply this:

(3) How is it possible that I can perform the action denoted by the verb "promise" just by saying "I hereby promise", that is, how does the saying — in the appropriate circumstances — constitute the doing?

As for the answers to these questions offered so far, the two basic approaches in (4) can be distinguished:

(4) a. This capacity of performatives is due to the semantics of the performative formula (Austin 1962, Searle 1969, Searle 1989).
b. This capacity of performatives is due to the pragmatics of conversational inferences (Bach/Harnish 1979, Harnish 1997, Harnish 1999).

Approach (4b) proceeds from the assumption that the literal meaning of performatives is that of a statement to the effect that the speaker is performing the act named by the performative verb. The fact that the speaker does in fact perform this act with his utterance is then derived from the literal meaning by a Gricean inferential process usually associated with indirect speech acts. Performative utterances are thus considered to be instances of indirect speech acts. Thus, in uttering a performative, the speaker directly performs the act of stating and indirectly performs the act that he states he is performing. To derive the indirect act from the literal meaning of (5), the hearer might reason (and be expected to reason) as indicated in (6) (Bach/Harnish 1979, Harnish 1999):

(5) I order you to leave.
(6) a. He is saying "I order you to leave".
b. He is stating that he is ordering me to leave.
c. If his statement is true, then he must be ordering me to leave.
d. If he is ordering me to leave, it must be his utterance that constitutes the order (what else could it be?).
e. Presumably, he is speaking the truth (conversational presumption).

f. Therefore, in stating that he is ordering me to leave he is ordering me to leave.

The further idea is that this sort of inference has been standardized so that after standardization, the performative practice "short-circuits the steps of this inference pattern, both as carried through by the hearer and as expected by the speaker" (Harnish 1999). The two assumptions of this approach that are of crucial concern to us here are summarized in (7):

(7) a. In uttering a performative, the speaker implicity performs the act of stating.
b. Performative utterances are semantically ordinary declaratives.

It is a corollary of (7) that performative utterances, due to their literal meaning, can be true or false in principle:

(8) Performative utterances can be true or false.

As is obvious from the reconstruction in (6), according to approach (4b) the semantics of performatives also contributes to the solution of the performative puzzle, but only in an indirect way: it determines the descriptive property of the performative and thus provides the basis for the inferential process that gives the "indirect" act.

Let us now turn to approach (4a). Searle (1989) rejects the idea that performatives work by way of being statements to the effect that one performs the act named by the performative verb. He considers the self-referentiality of such statements as not sufficient to be constitutive of the performance of that act. In his view, the performative utterance (5) is *literally* an order; the hearer does not have to *infer* that the speaker has made an order. On the other hand, he also assumes that a performative utterance has an assertive meaning. The question then is how these literal meanings of an ordinary indicative sentence interact to provide the actual performance of an action denoted by the performative verb. The crucial point in Searle's answer is assumption (9) (Searle 1989: 551):

(9) The manifestation of the intention to perform a linguistic action — in an appropriate context — is sufficient for the performance of the action.[2]

Against the background of this assumption, which I will not discuss any further, the basic question about performatives is how a performative manages to be a manifestion (and not just a description) of the intention to perform the action denoted by the performative verb. Searle's answer is (Searle 1989: 553):

(10) The literal meaning of a sentence encodes the intention mentioned in (9) if this sentence "encodes executive self-referentiality over an intentional verb".

ROBERT M. HARNISH

ARE PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES DECLARATIONS?

1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF PERFORMATIVES[1] AND CONDITIONS ON ITS SOLUTION

Performatives are of particular interest to the philosophy of language and linguistics because of the special tension that they reveal between semantics and pragmatics: any theory of them must explain their *'performative force'*, the (often nonconstative[2]) force marked by the performative element of the sentence, within the framework of a *compositional semantics*. An account of performatives would be easy were we to give up one or the other. For instance, if performative utterances were always just constative in their force, then the grammatical form of performative sentences could be straightforwardly declarative (or truth-valuable). On the other hand, if we ignore compositionality, then their performative force could be given by special conventions of force that attach to the performative element in (just) the performative sentence. But neither option is very attractive. Sentences (1a—c) really do seem to be used nonconstatively (not truth-valuable) — in fact they seem to be used to perform the act named by the performative verb (or noun etc.) that they contain:[3]

(1) a. I (hereby) order you to leave.
    b. I (hereby) promise to pay you five dollars.
    c. I (hereby) declare this meeting adjourned.
    d. I ordered you to leave.

And these sentences seem to be semantically compositional — the meaning of each sentence seems to be a function of the meaning its constituents have in other, non-performative, sentences plus their grammatical relations. We will call this formulation of semantic compositionality, 'innocent compositionality', and it rolls together two separate principles: (i) *compositionality*: the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meaning of its constituents plus their (grammatical) relations, and (ii) *innocence*: constituents contribute the same (range of) meanings to every expression that contains them.[4] A compositional semantics that can treat the contribution of e.g. 'order' in (1a) the same as 'order' in (1d) will have at least two advantages. First, a compositional theory need not explain how such a word loses the (normal) compositional meaning it has in (1d) when it occurs in (1a).[5] Second, a compositional theory will not make the prediction that each of these performative words, and the

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sentences they occur in, is ambiguous, and so it will not have to provide separate performative and non-performative clauses for each such word in the language.

Conditions of Adequacy Any adequate account of performatives should meet at least four conditions.[6] It should explain how performatives: (i) can be normal *declaratives* from the point of view of compositional semantics, (ii) can have an interpretation as a *non-constative* doing[7], and (iii) can introspectively feel as if they mean just that non-constative doing. In addition, a theory of performatives must (iv) explain how they work communicatively — how speakers perform the acts they do, and how this is communicated to hearers.

What are Performative Utterances? Austin (1961) introduced the term 'performative' as a "new and ugly word", and Austin (1962) develops and extends that discussion. Austin never defined a performative precisely, but he gave many examples and made some general comments about them.[8] For our purposes it is important to note that there seem to be two notions of a performative at work in Austin's discussion:[9]

Wide notion: Performative utterances are not merely sayings, they are also doings, where the utterance of certain words in certain socio-physical circumstances is sufficient to perform the act:

(2) a. I do. (said in a marriage ceremony)
b. Kamerad! (surrendering in war time)

Narrow notion: Performative utterances name the act being performed in that utterance (see (1a—c) above).

Both notions occur in discussions of performatives, but the second, narrow notion has become the focus of discussion.

The Problem of Performatives Here is the problem of performatives: how should we resolve this tension between a compositional semantics and a nonconstative pragmatics, while conforming to these conditions of adequacy?

Spectrum of Analyses of Performatives Philosophy of language and linguistics provides us with a wide spectrum of analyses of performatives, some of which have been pursued in the literature, and some of which have not (yet):[10]

1. Performatives are just used to *do* (illocutionary) things, (Austin, 1961, 1962; Searle 1965, 1969; Reimer 1995),
2. Performatives are used to *say* (locutionary) things and to *do* (illocutionary) other things (Austin, 1961, 1962),
3. Performatives are used to *constate* (illocutionary) one thing and to *do*, by *standardized indirection*, something else (illocutionary) (Bach 1975, 1995; Bach and Harnish, 1979, 1992; Harnish 1988, 1997),
4. Performatives are used to *constate* one thing (illocutionary), and by *implicature* to *do* (illocutionary) another,
5. Performatives are used to *declare* (illocutionary) one thing and to *do* (illocutionary) another (Recanati, 1987; Searle, 1989),

6. Performatives are *ambiguous* as between performative and a non-performative readings,
7. Performatives are *true* or *false*, but are not used to *constate* anything (Schiffer, 1972),
8. Performatives are *true* or *false*, and are used to *constate* one thing and to *do* that thing directly (Davidson, 1979).

Here we will briefly rehearse position 3, the standardized indirect analysis of Bach and Harnish, then we will turn to our central concern, an evaluation of Searle's version of position 5, the declarational analysis of performatives.[11]

2. PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES AS STANDARDIZED INDIRECTION[12]

Inferential Pragmatics Bach and Harnish (1979) (hereafter 'B&H') was written from within a certain framework, one we might call an 'inferential' theory of communication in particular, and pragmatics in general. The basic idea behind inferential theories is that successful communication involves a rich system of inferences over and above the information contained in the language per se. When a hearer infers a speaker's communicative intent from the utterance of some expression e, then the hearer makes an inference of the form:

The speaker has uttered expression e
[Mutual Beliefs and Presumptions]

So, the speaker is communicating the message that F(P).[13]

An alternative idea has been dubbed the 'message model' and the 'code model'. On this second conception, successful communication is secured by the encoding and decoding of a linguistic message, where it is understood that semantic (and possibly syntactic) rules or conventions forge the connection between sound and message and the message is the meaning of some sentences or subsentential expressions. Despite its distinguished history, there is virtually no chance such a theory can be right, and we should work to elaborate a conception of communication with a more modest role for knowledge of language and linguistic conventions.

Gricean Pragmatics B&H is a special case of 'Gricean' models of communication.[14] Gricean models construe successful communication as a species of rational, cooperative problem solving. The speaker produces an utterance, with a certain meaning in a certain context, with the expectation that the hearer shares knowledge of that meaning and that context, and is able, on the basis of this information, plus general principles, to infer what the speaker means to communicate. The speaker's problem is to give by his utterance, evidence that will allow the hearer, in the context, to recognize his communicative intention. If the speaker does not provide enough of the right kind of evidence, the hearer will not be able to reliably make the correct inference, and communication can break down. The details of this process distinguish specific Gricean theories, including Grice's own. Grice proposed an analysis of what it is for a speaker to

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EXPRESSIBILITY, EXPLICABILITY, AND TAXONOMY

*Some Remarks on the Principle of Expressibility**

1.

Searle's principle of expressibility, the claim "whatever can be meant can be said" (Searle 1969: 19), is often understood as the postulate that the transformation of implicit or primary speech acts[1] into explicit ones is always possible.[2] This reading is supported by the following claim: "... it is always possible for him [the speaker] to say exactly what he means. Therefore, *it is in principle possible for every speech act* one performs or could perform *to be uniquely determined by a given sentence (or set of sentences)*, given the assumptions that the speaker is speaking literally and that the context is appropriate" (Searle 1969: 18; my emphasis).

The distinction 'explicit-implicit' is often explained in terms of 'conscious-unconscious' or 'intentional-unintentional', e.g. in analogy to the difference between knowledge currently not present and knowledge directly available at the moment. Another characterization of that pair of terms aims at the difference between what is said in literal meaning (explicit) and what is said due to conceptual and contextual relations (implicit consequences and implicatures), that is, it aims at the logical and pragmatic preconditions that are necessary for what is said being in effect or valid (presuppositions).

Concerning the pragmatic role of utterances which has to be inferred primarily from the context, I will not use the terms 'explicit' and 'implicit' in the first sense, but rather in the second. For example the utterance "You stand on my foot" is usually treated as a demand and not as a statement, and the illocutionary role of that utterance is explicated correspondingly. Here the distinction between explicit and implicit coincides at least partly with the distinction 'clear/distinct' vs. 'unclear/indistinct' or between 'unambiguous' vs. 'ambiguous'. Accordingly, a speech act is implicit if what the speaker means by a corresponding utterance is not unmistakably accessible from its form. A paradigmatic case is irony. Explicating a speech act means nothing else than giving the utterance an unmistakable form — at least with respect to the given situation. In this sense, the principle of expressibility states that such an explication is always possible by choosing the explicit performative form of the speech act. Austin calls such a form "the normal or standard form". For Searle explicit performative speech acts take the following

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form: *F(p)* where *F* stands for an explicit performative verb ("illocutionary force indicating devices") that represents the corresponding illocutionary force, and *p* stands for the propositional content of the speech act ("it takes expressions for propositions"). Here the words are used in their literal meaning (Searle 1969: 31; Searle 1975: 1). According to Searle, this form is the 'real' object of the theoretical analysis of speech acts. In effect, the principle of expressibility works as a translation thesis: It is always possible to translate the normal language into a kind of an ideal language that does not leave space for misunderstandings because of its standardization. This is the methodical role of the principle of expressibility: If the principle holds, it is sufficient to examine the linguistic expressions in order to grasp the meaning of utterances.

If the principle of expressibility is interpreted as the claim that all speech acts can be made explicit in the sense explained, then one faces the following question: Is the principle not restricted by the fact that most of our speech acts really are 'implicit' in some way or other and by the fact that there are even certain implicit or indirect speech acts or illocutionary roles that cannot be performed at all if we would make them explicit? It is reasonable to understand the principle of expressibility not only as a claim of the semantic equivalence of implicit and explicit expressions for the purpose of analysis, but also as a claim of a pragmatic equivalence of implicit and explicit utterances in concrete situations? Standard counterexamples against the claim for pragmatic equivalence of implicit and explicit speech acts and therefore against the principle itself are apparently 'lying', 'offending' and 'hinting'.[3] If I want to offend someone, I will miss my intent if I say "Hereby I offend you!" Such an utterance is not an offence. If I tell someone explicitly that I am lying to him, then there is no lying at all. The same holds for hinting. In those cases an explicit expression prevents the success of the speech act.

Searle is right, however, not to be moved by such considerations. Implicit speech acts do not contradict the principle of expressibility. One reason for that is that the principle does not fix the addressee of the explication, it merely states that one can explicate what was (implicitly) meant. The addressee must not be identical with the hearer. When I explain my behaviour to someone by using the words "I lied to Miller" I also make my speech act explicit. Nevertheless, to Miller I lied. The difference between the two kinds of explication is that in the case of "direct lying" the addressee is the "target" of the speech act, while in the second case he is my "peer". This differentiation is irrelevant for the principle of expressibility.

Second, it is not in any case reasonable to make the speech act explicit to everyone if it is to have success Theoretically, this is not too relevant. The circumstance that a speech act does not lead to the intended outcome (for example that the addressee is offended) if it is made explicit to the addressee, does not affect the possibility of the explication. With respect to the intended result, the use of explicit performative verbs or any other explication of the speech act could be a pragmatic mistake.

Third, one should not confuse performing a speech act with reflecting upon it, and reflecting upon it with explicating it.

2. EXPLICATION AS THE ASSIGNMENT OF A SYNTACTIC FORM

If possible 'misunderstandability' or 'partial incomprehensibility' is a condition for a given utterance to be implicit, then 'making it explicit' means nothing else than making the utterance unambiguous or fully comprehensible. That means to give the utterance a certain syntactic form — the so called 'normal or standard form'. This form will make explicit the illocutionary role (i.e. the modus of the utterance), its propositional content (reference and predication), and the conditions for its fulfilment or 'happiness' (Austin). Disregarding the difficulties with this imagined separation between modus and content, and provided that the explication of the propositional content does not produce any problems, the question still remains whether every illocutionary role could be syntactically represented. Searle claims that there is a kind of correspondence principle between semantics and syntax. He thinks that "basic semantic differences are likely to have syntactical consequences" (Searle 1975: 1). Therefore it seems reasonable to look for semantic differences if there are syntactic ones. The question is whether there is an unambiguous explicit performative, conventional verbalization for every illocutionary role, which captures the semantic differences only by linguistic expressions. Is it possible to state the illocutionary role of an expression in a *context-invariant manner* by giving its explicit performative form, despite the different ways of using expressions?

The question presupposes the existence of such an expression. But let us ask first if there are explicit speech acts in the sense of unmistakable utterances at all. The answer is: yes and no. We usually understand what other people mean. We know the fulfilment conditions of their speech acts, we are able to judge the consequences, e.g. what social facts are produced by, and which commitments and entitlements arise from the performance of these speech acts for speakers and hearers. Understanding is indicated then by the proper continuation of either a discourse or a common action, or in the following or resulting actions (for example positive or negative sanctions, or simply the absence of inadequate reactions). The corresponding criteria of correctness and adequacy are normally not expressed, but they are known (implicitly or practically) due to the fact that we participate in a collective practice. If intelligibility is a sufficient condition for explicitness then there exist explicit speech acts in the sense of the concept of understanding mentioned. However, explicitness in this sense does not depend on a certain syntactic form of the utterances, e.g. the standard form of speech acts.

On the other hand, misunderstanding can never be completely excluded, even if the explicit performative form (or standard form) of speech acts is used. Therefore the question whether there exists explicit and therefore unmistakable speech acts has a negative answer. The reason is this: explicating a given utterance in order to make it understandable is to explain what can be done with it in a given context, what follows from it (logically *and* pragmatically), what counts as reason for it, what is regarded as proper response etc. That is, explicating an utterance means to explain how it is embedded into a given familiar practice.

Speech act theory wants to "translate" the utterance into its explicit performative form and state the corresponding rules for the proper and meaningful use of these linguistic forms (Searle) or its "conditions of happiness" (Austin).[4] However, can