

PREFACE

On bringing this encyclopedia of learning in phenomenology to the public, I want to express my warm thanks to our colleagues who have lent me their support by enlisting in the editorial board of this undertaking, as well as to all our contributors, who by their dedicated effort have made this project happen. The worldwide scope of their expertise and the high level of scholarship make it manifest that phenomenology is present and well grounded around the world.

The fact that the majority of our contributors are longtime participants in the work of the World Phenomenology Institute manifests the Institute's extensive and profound work and makes this encyclopedia of learning in phenomenology its crowning natural accomplishment.

So far unique in its kind, our guide is meant to offer a survey in depth of phenomenological learning. It is meant for the scholar in phenomenology as well as for the scholarly layman. It presents the complete body of learning/scholarship in phenomenology. A Glossary of Terms aids the general reader.

Here is the harvest of a hundred years. In these seven hundred some pages we have traced in in-depth specialized studies the course that the phenomenological inspiration of Edmund Husserl took in his followers and goes on taking. We have done this pinpointing the main assumptions of the Husserlian endeavor, tendencies, and aims while marking the turning points of their unfolding. Great attention is given to the main thinkers who came after Husserl, to their own original developments of his thinking in various directions. Lastly, great attention is paid to the ways in which phenomenology has informed, enlivened, influenced the fields of knowledge whether in the humanities or in the sciences.

We owe the reader some explanation of our roster of subjects and philosophers. I hope that all of the classical phenomenological thinkers of the first wave of phenomenology have been mentioned in appropriate places; we have chosen for a special individual entry only a few, namely, those whose influence remains alive and actual in contemporary phenomenological reflection. From the second wave of the phenomenological efflorescence, we have given an individual entry to all of the thinkers who made a substantial contribution to the field or exercised a major influence in their cultural area, while others have been mentioned in appropriate places in either specialized studies or in an account of phenomenology in

their nation. These may be located using the Index of Names.

As a matter of fact, we are not giving a general survey of phenomenological life in all countries. For that one may consult the last quarter century's issues of our journal *Phenomenological Inquiry* (formerly *Phenomenology Information Bulletin*). Here are covered, first, the most significant areas like Germany, the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc. secondly, those countries that have now emerged from Soviet domination (e.g., Georgia, Latvia, Slovakia), and then places we have not presented before, like India. I hope that all will find themselves in an appropriate entry.

Our view of phenomenology is very inclusive and broad, including all the allegiances of the scholars who feel an affinity with it. However, it should be understood, as I point out briefly in the Introduction, that in this allegiance there are several "circles" or rings to be distinguished, according to the clarity found of an at least immanent awareness of following more or less essentially phenomenology's procedures for achieving legitimate recognitions. Not every type of description complies with the rules of phenomenological description. The all-overriding call of Husserl is that we clarify as closely as possible what we are doing philosophically.

The volume will offer all necessary references for research and probing in phenomenology. But this is not its only or even main task.

Amid the diverse sweep of doctrines, approaches, views that claim allegiance to phenomenology, it is of paramount importance for a researcher or student of phenomenology to have guidelines that he may orient himself/herself in this field, in order to find proper bearings and phenomenology's authentic significance in the history of philosophy, its present aims, and inspirations too for pursuing it further.

It is my hope that owing to the effort of our enthusiastic participants in this substantial work it will be easier to locate phenomenology's place among the philosophical influences feeding our thought and culture and to propel it on a promising, fecund course. The seminal ideas which came to light should stimulate the philosophical imagination and lead to a phenomenological revival.

Thanks are due to the special people who were instrumental in carrying this project to its completion. First of all I owe great appreciation to Dr. Claire Ortiz

Hill, who with her great expertise has prepared the text of the book for publication and lent her judicious advice; Jeff Hurlburt, my assistant, gave invaluable assistance in the logistics of the project, with the aid of Louis Houthakker.

Lastly, I thank Robert J. Wise and Ryan Walther for their editing roles. To all of them I present my warmest thanks.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka

INTRODUCTION: PHENOMENOLOGY AS THE INSPIRATIONAL FORCE OF OUR TIMES

1. ITS SEMINAL INTUITIONS AND DYNAMIC

1.1. *Tracing the Roots*

“Phenomenology” is a term that has acquired varied meaning over the course of the last century, beyond those meanings already put into circulation by Lambert and Hegel. A multiplicity of theories, concepts, ideas are held to legitimately bear the name phenomenology. Those who advance them all claim that they are in some or other fashion, more or less directly, true adherents of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl. Certainly the schools of thought that Husserl inspired came to powerfully influence twentieth-century learning and culture.

As it unfolded over the course of the last hundred years, Husserlian-inspired phenomenology has thrown light on ignored corners of reality and experience, reformulated the great philosophical questions, and penetrated thought in almost all philosophy and all the fields of scholarship. It has changed our ways of seeing the world, interacting with each other, envisaging life. The very cultural climate of the Occident has been changed, and this way of thinking has made inroads in the rest of the world as well.

But at the same time there has occurred a cross-fertilization of phenomenology and numerous other philosophical approaches with the result that ideas of Husserlian inspiration have been transformed just as they transformed thought. They have even been exchanged for other insights. Together, but hardly in conjunction, Husserl’s followers have managed to obscure just what phenomenology proper is and just what is marginal or tangential to its informing insights.

The very foundational principles laid down by Husserl himself came to differ over his lifetime so that phenomenology may be said to have two fonts, one in Göttingen and another at Freiburg im Breisgau. The early followers and adherents, most prominently Scheler, continued in their own direction even as their master developed a new line of thought. The major thinkers who quaffed directly from the Husserlian stream—Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty—all reinterpreted or even questioned this or that aspect of his thought. The developers of still further lines of thought of Husserlian cast—Ricoeur, Gadamer, Derrida, Levinas—along with all the numerous interpreters and partial adherents have made it quite difficult to divine what phenomenology is and what it is not. And while the many avenues of research in which phenomenology has

been applied have enriched the field, this too has had the effect of confusing the picture we have of it. The borderlines are blurred.

What are the criteria for deciding what thought is phenomenological? What identifies phenomenology even in its avatars? We attempt in this volume to cover the worldwide spread of phenomenology, its adaptations, transformations, fields of investigation, as much as the format of a one-volume encyclopedia of learning will allow. But what is phenomenology? The present book, composed of contributions from numerous scholars from around the world aims at answering that and other questions.

1.2. *The Parameters of Phenomenology as Aimed at a Universal Science*

If we ask ourselves what phenomenology is, as a philosophical discipline, doctrine, point of view, “method,” we first ask after its foundational ideas and the direction of its research. At its core the project of phenomenology is an attempt to reach reality in a way that neither subsumes it within general concepts nor reduces it to elements. It is an attempt to make reality foundational and thought immediate, the better to focus and raise sites, to see reality in the round. Thus may the entire horizon of human interrogation and reflection on the world, life, and the human place and role in it find legitimate ground and be linked.

Husserl’s project emerged in a certain cultural area in which such foundations appeared to him to be of paramount significance. Husserl repudiated psychology’s claim to have brought all inquiry into its domain. And he rejected the naturalistic bent of the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. Neither the world nor its comprehension are captured by these points of view, he protested.

Such a concept of philosophy as was his was not new. Leibniz had dreamed of a philosophical foundation for all knowledge, a *mathesis universalis*. This project also corresponds to Aristotle’s “*philosophia prima*,” which stands prior to all the sectors of philosophical investigation.

Husserl’s itinerary sets us on a historical path. In this encyclopedia of phenomenological learning we take up first the sources of his inspiration, in particular the crystallizing effect the thought of Franz Brentano had on him. By beginning with his initial mathematical investigations and proceeding to his challenge to the psychologism, neopositivism, and materialism that then dominated thought, and following the publication of his major works, and covering the explorations of his posthumously published

manuscripts, we can retrospectively delineate phenomenology's unfolding and search out its intrinsic dynamisms.

The phenomenological method layed down by Husserl involves a certain unique attitude of mind, namely, the avoidance of inductive reasoning from facts, speculative spinning of reasons and causes. Phenomenological inquiry is properly "descriptive," sticking as closely as possible and solely to what is *given* to intuition in a manifestation. This descriptive principle has been of great import in the scholarship of the twentieth century from the humanities to the hard natural and laboratory sciences. A qualification must be insisted on, however. Not every description of a datum would qualify as phenomenology under examination. A key insight of original and foundational Husserlian thought is that in our inquiry we have to differentiate clearly the level of intuition with which we are dealing and we have as well to suspend all preconceived ideas and explanations of data, of givenness, adhering as closely as possible to them as they are in themselves. These are the criteria by which Husserlian phenomenology seeks to legitimate the results obtained by an inquiry. Here is the crucial and most difficult point for the researcher.

As Husserl proceeded he sought to found the given at deeper and deeper levels, establishing novel frameworks of legitimation as he went: eidetic, transcendental, the lifeworld, intersubjectivity, bodily participation in the constitutive process, etc.

We may situate cadres of his followers in accord with these stages. Reinach, Pfänder, Geiger, disciples of his Göttingen years, and Scheler, an adherent of his Munich years, could only be perplexed when, after his moving to Freiburg, their teacher turned from upholding the absolute objectivity of the essential structure of things to an exclusive focus on their constitution in subjectivity.

The death of Husserl in 1938 and the cogency that his capital work *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (brought to the reading public only in 1954) acquired with the staggering questions raised by World War II ushered in what was arguably phenomenology's most vigorous period. The setting up of the Husserl Archives at Louvain by Herman Leo Van Breda, and the program of publishing critical editions of his work provided all with better access to the master's thought at a time when they especially sought it. This was a period of reception, assimilation, and interpretation, which went in a wave across the globe as Husserl's works were translated into other languages.

The progress of the main stream of phenomenological thought from that time can be followed in the *Phenomenologica* book series and other dispersed publications.

We can see how the attention of Husserl's followers and interpreters shifted sharply from the eidetic analysis of regional ontologies to constitutive analysis of the structure of consciousness. To this period we devote careful attention in this volume for it was transcendental phenomenology that was received around the world. This is the era of the major interpreters/innovators, of Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Paci, etc.

In all this there is to be discerned a kernel of what I would call "authentic phenomenology" or "phenomenology proper" which sustains the diverse range of work now being undertaken in the field, which kernel allows divergent thinkers to remain conversant and allows work at the margins to identify with the source. What constitutes this kernel of intuition, this touchstone that makes scholarly—and not merely philosophical—explorations phenomenological?

But attempting to follow a historical line in phenomenology is almost impossible. Too many different undertakings occurred at the same time. Yet a tentative attempt at a coherent history must be made, if only to bring out the most original developments of this thought. A particular focus here will be on those contributions that are significant for this philosophy's engagement with life.

As it happens, phenomenology's first platform, that of the eidetic investigation of objects, realities, as undertaken by Husserl's Göttingen students, already opened the field of the world and life commitments. The last platform, that of the lifeworld allowed phenomenology to embrace all fields of scholarship.

This is seen in his Prague lecture on the crisis of European culture and the manuscripts deposited at Louvain that expand on it. With the publication of that treatise, a deliberate plunge was made into the intersubjectivity of the lifeworld. This theme brought to Husserl a new wave of followers.

This new focus of Husserl's thought, the genetic analysis of the lifeworld, was still not the final phase of his thought. The posthumous piecemeal processing and publishing of the final reflections of his inedita, in which we see a last breakthrough to empiria, sparked yet new interest. Therein he took up the themes of intersubjectivity and the body, which broke into the realm of the natural sciences and physiology.

Observations of the late Husserl support the phenomenology of life that has emerged and blossomed in the last quarter century into a full phenomenology of life "integral and scientific."

Likely we now have a picture of what I call the integral Husserl. Still any totalizing attempt to bring together the various phases of his reflection in an articulated

schema is counterindicated by its own probing nature. And yet there runs through the various phases the thread of the iron necessity of the logos. Each stage of his thought seems to have been for him a springboard for inquiry in a more profound direction. Here is not that kind of speculative thinker who seeks to unify his various insights. Husserl follows an analysis to an obvious end and then takes up deeper questions. Any picture of the integral Husserl will necessarily trace this developmental sequence without providing apparent links between its phases. But the planes of the human reality are intrinsically legitimated in that sequence, for Husserl adjusted his assumptions as he went without dismissing any set of them. He might call the regional ontologies “naive” as they stand alone, but he never disclaimed the eidetic insight through which we distinguish objects. He tacitly included it in the ascending noetic steps in the process of originating and forming the ideal structures of beings as they are constituted in the subjective, transcendental processes of the intellect. And then he immersed the singular mind with its set of constitutive procedures within the intersubjective lifeworld. The concatenations of the lifeworld open yet another field of investigation, but the nature of the constitutive process in the singular individual mind remains valid, however much apprehension of the reality of the lifeworld modifies appreciation of it.

It is not only the validity of each phase of phenomenology that is preserved but also the promise each offers. This inquiry into reality, the human being, the world effectively retains its assumptions as it proceeds even as it stepwise supersedes them. It rejects earlier work only in the sense that it digs deeper furrows into reality as successive layers of that reality become intuitively visible.

Here Husserl’s followers have to consider that phenomenology presents a vast field of investigation that, depending on the point taken as a starting point, takes different approaches to givenness, reality, the human being, and the procedures of thought. It embraces all of the traditionally distinguished branches of philosophy and contemporary schools of thought. Above all, this project advances beyond a fixation on inner subjectivity and engages the societal and ethical.

Even though the pursuit of a *mathesis universalis* so pronounced in the work of the Göttingen School became attenuated with the shift in Husserl’s attention to consciousness and vanishes from sight, its germ was not extinguished. It set the inquiry on a course that was self-prompting in its further stages, and as we will see, at a certain point this course came full-fledgedly into its own.

Following its stages we discover the rational framework of a philosophy that ever expands its horizon. The

searchlight of this quest for the originary—if not absolute—foundational reality leads one along a progressive line of logico necessity.

1.3. *Intuitive Insight and its Spheres: Its Intrinsic Dual Dynamism*

In seeking to define the nature of phenomenology, we must begin by stating the primordial role of intuition. In wending through the maze of intuitions at play in phenomenological praxis in search of authentic phenomenology, we bring out what Husserl so forcefully insisted on, namely, the *primordial givenness* of the objective correlates of our intuitions, which givenness owes nothing to theory, viewpoint, tendency, or any sort of preconception and is to be relied upon in itself, in its “bodily selfhood.”

What indeed distinguishes phenomenology from any other field of investigation is above all its autonomy. Owing to this independence from preconceptions, phenomenology stands on its own turf at all the levels of its inquiry. What then comes to fore is a plurality of intuitions, each sustaining a level of “intuitive visibility.” Evident in all the phases of Husserl’s philosophical reflection is an absolute faith in intuition, that is, in every type of intuition in which the givenness of objects in the essential objective realm and in their intricacies are thematized within a specific network and so establish themselves on a new platform of investigation.

Thus, “thematization” occurs as the spontaneous moment of intuition of evidence and the object’s final presencing of itself are identical. Then a proper conceptual sense is sought. The given is then received. The system of consciousness that Husserl, in accord with the nature of subjective acts, calls “intentional” and “transcendental” refers to its essential correlates intuitively. The objective correlates are now given in intentional garb, without objective forms being altogether abandoned.

The subjective intentional perspective of this investigation radically changes the horizon of the initial eidetic phenomenological search after the basis of reality: from the great spread of reality at the level of its objective, already made up structures, we plunge into the vast field of consciousness, for these structures appear within subjective acts in which they are first objectified in their being apprehended by the mind.

To thematize this insight of intentional objectification a new system had to be devised. In asking after the origin of the “objective” level of reality, we enter the whole realm of the intentional constitutive nature of consciousness in which objects are originally brought to us. There

their presence is sustained for us in a unique but universal subjective fashion, a presence that is meant to correspond to the actual reality. Such a platform of a rational intuitive nature is the very life of conscious being. The multilevel basic intuitive insight of the constitutive procedure of consciousness is characterized by its subjective intentional nature. That involves a dynamic prompting of its own that advances forward as the various moments of its making hook, intertwine, fuse, intergenerate, moving toward completion. An intrinsic concatenation of constitutive moments is revealed at different intuitive levels to complete the singular images. From one fragment of intentional inquiry we are drawn to its adjacent intrinsically indicated or motivated step. Thus, intentional inquiry, or inquiry into the intentional laws of constitution, is a dual “objective/subjective” (noematic-noetic), phenomenon a dual dynamic stream.

Two channels of self-generating forces—objective and subjective—roll forward, one proceeding from the concatenations of constitution on the objective side and the other proceeding from the nature of the subjective intentionality at work in that constitution; as two sides of the same coin their dynamic prompts the process to its rational limits. Let us emphasize the *sui generis* nature of these dynamisms. Husserl devoted voluminous investigations to pursuing the dynamism proper to consciousness and its life itself. According to him, consciousness consists of a flow, a stream of acts. Its natural dynamism is also identical with temporality: the internal time of consciousness in its flow. But here we are talking about the specific dynamism of the constructive logos of the real as it deploys itself. I am pointing out the state of affairs that in this natural onward flow of consciousness, its constructive acts bring forth their very own inner dynamisms and forces. Reason/logos is not a mere structuring line of construction, it is simultaneously its prompting force.

We see two driving forces at work. There is the “horizontal logos” of the interconnected structuring of the process of discriminating individual objects, on the one hand. And there are the dynamisms of the “vertical logos” of the fluctuating compossible interstructural, intergenerative links of the subjective line, on the other. Together these make up intentional acts, propensities, and constructive processes. The objectifying and subjectifying lines indispensably complement each other and as interlocking dual engines power a unified intentional constructive system of the logos of the manifestation of objectivity.

Yet the intentional platform falls short of clarifying the background of this interlocking horizontal/vertical

constitutive schema, however. Thus, Husserl sought further for its origination. He plunged then into the lifeworld, for the grounding of conceptualizing in the intentional network manifests a whirl of change, transformation, interaction, in brief, a fluctuating, exchanging, crisscrossing, transfusing, and transforming becoming. Its objectifying layers point to the dimension of the lifeworld, to the course of society.

This new dimension of the lifeworld seems to be an essential though pluridimensional correlate of the first platform of essential structures in that it offers a field in which to investigate the entire universe of reality in its becoming as the world. This vastly enlarged horizon stretches to the limits of the lifeworld. Indeed, the lifeworld is a correlate of the regional ontologies, though with some crucial differences. First, it opens the field of interactive transformation; second, it introduces the intersubjective, transactional dimension of societal living; third, it brings forth the empirical, “natural” underpinnings of psychic and social events and modes of becoming.

The multisphere platform of the lifeworld presents innumerable dynamisms and forces that fulgurate, spring forth spontaneously from its intrinsic and ever in flux entanglements. The lifeworld is primarily intergenerative, always sprouting new dynamisms. Here the dynamic interlinkage of subjective and objective perspectives is projected on an infinite play of forces.

The lifeworld goes in all world-significant—objective and subjective—directions. Its horizontality consists of a never ending game of tendencies, intentions, desires, ends, strivings; its verticality consists of all the productive/destructive forces that surge and generate drives. All these intermingle and press on, it seems in tandem, into infinite horizons. Hence, phenomenology of the lifeworld platform presents itself to our mind naturally.

Here we reach Husserl’s new intuitive platform, that of the genetic perspective. These are levels of intuition other than those in which ideal structures—*eidoi*—are given and other than those in which the acts and structure, static and dynamic, of human consciousness preparatory to constitutive genesis and the synthesizing acts of fulfillment are given, and even other than those of a particular horizontal level of intuitive awareness of the multiplicity of lifeworld interactions, intersubjective entanglements, and the vast intertwined network of levels of singular constitutive processes. These yet other intuitions are of the intentions of a genesis that proceeds, so to speak, “upwards” through different spheres of unfolding and in extending “outwards” forms bodily, kinesthetic feeling, etc. and informs the functioning of the various degrees of

objectification. These are the genetic intentions operative in the constitution of the lifeworld.

In order to thematize this novel field, Husserl again made attunements of phenomenological intuition, this time going deep. In dealing with the multifarious sectors of the lifeworld, it will not do to seek rigid essential structures or consequently have recourse to either eidetic or intentional structurizing consciousness devices. And yet these cannot be dismissed, nor are they to be relegated to a dormant inventory. An innermost intentional reference to them is the condition *sine qua non* of distinctiveness.

Further, with the new anthropological conception of the human being that has been introduced into phenomenology in the last quarter of a century, which brings out the centrality of the creative experience to the human condition, we are witnessing a new flourishing of intuitive modalities that go beyond Husserl's horizons but correspond to them. This brings about an essential transformation of the classical schema sketched above. It leads, in fact, to the opening of one more sphere for the intuition of the real.

Creative experience reveals indeed the vertiginous play of innumerable intuitions of virtual and possible constitutive elements within the creative act of the human being. The creative act reveals itself as the fulcrum that life has come to have in human becoming. Properly analyzed, the creative act is the royal pathway to seeing our intuitive human powers, leading to the proper apprehension of the cultural phenomena that fashion the specifically human world, "the specifically human significance of life." This apprehension opens a specific level of *ontopoietic* becoming, because it unveils how living beingness emerges within the networks of constitutive dynamisms of the system of life in a *linea entis* (ontically) as well as in the self-individualizing singularity of living beings (their very own poiesis). Last but not least, this new sphere of the logos of the real reveals the intuitive genesis of the sacral interpretation of the human-being-in-existence. This widened horizon of intuitions then constitutes the horizon of life.

This proliferating spread of intuition is obvious within the manifold diversification of phenomenological inquiries. All this corresponds to the first and foremost principle of phenomenology enunciated by Husserl, that is, to the principle of all principles: our concern is with "whatever presents itself in a self-given fashion."

Do this diversity of rationalities and the levels of givenness manifesting reality corresponding to them make the so-called "phenomenological method" obsolete? Already in Husserl's thinking, the expansion of horizons just described highlighted the need to ever

reexamine the so abused and misinterpreted question of the phenomenological method.

This quick overview of the phenomenological horizon in terms of this wealth of intuitions to be distinguished in the analytic work of phenomenology at large, along with their dynamisms, makes the situation of phenomenology's identity even more doubtful. What is phenomenology? On what grounds may research be claimed to be phenomenological? Is there still a current of thought that may legitimately be called "phenomenological"? Are the dynamisms and forces of authentic phenomenology already spent, and are we dealing merely with its elaborations, interpretations, vaguely related applications, and historical questions?

2. THE FOUNDATIONAL PROJECT OF ORIGINS

2.1. *The Beacon of Origins and the Phenomenological Method*

I have traced above the line leading onward from phenomenology's setting out on a twofold quest, a quest to both uncover ultimate reality and examine the uncovering of it in conscious cognitive acts. This quest is set up along the line of reality's *originary* appearance, that is, its appearance in constitutive consciousness. It is, indeed, a quest for the progressive levels of this originating appearance.

It has also been pointed out how the program of phenomenological investigation thus outlined by Husserl at the initial stage was relentlessly projected onward by its very own dynamic.

Now let us review its stages in the perspective of the so-called "phenomenological method."

Husserl ceaselessly added refinements, twists, and new dimensions to his method of investigation, with each shift of focus devising a new signifying apparatus for thematizing. All this has been so very much discussed for the sake of learning how to proceed with phenomenological research of varied subject matter as well as in order to obtain a better understanding of Husserl's work, that the subject would not be worth treating were it not for the fact that doing so will provide essential roadmarkers for the line of thought by which we hope to retrieve the authentic kernel of phenomenology and sketch its features. Then we will be able to recognize what is of phenomenological inspiration in peripheral philosophical projects. To put it sharply, the phenomenological method is nothing other than the innermost core of the phenomenological enterprise.

Unpacking the inspirational stages of the ever advancing work of Husserl, we discovered the rational network

I. THE INCIPIENT PHASE

FRANZ BRENTANO, THE “GRANDFATHER OF PHENOMENOLOGY” AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TIMES

BRENTANO, TEACHER OF HUSSERL

In the literature on Husserl there is a marked tendency to interpret the thought of the founder of phenomenology in the light of his later works, particularly focusing on *The Crisis of European Sciences*, which deals with the fundamental concept of *Lebenswelt*, as well on the themes of passive synthesis and inter-subjectivity, which were central concerns of this phase. Another dominant approach tends to view phenomenology purely in terms of transcendental phenomenology, a concept systematically developed in *Ideas I* of 1913, the text that most clearly reveals the closeness of Husserl to neo-Kantian movements.

While undoubtedly legitimate, such approaches presuppose the presence of some immanent directive idea driving the development of Husserl's entire work and, in so doing, tend to impose corresponding directive criteria for its comprehension and interpretation. They therefore underplay the slow and complex evolution of the founder of phenomenology, the conceptual work to which he submitted his early ideas, and his continual effort to give them more precise definition and radically greater depth. This is even more true in considering the initial phase of Husserl's work, which preceded and paved the way for *Logical Investigations*, a phase when the influence of his teacher Franz Brentano was strong and decisive. The fact that it was later dismissed by Husserl himself as being “psychologistic”, does not justify its removal or neglect. On the contrary, it must be evaluated historically in terms of the preparatory stage for the development of a line of thinking that would lead, through the above-mentioned work of conceptual clarification and investigation, to an increasingly precise definition of the sphere of action of phenomenology.

In the light of such remarks, we intend to review some of the crucial points along the philosophical itinerary traveled by Brentano, the man whom Husserl considered “my one and only teacher in philosophy” and from whose

lessons the then youthful mathematician “first acquired . . . the conviction that philosophy, too, is a field of serious endeavor, and that it too can—and in fact must—be dealt in rigorous scientific manner”. (Husserl, 1919, 154; translation, 48)

The outstanding feature of Brentano's philosophical propositions, which surfaces in the work of all his pupils, is the attribution of an essentially philosophical value to psychological investigation, which is in turn the basis for the revival and renewal of philosophy as a scientific discipline, whose crisis he imputes to the abandonment of the empirical method of research and the surrender to the speculative temptations typifying idealistic philosophy. It is in the singular blend of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Empiricist elements permeating this project that we uncover a series of decisive ideas which, critically perceived, were to influence profoundly the work of Husserl.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Franz Brentano was born in Marienberg, near Boppard am Rhein, on January 16, 1838. In the same year his family moved to Aschaffenburg, where the young Brentano underwent a rigidly Catholic education. The Brentano family, of distant Italian origin, were of considerable standing in the German cultural world. His father, Christian, writer of religious pamphlets, was the brother of Clemens Brentano and Bettina von Arnim and the brother-in-law of Carl von Savigny.

After early studies in Munich (1856/57) and a brief period at Würzburg, without finding any suitable teacher to oversee his higher education, Brentano moved to Berlin in 1858 to study under Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, the great promoter of the Aristotelian revival in 19th-century Germany. He finally went on to Münster to become a pupil of Franz Jacob Clemens, a major exponent of Neo-Thomism during the nineteenth century, who introduced him to the study of medieval interpretations of Aristotle and Thomism. Brentano concluded his studies in 1862, with the dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, presented at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, where, *in absentia*, he obtained his doctorate in philosophy.

After further studies in theology in Munich and Würzburg, Brentano was ordained to the priesthood in 1864. He continued the studies on Aristotle begun with his dissertation, and in 1866, he submitted the work *The Psychology of Aristotle*, to qualify as a *Privatdozent* at Würzburg. This marked the beginning of an extraordinarily successful period as a teacher, during which he

was to count among his group of first enthusiastic disciples Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf and Hermann Schell.

In the meantime, however, Brentano's life was upset by a series of events. The declaration of the dogma of papal infallibility, proclaimed in 1870 by the First Vatican Council, gave birth to his first religious doubts, triggering a crisis that eventually led him, on Good Friday 1873, to abandon the priesthood, and later, in 1879, to leave the Catholic Church. Such events were not without serious consequences for Brentano's academic career; in 1873 he resigned from the professorship he had acquired the previous year.

Between 1872 and 1873 Brentano traveled widely: to England, where he met Herbert Spencer, St. George Mivart and Cardinal Newman, to Paris and, finally Leipzig, where he met, among others, Gustav T. Fechner, Ernst H. Weber, and Moritz W. Drobisch. At this time, he was writing his best-known work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, and Leipzig was already the center of the avant-garde in German psychological studies.

Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint came out in 1874, the same year in which Brentano, with the decisive support of Rudolf Hermann Lotze, obtained a full professorship in philosophy at the University of Vienna. Here, he was to repeat the enormous success of the Würzburg period, again placing him at the center of a group of enthusiastic pupils, including, to cite some of the most distinguished, not only Husserl, but also Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Kasimir Twardowski, Alois Höfler, Thomas Masaryk, Franz Hillebrand. To these must be added the *Enkelschüler* Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil, Josef Eisenmeier, Emil Utitz and Hugo Bergmann. His "school" was destined to permeate the entire academic world of the Hapsburg Empire, with Marty becoming professor at Czernowitz and, later on, in Prague; Stumpf, in the meantime, became Brentano's successor at Würzburg, moving on to Prague (and then to Halle, where Husserl was his pupil, *Munich and finally Berlin*). Also active in Prague were Ehrenfels, Masaryk and Kraus. Meinong was called to Graz, Twardowski to Lemberg, Hillebrand and Kastil to Innsbruck.

Whilst in Vienna, Brentano was introduced to Ida von Lieben, the sister of a colleague; his decision to marry her gave rise to considerable problems since a clause of the Austrian Civil Code, of controversial interpretation, forbade ex-priests to marry. To obviate this difficulty, Brentano acquired Saxon citizenship and married Ida von Lieben in Leipzig. However, his acquisition of a new citizenship automatically meant the loss of his university post. Brentano went through the process of re-qualifying

in Vienna in the hope of getting his professorship back, but was unfortunately disappointed. As a result, he persevered in his activities as a mere *Privatdozent*, continuing to win over disciples, but without any real academic power. His bitterness over the failure of his attempts at reconfirmation, made all the more difficult to bear by the death of his wife, was compounded by appointment of his pupil Franz Hillebrand as the head of the psychology laboratory that he had for years been requesting from the Austrian authorities, all of which eventually convinced him, in 1895, to leave Vienna and, after a brief period in Switzerland, move to Italy.

After short stays in Rome and Palermo, Brentano settled in Florence with his second wife, Emilie Ruprecht, who he married in 1897 and with whom he also had a son. By this time, Brentano was already suffering from the serious sight problems that would gradually lead to blindness and was forced to entrust his reflections to dictation. It was in these years that he elaborated the new version of his thought that is generally referred to as "reism". While resident in Italy, he maintained contact with his students, either during the summers spent at his house in Schönbühel, in Wachau, or by regular mail correspondence, on a truly impressive scale (his letters to Marty alone number about 1,400, some of which are twenty pages long).

On Italy's entry into the World War I, in 1915, Brentano moved to Zurich, where he died on March 17, 1917.

BRENTANO'S PHILOSOPHICAL TRAINING

Brentano's philosophical training took place in the climate of renewed interest in Aristotle that dominated a significant part of post-idealistic German thought. In his dissertation *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*—a work that, as is known, profoundly influenced the young Heidegger—Brentano undertakes an analysis of Aristotle's ontology and theory of categories. With his second work, *The Psychology of Aristotle*, Brentano makes a detailed analysis of Aristotle's *De anima*, particularly dwelling on the complex problem of the *noûs poietikos*. Here, it is already possible to note the polarity and complementarity of ontology and psychology, of the ontological-metaphysical inquiry and philosophy of mind that would permeate all the subsequent development of his thought.

Although such youthful works are generally historical in character, they are clearly dominated by the proposal for a theoretic recovery of the Aristotelian heritage, conceived as the starting point for a new scientific foundation

of philosophy in opposition to the one proposed by the neo-Kantian movement. This foundation is not in fact based on the revival of the Kantian interrogatives concerning the conditions of possibility of experience, but on Aristotelian metaphysics as the “science of being as being”. Brentano, on the other hand, significantly reflects the reception of positivist themes which the Germany of the day had absorbed from French and English thought, although reformulating them in an independent and original way, in particular, giving them a distinctive psychological slant, thanks to the influence of Herbartianism.

The singular convergence of Aristotelian and positivistic themes must be taken in the light of Brentano’s particular Aristotelian training, which is of far greater complexity than is usually maintained. Brentano, in fact, was not only the Catholic priest whose approach to Aristotle rests heavily on a scholastic, especially Thomistic interpretative base; Brentano was also the pupil of Trendelenburg, the promoter of the *Aristoteles-Renaissance* in 19th-century Protestant Germany. The methodological-epistemological curvature of Trendelenburg’s Aristotelianism is, in this regard, of decisive importance, namely, his conviction that the development of philosophical reflection must take place in strict continuity with that of the single sciences: within this view, philosophy stands at the vertex of the system of sciences, of which, in its universality (in a perspective both ontological and logical-methodological) it is naturally supreme. Certainly far from casual is Trendelenburg’s preparatory role in the penetration of French, but especially English positivism in late-19th-century Germany; neither is it coincidental that the young Brentano, in confronting the need to re-assess Aristotelian enquiry in the light of the epistemological concerns emerging from contemporary philosophical and scientific debate, should focus his attention on some of the major exponents of Positivism—foremost Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill.

Of relevance in this regard, is the principle upheld in Brentano’s fourth qualification thesis: *Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est* (the true method of philosophy is none other than that of natural sciences). (Brentano, 1929, 136f) This thesis represents one of the cornerstones of Brentano’s philosophy and, together with the doctrine of the four phases of philosophy,¹ motivated the young philosopher’s faith in the future progress of philosophy. It was precisely this faith, bolstered by a strong missionary drive and by an extraordinary argumentative clarity and rigor, which so impressed his students, making them enthusiastic

disciples and participants in the grandiose project of their teacher.

PSYCHOLOGY FROM AN EMPIRICAL STANDPOINT

The complex interweaving of motives, the network of influences described above, provide a key to our understanding of Brentano’s project for a “psychology from an empirical standpoint”, which he saw as a foundation for the entire philosophical edifice. *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* is in effect a unique work in the philosophical and psychological panorama of late-19th-century Germany. Published in a cultural climate that had lost all belief in the possibility of a rational psychology, it set out to develop a new scientific psychology capable of ensuring a re-foundation of philosophy, allowing it to emerge from the foundational crisis into which it had fallen. While the spirit in which he sets about renewing the methods and content of psychological science reflects the cultural climate of the day, we cannot consider Brentano’s psychology on the same plane as other contemporary “psychologistic” projects, without losing the freshness and originality that characterizes this work. And its originality lies in the singular recovery of the Aristotelian tradition.

On close reading, Brentano’s “psychology from an empirical standpoint” is none other than Aristotelian psychology, with methods and content adapted to make it more palatable to the contemporary public. It is a psychology that can provide a node, a convergence point for the numerous and divergent courses of contemporary psychological science. Brentano thus sacrifices the traditional (and Aristotelian) assumption which sees psychology as the “science of the soul”, preferring to invoke, with F. A. Lange, a “psychology without a soul”. (*PeS* I, 16; translation, 11) The soul, Brentano states, is a metaphysical concept and cannot as such be placed among the *premises* of an empirical psychology, which programmatically aims at dealing with phenomena and not absolute entities. On the basis of such considerations, Brentano defines psychology as the “science of mental phenomena” and, he can conveniently delimit the latter by having recourse to the Aristotelian paradigm of the “intentional inexistence of the object”, thus re-introducing into contemporary debate the concept of intentionality.

With this term, borrowed from medieval Scholasticism, Brentano outlines the relational and directional character of mental phenomena, how they are always directed towards something, towards an object. Apart from the terminological derivation, Brentano takes the principle of “intentional inexistence” directly from

Aristotle: the mental phenomenon is always directed towards an object, it is an act, an *energeia*, that is to say the realization of a capacity initially present in the subject as purely a potential. In particular, it is Aristotle's theory of perception that functions as a paradigm in positing the concept of "intentional inexistence". According to Aristotle, the sensation consists of an alteration or modification induced in the perceiver by the outer sensible object. However, the modification implicit in the sensation is not a mere submission leading to an alteration of the perceiver, his or her corruption by something opposite. The sensation represents a cognitive modification of the perceiver and not his or her effective alteration. Thus, it cannot resolve itself in the material or physical presence of the sensible objects in the perceiver, but in their *objective presence*: feeling the cold does not mean being or becoming physically cold, but to perceptively appropriate something which is present in us "as an object" (*objective*). (Brentano, 1867, 80.)

Brentano's doctrine of intentionality will receive more detailed analysis below. For the time being, it is sufficient to underline the Aristotelian matrix of the concept of "intentional inexistence", as well as of the fundamental distinction between physical phenomena and mental phenomena on which Brentano founded his psychology. In Brentano, physical phenomena are not in fact the "objects" of our everyday experience, but that which is perceived by us without any form of inductive or conceptual mediation. Physical phenomena (colors, sounds, tastes, etc.) are spatially determined sensible qualities. Within an Aristotelian framework, physical phenomena are special sensible connected with the common sensible spatial form or shape. Mental phenomena are the co-respective acts, coordinated with them, but not reducible to them: *seeing* (a color), *hearing* (a sound), *tasting* (a flavor).

So far Brentano's conception of the mental act or phenomenon can be seen as an adaptation of the corresponding conception of Aristotle. There is, however, an aspect of the Aristotelian theory of perception that is drastically revised, namely, its cognitive validity. With Aristotle outer perception directed to the special sensible is immune from error, whilst for Brentano the perception of the physical phenomenon is always illusory. Colors, sounds, tastes, etc. evidently exist only for the ingenuous and unreflective consciousness, ignorant of the most elementary tenets of physical science. Against the ingenuous realism of Aristotle, so close to the position of common sense, speaks the entire development of modern science, which has led us to conceive of physical reality as a mechanical game of extended

moving particles and to deprive the sensible qualities, so refractory to mathematical analysis, of any objective consistence.

Thus, for Aristotle the intentional sense-object or special sensible is the accidental determination of a substance which by causally acting on the perceiver imposes on the act of perception a dependence that is causal in character; for Brentano the same object (the special sensible or physical phenomenon) simply does not exist, *either* externally *or* internally to consciousness. Basing himself on the results of modern physical science and adopting the Helmholtz's theses of critical realism, he affirms that physical phenomena are only "symbols" (*Zeichen*) of real entities or processes that are not directly accessible (atoms, molecule, electromagnetic waves, etc.); by acting causally on the perceiver, they produce in him a presentation which provides only an approximate indication of them.

At this point it seems legitimate to wonder what Brentano has gained by adopting intentionality as the distinctive criterion of mental phenomena, i.e., a concept belonging to a theory of perception and, more in general, to a theory of knowledge that is no longer palatable, except with radical revision, to the contemporary public. True to the principle according to which the real Aristotelian can and must know how to go beyond Aristotle himself, Brentano believes that the solution to these difficulties is that indicated by Descartes and British Empiricism, Locke in particular. In line with this tradition, Brentano sees the mental phenomenon as something more than a mere *act* of perception: it is, in its intrinsic nature, *conscious*, which means that there must exist within the mental act itself a moment that makes possible our consciousness of it. That is the function of *inner perception*, which Brentano considers a further distinctive criterion of the mental act, one closely coordinated, however, with intentionality. Inner perception, through which we are conscious of our mental acts, is not in fact an autonomous act of reflection directed towards the actual mental phenomenon; it is instead a different *intentional direction* which characterizes, as a secondary component, every mental act. Were the consciousness of a mental act to be superimposed, in a certain sense, from without onto the act itself, it would open up the way to an infinite chain of deferment, and we would be forced to admit an unconscious mental activity in order to close the series. Instead, it is in the single mental act with which we take in the (primary) object, where we find the very consciousness of perception, as its moment or non-independent part. The consciousness that accompanies each mental act is a secondary or accessory (*en parergo*)

consciousness, due to a reflective off-shoot of our attention, *primarily* directed towards the intentional object of the said act. Inner perception thus considered is the only source of self-evidence. It is the sole “insightful” evidence insofar as it is wholly identified with its object, which is apprehended free of any residual elements. It is assertoric, immediate, and anterior to the position of any distinction between subject and object.²

The fact that the mental phenomenon is *conscious*, i.e., grasped by the concomitant inner perception, does not mean for Brentano—and this is a decisive point—that it is *observed* by the subject. The reflective consciousness that accompanies the mental phenomenon cannot be an explicit, thematic or “distinct” consciousness of the mental phenomenon itself; that is to say it can never transform itself into an “inner observation” (*innere Beobachtung*). The reason for this impossibility lies in the very nature of the secondary reference, which is incapable of fixing or objectifying the mental phenomenon, without modifying its essence. This is illustrated by the example of rage. When angry, we are of course conscious of the rage by which we are affected; the fact that we feel it necessarily implies that we are conscious of it. It does not mean, however, that such consciousness can be transformed into an inner observation, almost as if we could fix our rage, with an attitude of detachment, without, that is, essentially altering the original state of mind.

The fact that inner perception can never transform itself into inner observation undoubtedly sets psychology at a disadvantage with respect to the natural sciences. Memory provides some degree of help, being able to analyze and therefore “observe”, i.e., to address as its primary objects mental phenomena that have just taken place. A further contribution can also come from the “objective observation” of the external manifestations of mental phenomena in the form of language and behavior. Such methodological instruments that complement inner perception appear indeed indispensable to fill the gaps inherent in the purely psychological methods; recourse to objective observation remains however an auxiliary procedure, which cannot in anyway claim to replace that which is the true “experiential basis” of psychology.

GENESIS VERSUS DESCRIPTION

It is revealing that neither in the long methodological section, nor at any other point in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* does Brentano refer to the methodological procedure of description. Description is entirely absent, and this in spite of the fact that the object

of psychological enquiry, the “mental phenomenon” or “consciousness”, is analyzed and classified according to its structure, as well as adequately differentiated against the background of its physical-physiological determinants. This fact and the complex apparatus of auxiliary methodological tools introduced to overcome the limits of inner perception bear witness to how Brentano, in 1874, had not yet explicitly formulated the distinction between genetic psychology and descriptive psychology, between diachronic causal investigation, directed towards identifying the genesis of mental phenomena, and synchronic morphological investigation. This aims at providing a taxonomy of the essential structures that together make up mental life, which only became of extreme importance a decade later. The “empirical standpoint” to which Brentano feels bound in 1874 in the development of psychology as a science depends as much on the description and classification of mental phenomena as on the identification of their laws of succession, considered as a logical and necessary integration of the classification. It is true that psychological enquiry presupposed the identification, in descriptive terms, of the essential features of mental phenomena and, on this basis, the delineation of their fundamental classes; however, its ultimate goal consists of the identification, by inductive means, of the general laws governing the development and succession of mental phenomena, valid for the entire realm of mental life. (*PeS* I, 62f; translation, 44f.) Such laws cannot, however, claim validity as ultimate and fundamental laws, like those of gravity and inertia in physics, due to the lack of available knowledge concerning the physiological conditions causing the insurgence of mental phenomena. In addition, compared to the laws of the natural sciences, psychological laws are not only incomplete, but also imprecise because of the insufficient, if not impossible application of mathematics in psychological enquiry. They are, Brentano emphasizes, “empirical laws” which, from both viewpoints, are in need of integration.

The problematic, if not contradictory character of Brentano’s position has been underlined: on the one hand, he wishes to develop psychology on an empirical basis, while on the other, it is precisely the empiric nature of psychological laws that makes them vague and imprecise. Brentano’s theses become comprehensible if one considers how, in this phase, his scientific ideal was the Comtian one of deductive science, in which the empirical dimension is progressively absorbed into the rational one, expressed by the law. The purpose of science is to explain observed phenomena in terms of precise and immutable laws, and to reduce the number of these laws

II. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

ON HUSSERL'S MATHEMATICAL APPRENTICESHIP AND PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS

Insight into the formative role that Edmund Husserl's early training in mathematics played in the development of his ideas is fundamental to understanding his philosophy as a whole. Besides shedding light on the genesis of phenomenology, which began to take shape in Husserl's reflections on the inability of the logic, psychology, mathematics and philosophy of his time to respond to certain onerous questions raised by his earliest attempts to secure radical foundations for arithmetic, understanding Husserl's ideas about mathematics sheds needed light on a number of other dimensions of his thought that have puzzled and challenged philosophers in this century. For example, this is precisely where many of the clues are to be found that are needed to answer questions of a controversial nature about seemingly enigmatic aspects of his thought, among them questions regarding the nature and evolution of his views on psychologism, on Platonism, on realism, and the relationship between his formal and his transcendental logic.

Moreover, this is the only way there is to situate and evaluate Husserl's philosophy in relation to the ideas and innovations of the most eminent and influential mathematicians of his time, notably Karl Weierstrass, Georg Cantor, David Hilbert, and Kurt Gödel, or Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, men who often shared Husserl's desire to discover secure, scientific foundations for mathematics and the theory of knowledge, his concern to reform logic, his intent to fight against psychologism, his desire to develop a theory of meaning, his questions as to the philosophical significance of the latest developments in mathematics, and so on.

Understanding the evolution of Husserl's views on mathematics is therefore essential to establishing Husserl's proper place in 20th century philosophy of logic and mathematics, a field with deep roots in Austro-German ideas about mathematics, logic and philosophy, which flowered in English-speaking countries in the

twentieth century, but into which Husserl's ideas have never been properly integrated. Given the preeminent role that philosophy of logic and mathematics has played in shaping the way philosophy was done in English-speaking countries in the twentieth century, investigations into Husserl's work in this area thus also supply the material essential for the building of any possible bridge between phenomenology and its principal rival, analytic philosophy. And such investigations afford the best possible explanation as to why so many of Husserl's ideas seem so close to those of that antagonistic school, while others remain so plainly diametrically opposed to it.

UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF WEIERSTRASS

Husserl came to the decision to pursue mathematics as a career during his student years in Berlin, where he enthusiastically threw himself into the study of that most rigorous of disciplines. It was there that from 1887–1881 he attended the courses of the great mathematician Karl Weierstrass (Schuhmann, 7; M. Husserl; Osborn, 12–14).

Weierstrass' thoroughgoing, systematic treatment, *ab initio*, of the theory of analytic functions had led him to profound investigations into the principles of arithmetic. His scrupulous manner of submitting the foundations of analytic functions to close scrutiny awoke in Husserl an interest in seeking radical foundations for mathematics. "I came to understand", Husserl recalled, "the pains he was taking to transform analysis from the mixture of reason and irrational instincts and know-how it was at the time into a pure rational theory. His aim was to expose its original roots, its elementary concepts and axioms on the basis of which the whole system of analysis might be deduced in a completely rigorous, perspicuous way" (Schuhmann, 7; Jourdain, 295–96).

In reaction to the Kantian psychologization of mathematics popular among his contemporaries, Weierstrass was preaching the arithmetization of analysis, the rigorous founding of analysis purely on the basis of the positive whole numbers. Weierstrass was famous for teaching that once one had thus admitted the notion of whole number, arithmetic needed no further postulate, but then could be built up in a purely logical fashion. This would have the effect of depsychologizing and degeometrizing analysis, of liberating it from the insidious appeals to intuitions of space and time that had been imported into it since Kant had proclaimed that mathematical propositions were synthetic a priori (Coffa; Demopoulos, 1994).

Husserl's encounter with Weierstrass had a deep and lasting effect on the future founder of the phenomenological movement. It was from Weierstrass, Husserl

would say, that he acquired the ethos of his intellectual endeavors (Schuhmann, 7). Late in his career he would even say that he had sought to do for philosophy what Weierstrass had done for mathematics (Becker, 40–42; Schuhmann, 34). As Andrew Osborn, who actually consulted with Husserl about this, explained: “Through Weierstrass especially, too, the Berlin school placed enormous importance on the rigor of demonstration, a practice that seized hold on Husserl’s imagination so that when later he turned to philosophy he sought to find there a strict science similar to that on which Weierstrass insisted, along with the certainty that follows from such strictness and such rigorous proof” (Osborn, 12).

Indeed, closely inspecting the course of Husserl’s intellectual career one continually finds him reworking themes present in Weierstrass’ work and striving to apply the very principles that underpinned the mathematician’s efforts to rigorize analysis. This is, for example, evident not only in Husserl’s early espousal of Weierstrass’ conviction that the cardinal number was “the first and most underivative domain, the sole foundation of all remaining domains of numbers” (Husserl, 1994, 2), but also in Husserl’s struggles with psychologism, his lifelong search for radical foundations for knowledge, his striving to lay bare the original roots, the most primitive concepts and principles of knowledge, to uncover the fundamental building blocks on the basis of which his whole system of philosophy might rest, his ideas about phenomenology as a strict science, his efforts to extend the notion of the analyticity, and so on. The nature of his attraction to Weierstrass’ work also explains much about the nature of Husserl’s attraction to the work of Franz Brentano, Georg Cantor, Bernard Bolzano, David Hilbert, and even Gottlob Frege.

Husserl was, of course, not alone in being decisively influenced by Weierstrass’ thoroughness and systematic approach. What we know of Husserl’s reaction before Weierstrass’ efforts to rigorize analysis is consonant with the impression that he left on much of the mathematical world of his time. “Mathematicians under the influence of Weierstrass”, Bertrand Russell once noted, “have shown in modern times a care for accuracy, and an aversion to slipshod reasoning, such as had not been known among them previously since the time of the Greeks” (Russell, 1917, 94).

In Berlin, Husserl was also influenced by Leopold Kronecker who also believed that: “Sometime we shall succeed in ‘arithmetizing’,—that is to say, in founding alone on the number-concept in the narrowest sense, and therefore in stripping away again all the modifications and extensions of this concept, which have mostly been

caused by the applications to geometry and mechanics,—the whole of arithmetic” (cited Jourdain, 5). Osborn credited Kronecker with having “sown the first seeds of philosophical understanding” in Husserl “and fostering the interest so aroused”. “Husserl found in him,” Osborn recounted, “a depth of understanding that stirred an echo in his own nature. Kronecker’s special field was the philosophy of mathematics and it was through contact with him accordingly that Husserl first came to any appreciation of the philosophic point of view. Reflective by nature, Husserl found a ready interest in the philosophy of mathematics which was for him, as it proved, a very big step in the direction of an interest in pure philosophy”. Osborn speculates that Husserl’s interest in Descartes may have first been awakened by Kronecker (Osborn, 12).

As happy as Husserl was in Berlin, acting upon his father’s wishes, he left for Vienna to prepare his doctoral thesis on the calculus of variations. Summoned by Weierstrass to serve as his assistant, Husserl later returned to Berlin. However, he quickly took advantage of an opportunity to return to Vienna to indulge a growing interest in philosophy (M. Husserl; Osborne, 15).

HUSSERL MAKES PHILOSOPHY HIS LIFE’S WORK

Although Husserl manifested little interest in philosophy during his time in Berlin, it became the minor subject for his doctorate in mathematics in Vienna. During that time, when his interest in philosophy was growing and he was wondering whether to make mathematics or philosophy his life’s work, Husserl began attending the courses of the philosopher Franz Brentano. At first he did so merely out of curiosity, but these courses finally proved to be the decisive factor encouraging him to dedicate himself entirely to philosophy. But for Brentano, Husserl would say, he would not have become a philosopher (Husserl, 1919, 342; M. Husserl; Brück).

The specific reasons for admiring Brentano that Husserl gave actually quite resemble his reasons for admiring Weierstrass. The man in whom Weierstrass had awakened an interest in seeking radical foundations for knowledge was impressed by Brentano’s clear, rigorous, insightful, objective, and precise philosophical analyses and ability to transform unclear beginnings into clear thoughts and insights, his “finely dialectical measuring of various possible arguments, his clarifying of equivocations, and retracing of every philosophical concept to its original intuitive sources”. “Brentano relatively quickly moved from intuition to theory, to the delimitation of sharp concepts, to theoretical formulation of working problems”, Husserl recalled. For Husserl, Brentano was

someone entirely devoted to the austere ideal of a strict philosophical science, someone completely certain of his method who believed that his sharply polished concepts, his strongly constructed and systematically ordered theories, and his all round aporetic refutation of alternative interpretations, captured final truths. He "strove constantly to satisfy the highest claims of an almost mathematical strictness". "Sometimes it was the subject matter which overcame me," Husserl recalled, "other times the quite singular clearness and dialectical sharpness of his expositions, the cataleptic power as it were of his way of developing problems and of his theories". It was from Brentano, Husserl acknowledged, that he acquired the conviction that philosophy "was a serious discipline which could and must be dealt with in the spirit of the strictest science" (Husserl, 1919, 343–44).

GEORG CANTOR AND HUSSERL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF ARITHMETIC

Having attended Brentano's lectures for two years, Husserl's next career move was to the University of Halle, to prepare his *Habilitationschrift* under the direction of Carl Stumpf, a member of Brentano's circle (Smith, 21–24) convinced of the great need for cooperation between mathematicians or scientists and philosophers in the area of logic (Frege, 1980a, 171).

Husserl would reside in Halle from 1886 to 1901. These were years during which his ideas were particularly malleable and changed considerably and definitively. In 1887, he completed *On the Concept of Number*. *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* was published in 1891. The better part of the subsequent years was spent in the throes of an intellectual struggle in the course of which he abandoned some of the main lessons he had learned from Weierstrass and Brentano and came to write the groundbreaking *Logical Investigations*, in which he began laying the foundations of the phenomenological movement that went on to shape the course of 20th century philosophy in Continental Europe.

Georg Cantor, the creator of set theory, taught at the University of Halle during those years and served on the *Habilitationskommittee* that judged Husserl's *On the Concept of Number* (Gerlach). The two became close friends. At the height of his creative powers in the 1880s and 1890s, Cantor had studied in Berlin from 1863 to 1869, where he too had come under the influence of Weierstrass, a fact which explains much of the initial intellectual kinship between Husserl and Cantor, whose ideas overlapped and crisscrossed in a number of respects (Hill, 1997a; Hill, 1999).

During Husserl's time in Halle, Cantor was particularly seeking philosophical justification for his theories. He wanted to show how his entire transfinite set theory rested upon sound principles and how the transfinite numbers might be regarded as consistent extensions of the finite reals. He had begun his *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* explaining to his readers that he had come to a point of realizing that further work on set theory would require extending the concept of real whole numbers beyond previously set bounds and in a direction which as far as he knew no one had searched yet, and he offered this a justification or an excuse for introducing apparently strange ideas (Cantor, 1883).

Cantor was one of the few mathematicians of his time intent upon wedding mathematics and philosophy. Over the years he had grown increasingly interested in philosophy and by the time of Husserl's arrival in Halle was primed to abandon mathematics for philosophy. In 1894 Cantor would write to the French mathematician Charles Hermite that "in the realm of the spirit" mathematics had no longer been "the essential love" of his soul for more than twenty years. Metaphysics and theology, Cantor "openly confessed", had so taken possession of his soul as to leave him relatively little time for, his "first flame", i.e., mathematics. He was now serving God better, he told Hermite, than, owing to his "apparently meager mathematical talents", he might have done through exclusively pursuing mathematics (Cantor, 1991, 350).

Although older, and far less in a position to change course than Husserl was, this did not prevent Cantor from trying to teach philosophy (Cantor, 1991, 210, 218) and from seasoning his writings with philosophical reflections and references. In 1883, Cantor had published the *Grundlagen einer allgemeine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*, a work which, according to its original 1882 foreword, had been "written with two groups of readers in mind—philosophers who have followed the developments in mathematics up to the present time, and mathematicians who are familiar with the most important older and newer publications in philosophy" (Hallett, 6–7). During Husserl's early years in Halle, Cantor published his theories in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* because, as he said, he had grown disgusted with mathematical journals. He was in fact trying to integrate philosophy into his mathematical work to such an extent that colleagues warned him that this was liable to harm his reputation (Dauben, 139, 336 n. 29).

During Husserl's years in Halle, Cantor persisted in clothing his theories about numbers in a metaphysical garb. And he left no doubts as to where his philosophical sympathies lie. In the *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre* he had

emphasized that the idealist foundations of his reflections were essentially in agreement with the basic principles of Platonism according to which only conceptual knowledge in Plato's sense afforded true knowledge (Cantor, 1883, 181, 206 n. 6). His own idealism being related to the Aristotelian-Platonic kind, Cantor wrote in an 1888 letter, he was just as much a realist as an idealist (Cantor, 1991, 323). "I conceive of numbers", he informed Giuseppe Peano, "as 'forms' or 'species' (general concepts) of sets. In essentials this is the conception of the ancient geometry of Plato, Aristotle, Euclid etc." (Cantor, 1991, 365). To Hermite he wrote that "the whole numbers both separately and in their actual infinite totality exist in that highest kind of reality as eternal ideas in the Divine Intellect" (cited Hallett, 149). Cantor considered his transfinite numbers to be but a special form of Plato's *arithmoi noetoi* or *eidetikoi*, which he thought probably even fully coincided with the whole real numbers (Cantor, 1884, 84; Cantor, 1887/8, 420). By "manifold" or a "set" he explained in the *Mannigfaltigkeitslehre*, he was defining something related to the Platonic *eidos* or *idea*, as also to what Plato called a *mikton* (Cantor, 1883, 204 n. 1). For Cantor, the transfinite "presented a rich, ever growing field of ideal research" (Cantor, 1887/8, 406).

Cantor considered that his technique for abstracting numbers from reality provided the only possible foundations for his Platonic conception of numbers (Cantor, 1991, 363, 365; Cantor, 1887/8, 380, 411). Abstraction was to show the way to that new, abstract realm of ideal mathematical objects that could not be directly perceived or intuited. It was a way of producing purely abstract arithmetical definitions, a properly arithmetical process as opposed to a geometrical one with appeals to intuitions of space and time (Cantor, 1883, 191–92). He envisioned it as a technique for focussing on pure, abstract arithmetical properties and concepts which divorced them from any sensory apprehension of the particular characteristics of the objects figuring in the sets and freed mathematics from psychologism, empiricism, Kantianism and insidious appeals to intuitions of space and time to engage in strictly arithmetical forms of concept formation (ex. Cantor, 1883, 191–92; Cantor, 1885; Cantor, 1887/8, 381 n. 1; Eccarius, 1985, 19–20; Couturat, 325–41).

With his theory of abstraction Cantor believed that he was laying bare the roots from which the organism of transfinite numbers developed with logical necessity. In the "*Mitteilungen*," written during the late 1880s, the embattled mathematician was particularly intent upon proving that his theorems about transfinite numbers were firmly secured "through the logical power of proofs"

which, proceeding from his definitions which were "neither arbitrary nor artificial, but originate naturally out of abstraction, have, with the help of syllogisms, attained their goal" (Cantor, 1887/8, 418). Inspired by Weierstrass' famous theory to that effect, he was hard at work demonstrating that the positive whole numbers formed the basis of all other mathematical conceptual formations.

All this was part of his greater strategy aimed at providing his "strange" new transfinite numbers with secure foundations by demonstrating precisely how the transfinite number system might be built from the bottom up (Dauben, 1979, Chapter 6). In so doing, he was acting on a conviction, spelled out in an 1884 letter to Gösta Mittag-Leffler, that the only correct way to proceed was "to go from what is most simple to that which is composite, to go from what already exists and is well-founded to what is more general and new by continually proceeding by way of transparent considerations, step by step without making any leaps" (Cantor, 1991, 208).

HUSSERL'S FIRST FORAYS INTO PHILOSOPHY

Impressed by Karl Weierstrass' work to arithmetize analysis and armed with analytical tools learned from Brentano, Husserl embarked on a project to help supply radical foundations for mathematics by submitting the concept of number itself to closer scrutiny. *On the Concept of Number* and *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* were the result.

Husserl began *On the Concept of Number* writing of the need to examine the logic of the concepts and methods that mathematicians were introducing and using and for a logical clarification, precise analysis, and rigorous deduction of all of mathematics from the least number of self-evident principles. The definitive removal of the real and imaginary difficulties on the borderline between mathematics and philosophy, he deemed, would only come about by first analyzing the concepts and relations which were in themselves simpler and logically prior, and then analyzing the more complicated and more derivative ones (Husserl, 1887, 92–95).

The natural and necessary starting point of any philosophy of mathematics, Husserl still believed, was the analysis of the concept of whole number (Husserl, 1887, 94–95). He was confident that: "a rigorous and thorough-going development of higher analysis... would have to emanate from elementary arithmetic alone in which analysis is grounded. But this elementary arithmetic has... its sole foundation... in that never-ending series of concepts which mathematicians call 'positive whole numbers'. All of the more complicated and artificial

forms which are likewise called numbers the fractional and irrational, and negative and complex numbers have their origin and basis in the elementary number concepts and their interrelations" (Husserl, 1887, 95).

As he undertook his project to provide a more detailed analysis of the concepts of arithmetic and a deeper foundation for its theorems, the still faithful student of Brentano also considered that psychology was the indispensable tool for analyzing the concept of number (Husserl, 1913, 33; see Husserl, 1891, 16). However, although the psychological analyses of *On the Concept of Number* were almost entirely incorporated into the first four chapters of *The Philosophy of Arithmetic*, the enthusiastic espousal of psychologism found in the earlier work is absent from the later one. And Husserl, who had not initially considered Brentano's teachings to be empirical and psychological in a pernicious sense, later confessed that there had been "connections in which such a psychological foundation never came to satisfy" him, that it could bring "no true continuity and unity", that he had grown "more and more disquieted by doubts of principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of mathematics, and of all of science in general, with a psychological foundation for logic" (Husserl, 1900–01, 42; Husserl, 1975, 34).

Husserl also soon abandoned Weierstrass' teaching on the primacy of the cardinal number. In a letter to Stumpf, written in 1890 or 1891, Husserl revealed that the theory that the concept of cardinal number forms the foundation of general arithmetic that he had tried to develop in *On the Concept of Number* had soon proved to be false. By no clever devices, he explained, "can one derive negative, rational, irrational, and the various sorts of complex numbers from the concept of cardinal number. The same is true of the ordinal concepts, of the concepts of magnitude, and so on. And these concepts themselves are not logical particularizations of the cardinal concept" (Husserl, 1994, 13). Husserl's tergiversation in this regard also becomes apparent through a comparison of the foreword and the introduction to *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* (Husserl 1891, viii, 5 and note; Hill, 1991, 81–85).

The lessons learned from his revered mentors had left him in the lurch. Husserl felt forced to embark upon an independent path. Ten years of hard, lonely work and struggle ensued. He felt that his efforts had brought him "close to the most obscure parts of the theory of knowledge", and that he was standing before "great unsolved puzzles" concerning the very possibility of knowledge in general. He described himself as having been "powerfully . . . gripped by deep, and by the deepest, problems" (Husserl, 1975, 16–17; Husserl, 1994, 167, 492–93). His

search for answers that he did not believe his early training could provide eventually led him to adopt metaphysical and epistemological views that he had learned to consider odious and despicable (Hill, 1998).

FROM BOLZANO THE MATHEMATICIAN TO BOLZANO THE PHILOSOPHER

By his own account, Husserl had always been well positioned to appreciate the work of Bernard Bolzano who, as a mathematician, had already come to his attention as a student of Weierstrass. Husserl had become further acquainted with Bolzano's ideas through Brentano's critical discussions of the paradoxes of infinity in his lectures, and then through Georg Cantor (Husserl, 1975, 37).

Bolzano was a forerunner of the movement to rigorize analysis that would gain momentum later in the 19th century. His pioneering work to rebuild intuitively accepted proofs of theorems in a rigorous way solely on the basis of arithmetical and logical concepts prepared the way for much that Weierstrass would later advocate and undertake. And, as Weierstrass himself acknowledged, Bolzano actually developed much of the theory of real functions in much the same form that, inspired by him, Weierstrass would teach it in his inspiring courses forty years later (Sebestik, 17, 107 and note; Kline, 948, 950–55; Jourdain, 297; Føllesdal, 7–10; Coffa).

With so many of his mentors impressed by Bolzano's work, Husserl should have been primed to appreciate it. This was not, however, immediately the case. Once acquainted with Bolzano's thought, Husserl recalled, he had "made a point of looking through the long-forgotten *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1837 and of making use of it from time to time with the help of its copious index", but he originally misinterpreted Bolzano's original thoughts about ideas, propositions and truths in themselves as being about mythical entities, suspended somewhere between being and non-being (Husserl, 1975, 37; Husserl, 1994, 201–02).

This particular reaction on Husserl's part is understandable. For Brentano inculcated in his students a model of philosophy based on the natural sciences and trained them to despise metaphysical idealism. So, it is easy to see how Husserl, so completely under Brentano's influence in the beginning, might not have quickly warmed to philosophical ideas that Brentano taught his students to disdain (Husserl, 1919, 344–45). It was only after having grown disillusioned with Brentano's empirical psychology that Husserl became receptive to Bolzano's idealism.

III. THE EFFLORESCENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY: ITS CLASSICAL REPRESENTATIVES

MAX SCHELER: THE HUMAN PERSON IN ACTION AND IN THE COSMOS

Falsely labeled a student of Edmund Husserl in the past, Max Scheler's significance, and difference from his phenomenological contemporaries, is to be seen in his uncompromising criticism of the phenomenological *method*, of *consciousness as such*, and of the *transcendental ego*. While he did make use on occasion of methods and reductions à la Husserl, his numerous contributions to *ethics*, *metaphysics*, *philosophical anthropology*, *philosophy of religion*, *sociology* and to contemporary political and cultural issues are based on the overwhelming power of phenomenological *intuition*. This is to say that, whereas methods lead to a result once methodological procedures are carried out, the nature of such a result is, as it is in mathematics, already given to some degree as something to be sought and established before an application of a method. In Scheler's phenomenology, there is a phenomenologically intuited, *a priori* meaning-content, i.e., a noematic phenomenon, at the very outset of phenomenological investigations—hence, his copious presentations on human phenomena such as *shame*, *the tragic*, *resentment*, *love*, *sympathy*, *repentance*, *aging and dying*, *model persons*, the moral condition of philosophical knowledge, Asian culture, *et al.* The fabric of intuition bears out at the same time the order of *values* and their ranks as felt in the human heart (*ordo amoris*). With this, broadly speaking, Scheler keeps up an age-old tradition—one neither espoused in his own time, nor today—that *love* precedes knowledge, or knowledge is neither antecedent to, nor constitutive of love and feelings.

Let two of many statements be recorded here that were made right after Scheler's untimely demise:

Ortega y Gasset: "With the death of Scheler Europe lost its greatest mind."

Martin Heidegger: "There is no one amongst serious philosophers in our time who would not be essentially indebted to him. There is no one who could replace the living prospect of philosophy that we lost with his death. This irreplaceableness, however, is the token of his greatness."

Max Scheler was born in Munich, Germany, August 22, 1874. His father was Lutheran, his mother Jewish. He studied medicine and philosophy in Munich and Berlin. He received his doctorate in philosophy in 1897 and his *Habilitationsschrift* was approved in 1899, both at the University of Jena under the direction of R. Eucken. In 1899, he converted to Roman Catholicism, a religious involvement that accompanied him more or less during his first period of philosophical productivity. He taught philosophy at the University of Munich from 1900 to 1906 and became familiar with the fledgling phenomenological movement, of which he, however, remained independent throughout his life. His unusually growing rate of publications won him renown beyond Germany's borders by 1920, the year which roughly marks the end of his first period.

From 1919 on he taught at the University of Cologne until his death in Frankfurt on May 19, 1928. These years more or less cover the second period of his productivity, characterized by research into metaphysics and philosophical anthropology, a field of which he was the initiator. His thought became rapidly known worldwide. Deteriorating health obliged him to cancel invitations to lecture in Japan for two years, Russia, and in the United States.

In what follows, the study of Scheler's philosophy will be divided into two parts: the first period; and the second period. As much as possible, the chronological order of the development of his thought will be observed.

The first period of Scheler's philosophy ranges from 1887 to roughly 1920. The title of his 1897 doctoral Dissertation, *Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien*, already points to an issue that would accompany him for the rest of his life: the clarification of the difference between the logic of reason and the logic of the heart or, between thinking, on the one hand, and loving, on the other. His analyses of this difference were treated in more detail in *Toward a Phenomenology and Theory of Feelings of Sympathy and of Love and Hate* (1913), expanded in 1923 as *The Nature of Sympathy*. These analyses were carried over into his monumental ethics of values, entitled, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values. A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism* (1913; printing finished in 1916).

Mention needs to be made of the fact that there are two early works by Scheler that have recently been posthumously published in the German edition of his collected works and whose texts have remained hitherto more or less unknown. They cast light on Scheler's early judicious reasoning about E. Husserl's phenomenology and they cast light as well on the origins of Scheler's later *Metaphysics*.

Concerning the first, Scheler and Husserl met first likely in 1902. In their discussion both realized they had expanded the phenomenological notion of intuition independently of each other. Between 1902 and 1904, Scheler wrote a first volume of a book entitled *Logik*. Upon completing this first volume, he withdrew it from the printer in 1905/6. His reasons for so doing are unclear. In it, however, there is pungent criticism of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900–01). Scheler's main point had been to show Husserl's alleged Platonism in that work.

The second work concerned is a posthumously published lecture that Scheler gave on philosophical *Biology* at the University of Munich in 1908/9. In Section III of this lecture, he already described what was later to become an overriding theme of his *Metaphysics*. The essence of this issue lies in the concept of "fluctuation" (*der Wechsel*) as a principle of the center of the self-activating vital energy in individual and universal life. In both his phenomenology and metaphysics, the principle of fluctuation lies at the origin in life, constituting both *spatialization* and *temporalization* and, secondarily, objective space and objective time in humans. At the bottom of vital energy, temporalization and spatialization are not yet separated from one another. Hence, the foundation of vital energy is also referred to as four-dimensional.

Later, in his second period of productivity, this principle of vital energy would bear the name "*Der Drang*," or "*impulsion*." Since Scheler entertained only loose ties with the phenomenological movement, it appears commendable to list some guidelines that characterize his phenomenology as very distinct from that of Husserlians:

1. Consciousness presupposes a *form* of its existence: this is the *person*.
2. The *ego* is an object of internal perception.
3. Time-consciousness presupposes the self-activity of vital energy ("*Drang*").
4. Methods are secondary. Intuition is primary. It must not contain sensory data.
5. Emotive value-ception (*Wertnehmung*) precedes inner and outer perception and acts of willing and of thinking.

6. *Reality* is constituted in *resistance*.

7. Consciousness is "*becoming*" (*Bewusstseinswerdung*).

While Scheler continued to pursue his philosophical research, it should at this point be mentioned that the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918) caused his interests to take on a new direction. He began to write on national and international political issues. He continued to be concerned with them up to the end of his life. In 1914/15 he wrote a book, entitled, *The Genius of War* (1914/15), that strongly echoed the general German enthusiasm surrounding the outbreak of World War I. The book was replete with antagonism towards the Allies. But he dampened his own enthusiasm in about 1916 when he published another book entitled *The Causes for the Hatred of Germans*. While in later years Scheler discounted his earlier flirtation with Germany's declaration of World War I, at least to the extent that he did not justify it after the war was lost, in his second period he increasingly envisaged the upcoming dangers of a World War II (1939–1945) and in 1927 openly condemned the growing Nazi movement, Marxism in Russia, and Fascism in Italy. Finally, his political writings forecast humanity's future as a "World-Era of Adjustment," i.e., as a gradual convergence among all peoples and cultures in accordance with historical laws based on a historical development stemming from peculiar shifts in human drives.

Now let us continue with a concise synopsis of his major philosophical works of the first period. The main themes of his books on *The Nature of Sympathy* and of his *Formalism in Ethics* are the following.

In Part I of the book on Sympathy, Scheler pointed to four basic types of *feelings* that humans can share with one another. They are; Joint Feelings with others (*Miteinanderfühlen*); Fellow Feeling (*Mitgefühl*); Psychic Contagion (*Gefühlsansteckung*); and Emotional Identification (*Einsgefühl*).

A case of joint feeling is present when a father and a mother are looking at their deceased child. The sorrow is mutual and one and the same in the two persons. A person joining this scene has a fellow feeling with them. Psychic contagion occurs subconsciously, for instance, among people finding themselves in a raging crowd. Their egos are just about extinct. They neither notice, nor care about people being trampled to death near them. This feeling also occurs among animals as in wildly running buffalo herds.

Part II is a detailed analysis of love and hate. It is the first instance in which Scheler shows that love is at the heart of the nature of being human, a position that he held and kept on explaining throughout his life. The bearer of love, the person, partakes in three kinds of

love: spiritual, psychic, and passionate love. His analysis of hate, on the other hand, remains in the background in the book. A detailed explanation of hate is found in one of his most remarkable essays, written in 1914, and entitled *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen*. In Part III of the book, he offers a phenomenological investigation of the pre-givenness of the alter ego, which is likely among the very first, if not the first, thesis presented on this subject and one that remained rather popular throughout the twentieth century.

The first part of the title of Scheler's value-ethics, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* has two antithetical parts. *Formalism in Ethics* refers to all ethics of the past that is based on formal judgments. Scheler mostly uses Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* as an example to show that it is *Non-Formal Ethics* that can do justice to the role of values and the individual person in ethics, a role insufficiently treated, if at all, in formal ethics. Scheler dismissed some presuppositions found in Kant's formal *Critique of Practical Reason* as erroneous by showing that the entire realm of acts of feeling had been misjudged in the past as being nothing but a chaos that according to formalism in ethics has to be ordered by reason. In *Formalism in Ethics*, we are told that this has been a false assessment of feelings made throughout the past. Instead, there is a principle uncovered by Scheler according to which a value is phenomenologically given in acts of feeling and that both an act of feeling and its noema, a value, have an inherent a priori order. Scheler applied Blaise Pascal's (1623–1662) moral theorem that the human heart has reasons of its own—“*Le coeur a ses raisons*”—which do not only differ from logical reasons, but to which rationality can even be blind. While Scheler elaborated more on the priority of feelings and of love, in his 1914 essay entitled “*Ordo Amoris*” one finds references to the *ordo amoris* also in his *Formalism*. Scheler offered a number of demonstrations that, in the order of their phenomenological foundation, feelings precede, as mentioned above, perception, willing, and thinking.

What is the nature of values? First, values as such do not exist unless they occur with or on things. Second, while values exist only in relation to entities, they are nevertheless independent of entities they occur on. That is to say, feeling values is independent of objects perceived or thought. For this reason, Scheler insists, values are analogous to colors. For just as the color green is independent of the cloth, paper or leaves that the color green is on, so also a value is independent of objects that it may belong to. The value of comfort is independent of a chair or a garment felt to be comfortable. Moreover, values are

also analogous to spectral colors hidden behind visible colorations. The five ranks of values form a value-spectrum hidden under a myriad of constantly changing nuances among values felt at any time and under any circumstance whatsoever. The value of justice, as a spectral value is independent of variations or nuances of justice among legal systems or during different historical periods, and it is independent also of any amendment made to a constitution, of different individual cases that justice is applied to in court. The value itself, Scheler emphasizes, is *a priori* “felt” as (1) what it as a value is, and (2) as it is felt with regard to the place that the value of justice has among value ranks. For example, a feeling of justice, or of injustice, is a feeling that is a priori different from the value-rank of vital feelings of health or illness, let alone of a sensible feelings of pleasure or pain. There must exist, then, a phenomenologically intuitable “order” among the five value ranks.

The order of values falls into two groups. Values are either relative to life and a lived body (*Leib*), or they are relative to only personal feelings. Starting with the set of value ranks in their ascending order, i.e., from their lowest to their highest rank, the following ranks are to be distinguished, each rank also dividing into positive and their opposite negative values.

1. Pleasure values, which are those values experienced as “agreeable” or “not agreeable,” comfortable or not comfortable to the lived body. The feeling of these values is localizable on or in the body. They are to a certain extent controllable by the will or by mental techniques, for example. They are more controllable by medical treatment. In all such cases, pleasure values are always potentially manageable.
2. Pragmatic values. These pertain to what is “useful” or “not useful.” These values play a salient role in technology, science, and in everyday life. They, too, are manageable and localizable in things, although to a lesser degree than the pleasure values are.
3. Life Values. Life values span what is “noble” down to what is “common.” They span all living nature including human beings. Feelings of health and sickness, of strength and weakness, of giving birth, aging and oncoming death, the feeling of blood bonds, are cases in point. This rank has one value that applies only to humans. This is the value of the “heroic.”
4. Values of the Mind. These values are values felt only in the human person. While the former values are shared with animals to whatever degree, mental values are felt as being entirely separate from them. Mental values fall into three groups: the value of the cognition

of truth; aesthetic values of beauty; and the value of justice. Mental values are given only to personal feelings and in this they are clearly separate from any feelings in the lived body and of life.

5. The highest value rank is given in a feeling of the "holy." As is the case of all other values, a feeling of the holy does not imply any specific object like a specific deity. The feeling can pertain to any deity as found in the history of religious beliefs, including mythology. The holy can even pertain to what individuals or groups deem to be "absolute," such as a fetish, matter (materialism), or even a complete absence of the holy (atheism). But the value rank of the holy itself, even if only as an absolute, remains inherent in consciousness. There is no consciousness without a "sphere" of the absolute.

Surprisingly enough, the moral values of good and evil are not contained in the ranks of values. This is because good and evil "come up" in personal existence and in a unique way. "Good" appears in an act of "leaning-toward," or in what Scheler calls the emotive "preferring" of a higher value rank over a lower value rank. The good appears during the act of realizing a higher value as given in the *ordo amoris*, rather than a lower one. Evil appears in the opposite cases. Scheler recognized that there are also deceptions in feelings of higher and lower values and he wrote a number of essays on this subject also.

In the history of ethics, Scheler's exposition of good and evil marks the first instance of *good* and *evil* as dynamic values that come up in what in phenomenology is now called "passive constitution." During the act of preferring and realizing a higher value, we do not intend to be good or evil, rather, these values are "on the back" of the realization of a higher value. Scheler refuted the position that one should "will" the good although, admittedly, this can in individual cases also be a good thing to do; but willing good can also be fraught with hidden self-deception, by just wanting to showcase one's goodness to other people.

Scheler's demonstration that each value rank is given in respective acts of their being felt bears on various regions of knowledge: (a) historical, (b) theological, and (c) sociological regions.

(a) Historically, the order of values is reflected in terms of five exemplars of personhood. Like the five value-ranks, their respective person-types are spectral also, i.e., hidden behind countless variations of types and characters of persons. A distinction is made between five "ideal" exemplars of personhood, on the one hand, and variations

of their factually existing model persons, on the other. Ideal exemplars, like values, do not exist as such unless they enter into a function, or "functionalize" themselves with existing variations of them in model persons.

Parallel to the ascending order of the five value ranks, Scheler lists the following ideal exemplars of person: 1. the master of the art of living; 2. the leading mind of civilization; 3. the hero; 4. the genius; and 5. the holy person as the founder of a religion. In practice, no living person can be a pure exemplar, but only a specific one. A genius may be a musical, literary, or scientific genius. Therefore, one can make choices among model persons belonging to any one of the five ranks. This is not the case with the holy person. Geniuses like Beethoven, Raphael, or Shakespeare allow for a choice that one can make among them. However, the holy person as the founder of a religion demands unwavering, unconditional faith: "Either you are with me, or against me." No choice.

While pure *exemplars* belong to the *ideas* of the human mind, and while both ideal exemplars and real model persons exercise a "pull" on us that makes us freely follow them, said ideas of them are not inborn. For it is they, the ideal model persons, who "possess us." In his second period, Scheler would show that by itself the mind is "impotent" to produce anything, including the five exemplars of personhood. Ideas must enter into functions with realizing factors for them to become reality in practice. If they fail to enter into such a function, ideas remain ineffective.

A most engaging aspect of existing model persons is Scheler's axiom of it in *education*. There is nothing on earth that makes a person a good person from the bottom of his or her heart other than freely following his or her good exemplary person. This moral pull coming from an exemplary person to us may have been exercised by parents on their child, by a teacher on students. It may or may not have come from a saintly person, a president, or others whose self-value pulls people toward them not by design but by their heart alone. Hence any formalism in ethics asking one to respond rationally to a Kantian "categorical imperative" fails to address the very heart of the person as an individually unique, irreplaceable value-person (*Wertperson*) and a person's possible moral exemplarity.

(b) The order of the five value ranks has bearings on theology. The upper three ideal exemplars: the hero, the genius, and the holy person—corresponding to the three highest value ranks of life, mind, and of the value of the holy—apply to three perspectives of the Godhead's revelation to humans in that same order: namely God as the Almighty, God as the Omniscient, and as God of Love.

Now the subtitle of Scheler's Value-Ethics, "A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism", may be even more indicative of his intentions in ethics. The new attempt pertains (1) to the explication of the person as the bearer of all values and (2) to the person as a member of different forms of communality.

1. While since Aristotle, human beings have mainly been seen as rational animals and, in addition to the Aristotelian definition, more recently as beings whose essence is their consciousness, ego, or practical reason, Scheler challenged these and other characterizations of human nature. He tried to show that neither reason, consciousness, nor the ego can exist without having the form of "person," and that there is no mind that is not a personal mind. This is why Scheler rejected both a "pure" consciousness and a transcendental ego as "evidential non-sense."

Scheler's contention that "person" is the form of mind or of "spirit," as he preferred to say, hinges on three points: a) the person is shown to exist only in the "execution" of acts. From this follows that the person cannot and must never be treated like a thing. Rather, the (verbal) be-ing of the person (*das Sein der Person*) is existence acted out into "world openness." Yet, in each indivisible moment, this act-being of the person realizes his or her existence by being an embodied person. The lived body and its central vital energy, called impulsion, is one of the factors necessary to realize ideas of the mind. Mind by itself, i.e., without this and other realizing factors, remains impotent.

With this emphasis, Scheler offered a new conceptualization of the traditional but familiar problem of essence and existence. It is through the capacity of *resistance* inherent in the vital energy of impulsion that existence and reality are given to us. On the other hand, the nature and whatness of entities is given through the mind. The person is a continuously self-realizing existence. In this process the person's ideas must "functionalize" with realizing factors of social, cultural, geographic, political and economic conditions at hand. It is only in terms of these conjunctions between mind and such realizing factors that ideas of the mind become workable. If they do not fit these realizing conditions, the ideas remain dormant. Essential characteristics of the form of the mind, the person, are the following:

Each person acts out his or her own existence in his or her "unique" way. No two or more persons can be alike. True, all persons act out the same types of acts, such as thinking, willing, feeling, remembering, expecting, etc. However, each person acts them out with an individual, personal quality. This particular individuality

of the acting out of acts Scheler referred to as the "qualitative direction" of acts by which each person is different from another person.

As form of the mind, the person, is independent of gender, racial affiliation, social standing, religious and cultural association. The form of the mind must not be understood as encompassing the mind or consciousness. Rather, the person is shown to be permeating every act of each individual mind. That is to say, the form is continuously self-becoming in each individually different act like that of loving, thinking, willing, etc. The person also varies in good and bad deeds that carry with them traces of the individual person.

Last not least, the person is value-being (*Wertperson*) whose individual value is irreplaceable and unrepeatable. As the highest value of all values, the person is the "value of values."

The fact of no two persons being alike because of the unique qualitative direction of the acts of each person calls for a clarification of how the permanent order of five value ranks in the person's *ordo amoris* is compatible with individually varying and different persons and the different directions of their acts.

The answer to this question cannot be solved by assuming that there is an underlying transcendental ego. The answer lies in an individual *refraction* of the permanent order of values, a refraction that corresponds to each person's qualitative direction of acts. Such refraction of the order of values is also present in different types of communities and different historical periods.

With this relativity of individual and communal refraction of the ordered values, Scheler was able to preserve the freedom of the individual person, especially that of democracy. Indeed, by abstaining from a categorical imperative, his *Formalism in Ethics* reaches the conclusion that all divisible values of the lower value ranks, such as nutrition and health, "ought" to be equally distributed among humans "on earth," whereas realizations of mental and sacred values remain a matter of the conscience and moral tenor (*Gesinnung*) of the person. "To put it plainly, aristocracy 'in heaven' does not preclude democracy 'on earth'." Before God, therefore, and morally, all persons are unequal. This result of value-ethics stands in stark contrast to ideologies pleading for political and social egalitarianism among persons. Egalitarianism is revealed as an outcome of modern resentment deeply seated in various types of individual ineptitudes, including the inability to face morally qualitative differences among individual persons.

2. There are five different forms of social togetherness among persons. These social forms are "co-original."

I. RECEPTION: INTERPRETATION, ASSIMILATION AND ELABORATION AROUND THE WORLD AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

GERMAN PHENOMENOLOGY FROM LANDGREBE AND FINK TO WALDENFELS

Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink can rightly be considered as the *Dioscuri* of German phenomenological thought of the period after World War II. In addition, the course that their human and philosophical lives took was parallel from several points of view, marked as it was by the teachings of Husserl and their close collaboration with the master, for both were his assistants and also editors of some of his fundamental works.¹ In both cases, their personal and intellectual lives were profoundly characterized by their political distance from the Nazi regime during the years of their philosophical maturation and later by their common support for the cultural project of preserving the phenomenological tradition proposed by the Husserl Archive in Leuven.² A non-dogmatic attitude toward the phenomenological school, openness to other varieties of contemporary philosophy, whether or not of a phenomenological matrix, and especially to Heidegger's philosophy, as well as their constant solicitude for the philosophical tradition, working to impart Husserl's ideas and the training of the younger generations represent other common features characterizing their thought and their lives. The Catholic University of Leuven made a very happy and appropriate decision to grant them honorary doctorates on April 2, 1971, at a time when both were already emeritus professors at their respective universities and also internationally well known for their scholarly work. This was almost as if to place a seal on a twinning far more profound than the differences that yet separated the two men.³

Landgrebe was born in Vienna on March 9, 1902 and died in Bergisch Gladbach on August 14, 1991. During the years immediately following World War II, he sought new beginnings by which to rebuild the foundations of thought from the rubble of a tradition which had seemingly gone to ruin, but which in actual fact was still vital and capable of being regenerated. With this end in view, right from the beginning he turned to phenomenology, the philosophy of life, the metaphysical tradition of German idealism and Heidegger's reflections, not least of all with a view to sketching a new phenomenological metaphysics, a new inquiry into being itself.⁴

In particular, Landgrebe attributed central importance to the theme of historicity and the ultimate and irreducible fact of human existence. So the late Husserl (together with Dilthey and Heidegger) was therefore his privileged fount for defining the problem of the historicity of consciousness, life, and the world.⁵ For Landgrebe, the centrality of the question of human beings must not be understood in the sense of a simple emergence of an anthropological type. Rather, human beings were the ultimate principle of philosophy, their being the true fount of every apperception, their facticity and corporeity. In Landgrebe's opinion, their being together with others in a common world and historical situation represented the radicalization, fulfillment and abandonment of the Cartesian assumption, all of which he held to have been realized first and foremost in Husserl's phenomenology, but then also in Heidegger's thought and in contemporary philosophical reflection bearing the German and French imprint.⁶

For Landgrebe, the constant reference to Husserl and Heidegger was certainly not that of a relationship of "respective exclusion" of particular ideas, but rather one of a "reciprocal integration" that Landgrebe sought to highlight.⁷ As far as Landgrebe was concerned, the intentionality of consciousness, the process of reduction to absolute subjectivity and of constitution—with its correlates of passivity and activity, on the one hand, and the thematization of facticity of *Dasein* and its historicity, on the other—could not but be inseparable conditions for rethinking the great themes of the philosophical tradition and even the absolute of an Aristotle or a Hegel.⁸ Phenomenology, and particularly genetic and transcendental phenomenology, had to be rethought as a transcendental theory of history, and in this connection he especially sought textual support for his interpretation in Husserl's notes of the 1930s about the founding 'fact' of the I as absolute and originary foundation and in his manuscripts of the 1920s about history as 'the great fact of absolute

being'.⁹ In the aporia between 'fact' and 'essence' that characterizes the 'absolute fact' and the '*Faktizität*'¹⁰ with which the late Husserl concerned himself, there appear the two fundamental reference points of the I and history. Inseparable one from the other, they are therefore to be thematized, precisely in their inseparability, as transcendental genesis, transcendental history of consciousness, on the one hand, and as history of its experience, as empirical history, but also as absolute history, on the other. "Consciousness is in itself this history. It is not consciousness of a history, but rather the place of its formation".¹¹ Yet, "history is the sphere of absolute factuality and, inasmuch as it is such, it is the theme of metaphysics".¹²

The highly ethical aspect of phenomenological reflection is constantly stressed by Landgrebe, for example, in his accentuation of the relationship with the other and the world, in underscoring the phenomenological theory of constitution as the foundation of a philosophy of absolute responsibility or in exalting the highly practical significance of every reflection.¹³ In this connection, the phenomenological concept of the horizon of possibilities becomes of fundamental importance, just as does its rooting in consciousness of an 'I can' that is genetically preliminary to every 'I am'.¹⁴ Here we have the philosophical foundation upon which it becomes possible to think the radical contingency on which every society, intersubjectivity or ethico-political action is based.¹⁵ As far as Landgrebe is concerned, here we also have the foundation of every philosophy of politics. Indeed, in human '*Sein-Können*', we have the ontological foundation on the basis of which one has to think the roots of the phenomenon of capacity and power, as well as the process of action and connected projections of possibilities to be realized. Here we have to also concentrate our attention on the problem of utopia, which must not be considered insignificant as if were just a question of fantasies without any context and must rather be understood according to its productive and directional potential.¹⁶ Even though this aspect of Husserl's reflection is not pursued further, considerable significance attaches to the fact that Landgrebe repeatedly underscores the crucial nature of the phenomenological concept of possibility and, more particularly, that of '*Vermöglichkeit*', i.e., facultative possibility, dispositional capability, the true root of consciousness of what is possible and the difference between what is possible and what is real, as well as the crux of the dual characterization of subjectivity and its corporeity as both constitutive and constituted, as *possibilitas* and *potentia*.¹⁷

His untiring activity as an organizer of cultural events, a member of academies, institutes, scientific commissions

or committees of philosophical journals and participant in publishing initiatives,¹⁸ his commitment to the dissemination of philosophical theories and ideas through the mass media as well,¹⁹ the fame that his writings enjoyed abroad and the repeated invitations to be lecturer and visiting professor,²⁰ as well as his indefatigable intellectual support for the younger generations have conferred upon Ludwig Landgrebe the aura of a master and made him one of the most significant points of reference of international phenomenological scholarship in the period after the World War II.²¹ Among the phenomenologists directly influenced by his teachings and his writings one may mention, among others, Gerd Brand, Lothar Eley, Ulrich Claesges, Klaus Held, Paul Janssen, Antonio Aguirre, Ante Pažanin, Öney Sözer, Ram Adhar Mall, all of whom worked the vein of an inquiry into transcendental consciousness, intentionality or genetic phenomenology, the life world and history, in confrontation with the philosophy of language and intercultural issues.²²

EUGEN FINK

Eugen Fink was born in Constance on December 11, 1905 and died in Freiburg on July 25, 1975. During the 1930s, thanks not least to his closeness to the master and the task of refashioning *Cartesian Meditations* that had been entrusted to him, as well as Husserl's work on *Crisis*, Eugen Fink had become—as it were—the depository and custodian of phenomenology in Germany, this to the point that Husserl himself, in presenting one of his student's articles, could say that he fully shared the ideas contained in it and could underwrite every single sentence.²³ Fink's writings of the 1930s already prefigure the attention that he was to pay to the phenomenological problem of the world, which was to become a constant feature of his thought, and to the ontological issues, also based on Heidegger's thought, that were eventually to become a significant reference point.²⁴

In actual fact, many of the texts published after World War II reproduce his university lectures, some published posthumously by the Eugen Fink Archive established at the Pädagogische Hochschule of Freiburg University.²⁵ In the engrossing, explanatory style of a teacher, they sketch the fundamental lines of a theoretical approach that moves between Husserl and Heidegger, but also between Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and the tradition of Greek thought, this in the sense of a redefinition of subjectivity and existence and within the great metaphysical questions connected with being, truth and the world.²⁶ The first course that he taught at Freiburg during the summer

semester of 1946 had systematically moved from an inquiry into the starting point of philosophy, starting, above all, with Husserl and the intentional analysis of the horizon of the world, but integrating into this phenomenological perspective Heidegger's question about being, the ontological difference and *aletheia*, Hegel's concept of the absolute and the associated need for a first philosophy, and Kant's question about the transcendental: here we have the fundamental questions of metaphysics that were to constitute a constant point of reference also for Fink's subsequent work.²⁷ Against this backdrop, what was subsequently above all studied was the problem of the world, a true source of torment for every theory. It was examined as the transcendental horizon of the problem of being, an open horizon anchored and centered in one's own body (*Leib*), i.e., as the ultimate starting point of every orientation, a horizon whose essence expresses itself by giving space and leaving time to entities and being itself.²⁸ It is the problem of the world rather than the problem of being that has to be subtracted from the oblivion of metaphysics. It is the cosmological difference between world and thing that has to be rethought, rather than the ontological difference between being and entity, this being the only way in which one could at long last pose the problem of human openness to the world.²⁹

Fink's thought also represents the attempt to reformulate an expressly mundane philosophical anthropology intended to analyze the fundamental phenomena underlying *Dasein*, commencing with a self-interpretation of existence.³⁰ Death, work, conflict, love and play represent the five fundamental reference points, sign posts along the way, formal indicators, each with a specificity of its own, but each comprehensible only in relation to the other, in a kind of circular, mutual implication and in common reference to corporeity.³¹ Only human beings, as distinct from both animals and God, are essentially "*workers, players, lovers, fighters and mortal*".³² It is above all awareness of one's own finitude, and therefore of time and death in their relation with nothingness, that characterizes every inquiry intended to be radical, and it is here that Fink's thought comes particularly close to Heidegger's in *Being and Time*.³³ Death, the most disquieting indicator of our finitude, is at one and the same time also the ground upon which human historicity is constituted, since it is human beings who interact with and transform the world, since it is human beings who fight and even kill.³⁴ Faced with the misery of surviving, but also proudly conscious of their productivity, human beings—on account of their work—know themselves to be a factor in the reality that surrounds them and that they dominate with their technology, but also to be part of a society.

In love, they know themselves to be no more than a fragment in need of completion, while in playing—and it is here that Nietzsche's influence emerges in a rather lively way—they can inhabit the intermediate spaces of the 'as if' and the passages between the real and the imaginary. However, it is precisely in the unreality that inaugurates playing that there emerges the hyper-reality of essence and being and that sense and meaning announce themselves.³⁵ The relationship with the future, what is possible, the horizon of what is feasible, what is potential or imaginable are what characterize these five fundamental dimensions of life. They are underlain by a common project or planning, but also by the reminder of one's own impotence and the reference to the others within an intersubjective horizon and a common world.³⁶

In particular, Fink considers playing to be an authentic philosophical problem.³⁷ Inasmuch as it is human playing, playing not only has a mundane significance as a phenomenon that can be analyzed, but is also a fundamental existential phenomenon and even symbol of the world. Inasmuch as it is also the playing of the world, in this form it becomes a metaphor for the very essence of being.³⁸ In an ideal continuation of Heraclitus (according to whom the course of the world is like a child playing with dice) and Nietzsche (according to whom the world is the playing of a god),³⁹ Fink's ideas about playing set out to highlight above all the relationship that becomes established between reality and such really existing unrealities as—for example—a story put on stage, or the reflection of something on a surface mirroring it.⁴⁰ As far as Fink is concerned, it is precisely in the character of the unreality of playing and in its visionary modality that there most clearly emerges its confrontation with the imaginary, its being the recovery and enjoyment of lost possibilities,⁴¹ a variation full of fantasy that proffers not the real, but its essential and authentic core, as shown, for example, by the experience of the feast, the cult, magical practices, the mask, sacred representation. But more than a relation with being, playing is a relation with the world, openness to the world, which is like a whole without any foundation, without purpose and without sense, and must therefore necessarily be thought of as a game without players.⁴²

Active and indefatigable in his commitment to cultural activities, convinced proponent of the need for dissemination and pedagogical mediation, Fink was one of the promoters of the so-called Bremen Plan of 1960 for the reform of the school system and for a new type of training for teachers.⁴³ He also taught at *Volkshochschule*, from the lectern of numerous academic institutions in Germany and abroad, in continuing education radio courses

intended for industrial workers.⁴⁴ Like Landgrebe, Fink, too, gathered entire generations of students around him, and not just Germans, who were to make his work internationally known, as is readily evident also in the bibliography of his writings, bearing witness not only to the wide spectrum of his interests, but also to the penetration of his thought into other linguistic environments.⁴⁵ Recent decades have seen his philosophical views made the subject of numerous international symposiums, testimony to the great interest with which his work continues to be read.⁴⁶

However, phenomenological research in Germany after World War II not only developed around heirs and perpetuators of Husserl's tradition like Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink, but also and above all around the institutions established to edit and publish his texts and to sustain common discussion. Apart from the two branches of the Husserl Archives in Cologne and Freiburg—where Landgrebe and Fink were succeeded by Elisabeth Ströker and Werner Marx respectively⁴⁷ (and which are now headed by Klaus Düsing and Klaus Erich Kaehler, and by Micheal Großheim and Hans-Helmuth Gander)—the task of perpetuating German phenomenology fell, above all, to the Husserl Archive at Leuven and, more particularly, to its publishing endeavors.⁴⁸ Another important institution that has also acted to stimulate the confrontation of ideas and the encounter of phenomenologists is the Deutsche Gesellschaft für phänomenologische Forschung, which, founded in 1971, has organized numerous meetings and since 1975 has been publishing the *Phänomenologische Forschungen* series (published by Alber) that, twenty years later, was to be transformed into a regular journal directed by Ernst Wolfgang Orth.⁴⁹

Among the various phenomenological groups that formed around personalities of philosophical scholarship and production I shall here recall only the Bochum Circle that had Bernhard Waldenfels at its center during the years that he taught at the university and which continues to be a true breeding ground of ideas and initiatives.⁵⁰ Waldenfels, who benefited from Franco-German training, for at Munich he was in contact above all with Helmut Kuhn and in Paris with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, mainly sought to transform Husserl's transcendental and intentional approach into a 'dialogic' founded on the phenomenology of existence and bodily co-existence, proposing a reflection at the level of intercorporeity and polyrelationality.⁵¹ The phenomenological question of what is '*fremd*' (in English foreign, alien, strange and unknown!), which—inasmuch as it is a solicitation of and appeal to the extraordinary—reaches beyond the limits of what from time to time constitutes our personal and

collective order, has been developed, above all, in his most recent writings, in which he proposes a 'responsive' phenomenology, posing the problem of the other neither in the nominative, nor the accusative, but in the dative, in that '*to which*' that motivates the response and the responsibility, unbalancing any pretense of symmetry.⁵² Attentive to the findings of the human and social sciences, stimulated also by the critical and dissident Marxism of Eastern Europe, by analytic philosophy, by structuralism and, of course, by the more significant expressions of recent French work in philosophy (for example, Foucault, Levinas, Ricœur and Derrida), Waldenfels has acted, and is still acting, as a mediator for French phenomenology in Germany and for German phenomenology in France and other countries, thus giving proof of a *synphilosophie* that goes well beyond a mere twinning on the borders of the Rhine.⁵³ Before concluding, deserving brief mention is the bi-annual *Journal Phänomenologie* published under the auspices of Vienna's Gruppe Phänomenologie and the Bochum Phenomenological Circle.

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NOTES

¹ As is well known, Landgrebe was Husserl's assistant in the period 1923–30, Fink in the years 1928–38. The former was the editor of *Erfahrung und Urteil*, the latter looked after the supplement of *Krisis* and also the *VI. Cartesianische Meditation*, which was to be published only after Fink's death. Cf. E. Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil* (1976); *Id.*, "Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentionalhistorisches Problem" (1938–39); E. Fink, *VI. Cartesianische Meditation* (1988).

² Landgrebe left Germany in 1933 and, after having obtained his *Habilitation* with Oskar Kraus at Prague's Charles University with a thesis on Marty's philosophy of language—cf. L. Landgrebe, *Nennfunktion und Wortbedeutung* (1934)—worked there until 1939, animating Prague's Philosophical Circle in close collaboration with Jan Patočka. Between 1939 and 1940 both Landgrebe and Fink worked alongside one another at the Husserl Archive in Leuven, editing the manuscripts left by the master. The war then obliged the former to work with a commercial firm in Hamburg (in the years 1940–45), while the latter served as a private in the German army. The years immediately following the war saw Landgrebe first as professor at Kiel (1947–56), until he was called to Cologne University to take on the chair previously held by Heinz Heimsoeth (1956), where, together with Karl-Heinz Volkman-Schluck, he also directed the Husserl Archive, which had been set up there in 1951 as a branch of the archive at Leuven. Fink received his *Habilitation* at Freiburg University in 1946, where he was to

receive appointment in 1948 as Visiting Professor and later as Ordinary Professor of Philosophy and Science of Education. Ever since 1950 a branch of the Husserl Archive has existed also at Freiburg University, and Fink remained its director until 1971.

³ Cf. H. L. van Breda, "Laudatio für Ludwig Landgrebe und Eugen Fink", in *Phänomenologie heute*, (ed.) W. Biemel (1972), pp. 1–13.

⁴ Cf. L. Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik* (1949), pp. 7–11 ("Vorwort"), 132–147 ("Das Problem einer absoluten Erkenntnis"). With the exception of the "Gedächtnisrede auf Edmund Husserl 1938" (pp. 12–21), the commemorative speech made at the Prague Philosophical Circle and the essay on "Das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit des Lebens und die Phänomenologie Husserls" (pp. 22–55), which goes back to a lecture given at Göttingen's Kant Society in 1932, the other articles of the late 1930s and the 1940s were all re-published in the essay collection published by his pupils in honor of his sixtieth birthday; cf. L. Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie* (1969³), pp. 9–110. Landgrebe's doctoral thesis, directed by Husserl and presented at Freiburg University in 1927, was devoted to Dilthey's philosophy; cf. L. Landgrebe, "Wilhelm Diltheys Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften" (1928). Cf. also L. Landgrebe, *Philosophie der Gegenwart* (1961³), p. 18 ("Einleitung"); the philosophical parabola outlined by this text proceeds from a question regarding the essence of man and, by means of an inquiry about the world as nature and history, poses the problem of artistic expression, of knowledge and action, and eventually concludes with a reflection about the problem of being; cf. in particular Chap. VII: "Das Problem des Seins. Philosophie und Theologie".

⁵ About the late Husserl of *Erste Philosophie* and *Krisis*, cf. for example L. Landgrebe, "Husserls Abschied vom Cartesianismus" in *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, pp. 163–206. Cf. also S. Poggi, "Filosofia della vita, fenomenologia ed esistenzialismo in Ludwig Landgrebe" (1973).

⁶ Cf. L. Landgrebe, *Philosophie der Gegenwart*, p. 43 (Chap. I: "Das Wesen des Menschlichen"); in this text Landgrebe refers also to the highly topical discussion going on at the time and animated by, among others, Heidegger and Jaspers, Sartre and Camus. Cf. also *Id.*, "Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre. Trois aspects de la phénoménologie" (1964). For a confrontation with Dilthey and Gadamer, cf. also *Id.*, *Phänomenologie und Geschichte* (1968). On the theme of corporeity and the confrontation with Merleau-Ponty, see in particular *Id.*, "Die Phänomenologie der Leiblichkeit und das Problem der Materie" and "Merleau-Pontys Auseinandersetzung mit Husserls Phänomenologie" in *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*, pp. 135–47 and 167–81. For a discussion of the problem of philosophical anthropology in confrontation with the tradition and the contemporary debate and for a prefiguration of an ineffable universality of the subject of an experience that is absolute, but true in its being alive and responsible, cf. *Id.*, "Philosophische Anthropologie—Eine empirische Wissenschaft?" in *Die Welt des Menschen—Die Welt der Philosophie*, ed. W. Biemel (1976), pp. 1–20.

⁷ L. Landgrebe, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, p. 11, Note 3 ("Husserls Phänomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung"). For a problematization of the mutual integration of Husserl's thought and that of Heidegger, cf. also *Id.*, "Faktizität und Individuation" in *Faktizität und Individuation* (1982), pp. 102–16.

⁸ Cf. L. Landgrebe, *Phänomenologie und Metaphysik*, pp. 148–99 ("Phänomenologische Bewußtseinsanalyse und Metaphysik", reprinted also in *Id.*, *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, 75–110). For a reflection about the problem of the relationship between phenomenology and dialectics, cf. in particular *Id.*, "Phänomenologische Analyse und Dialektik" in *Dialektik und Genesis in der Phänomenologie*, ed. E. W. Orth (1980), pp. 21–88. Cf. also *Id.*, "Das Problem der Dialektik" in *Phänomenologie und Geschichte*, pp. 80–134. Landgrebe was also well known as a persistent inspirer of studies concerning classical German philosophy and as a proponent of a philosophical approach to the thought of Marx.

⁹ Cf. L. Landgrebe, "Die Phänomenologie als transzendente Theorie der Geschichte" in *Phänomenologie und Praxis*, ed. E. W. Orth (1976), pp. 17–47. Cf. also L. Landgrebe, "Meditation über Husserls Wort 'Die Geschichte ist das große Faktum des absoluten Seins'", "Faktizität und Individuation" and "Faktizität als Grenze der Reflexion und die Frage des Glaubens" in *Faktizität und Individuation*, pp. 38–57, 102–16 and 117–36.

¹⁰ The German 'Faktizität' has been variously translated into English as 'factualness' and 'facticity', the former being generally used in connection with the later Husserl, the latter in connection with Heidegger, his lectures of the 1920s being a case in point. Cf. D. Cairns, *Guide for Translating Husserl* (1973), p. 50; M. Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)* (1988); English transl. *Ontology: the Hermeneutics of Facticity* (1999).

¹¹ Cf. L. Landgrebe, "Lebenswelt und Geschichtlichkeit des menschlichen Daseins" (1977), p. 55.

¹² L. Landgrebe, "Meditation über Husserls Wort 'Die Geschichte ist das große Faktum des absoluten Seins'" in *Faktizität und Individuation*, p. 39.

¹³ In this connection cf. L. Landgrebe, "Das Problem der passiven Konstitution" in *Faktizität und Individuation*, pp. 71–87, in particular 87; *Id.*, "Das Problem des Anfangs der Philosophie in der Phänomenologie Husserls" in *Faktizität und Individuation*, pp. 21–37, in particular 30 and 35–36; *Id.*, "Vom Sinn der transzendental-phänomenologischen Reflexion" (1983), in particular pp. 113, 114, 116. The latter text is also a kind of assessment of the development of the author's thought.

¹⁴ Cf. L. Landgrebe, "Der phänomenologische Begriff der Erfahrung" in *Faktizität und Individuation*, pp. 58–70, in particular 66–67. It is interesting to underscore that even the artistic phenomenon and aesthetic experience are considered from this point of view; cf. *Id.*, "Was ist ästhetische Erfahrung?" (1983), in particular pp. 134–39, 142–43.

¹⁵ Cf. L. Landgrebe, *Der Streit um die philosophische Grundlage der Gesellschaftstheorie* (1975), in particular pp. 19, 40 and 35, Note 46.

II. FURTHER INSPIRATIONS AND PROBINGS, NEW BEGINNINGS AND DEVELOPMENTS

JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, A PROFOUND REVISION OF HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

Life taught me 'the force of circumstance'.

—J.-P. Sartre

Jean-Paul Sartre is undoubtedly the one who, along with Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanuel Levinas, contributed the most to the spread of phenomenology in France. While developing a phenomenology of existence or living experience, he carried out a profound revision of Husserlian thought. That revision involved three distinct dimensions, which presuppose one another and overlap, and at the same time constitute the principal stages of his philosophical evolution:

- the phenomenology of consciousness (1933–39)
- ontological phenomenology (1939–48)
- phenomenology of freedom based on moral and political commitment (1950–80)

Here I am going to try to provide a broad, general outline of them because it is impossible to go into detail here.

1. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Born on June 21, 1905 in Paris, Sartre lost his father, a naval officer, very early, at the age of one, and was raised by his mother and his grandparents of the Schweitzer family. After passing his *baccalauréat* examination in 1922, he passed the entrance examination for admission to the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure in 1924. There he frequented Paul Nizan, Raymond Aron, Daniel Lagache, Jean Hyppolite *et al.* In 1929, he met Simone de Beauvoir and prepared with her the oral part of the *agrégation* examination. They both received high scores in the competition. He came in first and she second, after

which he proposed a two year “lease” to her, which was to last a whole lifetime. In November of the same year, he began his eighteen month military service. In 1931, he was appointed to teach philosophy in secondary school in Le Havre, where he taught until 1933. In September 1933, Sartre left for a year in Berlin as a fellow of the French Institute. There he intensely studied the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger, read Scheler and Jaspers. Upon returning to France, he received an appointment as a secondary school teacher in Le Havre (1934–36), then in Laon (1936–37) and finally in Paris (1937). The 1930s saw the publication of his first literary works (*La Nausée* 1937, *Le Mur* 1940) and his first philosophical works (*La Transcendance de l'Ego* 1934, *L'imagination* 1936, *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* 1939, *L'imaginaire* 1940). In September 1939, Sartre was mobilized in Nancy, then in Alsace and taken prisoner in Padoux. In 1941, he was freed and became a secondary school teacher at the Lycée Pasteur, then at the Lycée Condorcet, where he taught until 1944. It was while he was a soldier that Sartre began writing *L'Être et le néant*, which was published in 1943. The book went unnoticed in the beginning, and it was not until the autumn of 1945 that it attracted attention and became the most discussed book in France. This was the beginning of the great existentialist vogue (in October 1945 Sartre gave his famous lecture *Existentialism est un humanisme*) and at that same time, with the publication of the first issue of the review *Les Temps modernes*, which he founded with Maurice Merleau-Ponty, marked the turn towards committed or *engagée* literature and philosophy. This turn led to the existentialist revision of Marxism and a rather ambiguous leftist political commitment, accompanied by long controversies and the breaking off of relationships (with Camus, Merleau-Ponty, then the Communists). If in 1952 Sartre allied joined the Communist movement in opposing the cold war, he found himself obliged to leave it following the 1956 Hungarian uprising. All that left a mark on his philosophical and political writings—*Matérialisme et révolution* (1946), *Les Communistes et la Paix* (1952); *Le fantôme de Staline* (1957)—and culminated in the basic treatise *L'existentialisme et Marxisme* (1957), which was first published in a Polish review and later appeared with the title “Questions de méthode” in his second monumental work, *La Critique de la raison dialectique*, Vol. 1, 1960, the second volume of which was published only after his death (1985). Thus the theme of the last phase of Sartre's work (1950–80), which found expression in a great number of literary and theoretical works, several of them unfinished or not yet published (as, for example, his manuscripts on ethics), is the political

foundations of anthropology. This is what to large extent constitutes, as we will see, the exclusivity of Sartre's existential phenomenology and explains why he refused the Nobel prize in 1964.

2. TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

While Sartre's primary intention was to write, as he noted in his autobiography, *Les Mots* (*Words*), he was, nonetheless, far from becoming a "professional philosopher". In secondary school, and even during his time at *hypokhâgne* (preparatory school for entering the *Ecole Normale*), he found philosophy disgusting: "my teacher, by the name of Bernes, was inordinately difficult and I did not understand what he was talking about. It was in *khâgne* that I made up my mind, under a new teacher, Colonna d'Istria . . .".¹ It was by following the advice of the latter that he began to read *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* by Bergson. He found reading this book captivating. It made him think that philosophy "teaches the truth"² and that one must devote oneself to this. "I decided that I would study philosophy, considering it, at that point, to be simply a methodological description of man's inner states, of his psychological life, all of which would serve as a method and instrument for my literary works".³

This initial confusion, or identification, of philosophy with psychology, as well as Sartre's interest in inner life, in particular the reading of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* and *The Interpretation of Dreams* by Freud, led him to part with idealism, to renounce the conception of the world as a pure idea or pure "state of consciousness". In this context, he admitted in *Les Mots* to having had a tendency to confuse his literary experiences with reality ever since he had been a small child.⁴ Later on, his studies of academic philosophy—the idealistic rationalism of the Sorbonne—fettered him in the beginning, but he little by little managed to rid himself of it.⁵ The decisive break with this idealistic dogmatism, preaching the abstract unity of the world, came about when one of Brunschvicg's students threw herself in a stream and drowned there: "Mr. Brunschvicg recognized then that philosophy of mind had not provided for a comparable case of mental disintegration. He did not cease propounding his thought, but he less often believed what he said. The rest of us did not need this didactic suicide in order to flee this disastrous, cozy idealism that foolishly repeated, to excess, 'Thinking is measuring'".⁶

The questions of everyday life that concerned the young Sartre reinforced in him the desire for a philoso-

phical approach which accorded a place to reality as well as ideas. This is what he would discover completely unexpectedly in Husserlian phenomenology: "The messenger from heaven, for me, was Raymond Aron. Upon his return from Berlin,⁷ he spoke to me in a bar about the phenomenologists. 'Those hearty individuals,' he concluded smiling, 'find a way of philosophizing about everything. They would pass the night phenomenologically describing the essence of a lamppost.' I was overjoyed: nothing seemed more important to me than raising streetlights to the dignity of a philosophical object . . . A year later I was reading Husserl in Berlin. Everything had changed for all time".⁸ In this regard, he would remark in *La transcendance de l'Ego*: "For centuries . . . one had not experienced a movement in philosophy that realistic. They (the phenomenologists) plunged human beings back into the world. They gave them back the full measure of their anguish and their sufferings, their revolts also".⁹

This realism, which excited Sartre, consists more concretely in the fact that "consciousness and the world are given in a single blow: inherently external to consciousness, the world is, inherently, relative to it".¹⁰ He saw the foundations of this realism in intentionality or the principle according to which consciousness exists as "consciousness of" something. For him, this was the key conception of phenomenology, and this is why he devoted his two first essays *Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: L'intentionnalité* (1934/39) and *La transcendance de l'Ego* (1934/36) to it.

These essays first of all show the profound difference between the Sartrean idea of phenomenology and that of Husserl, who emphasized *pure* or *transcendental* phenomenology, which is not a science of fact, and is therefore not interested in the existential circumstances of things, but which carries out an eidetic description of immediately evident essences.¹¹ Husserl saw the principal new feature of his approach to be the phenomenological reduction, meaning the transition from mundane subjectivity to transcendental subjectivity, by criticizing the philosophy of life, anthropology (empirical or transcendental), psychologism, etc.¹² In his earliest writings, Sartre tended to present the positions criticized by Husserl as the very principles of his doctrine. "Intuition, according to Husserl, puts us in the presence of the thing. It must thus be understood that phenomenology is a science of fact and that the problems that it poses are problems of fact, as for that matter may be understood by considering that Husserl calls it a *descriptive science*".¹³ Despite the fact that Sartre remarks in the notes that Husserl would not have used the expression "science of fact", but "science of

essences”, he underscores that from his standpoint that would come down to the same thing.¹⁴

Sartre developed thereby a phenomenology of consciousness which, although it takes Husserlian thought as its point of departure, progressively distances itself from it. In contrast to Kant and Husserl, for whom the I is but a formal structure of the consciousness, Sartre was trying to show that the I, even abstractly conceived, is an infinite contraction of the “material” empirical Me. That is explained by the fact that the Ego has two components that meet—one subjective, ideal, active component that is the I, and an objective, “material”, passive element that is the Me and implies the former. In other words, the Me is the concrete psycho-physical totality that constitutes me as a person and sees to it that I am situated in the world. Thus the Ego is not doubled “the Ego, of which the I and the Me are but two sides, constitutes the ideal (noematic), indirect unity of the infinite series of our reflected consciousnesses”.¹⁵ That has several important consequences.

First, the transcendental field becomes impersonal, pre-personal, without an I, because the Husserlian thesis about the transcendental I as a personal field founding and unifying consciousness proves useless from the point of view of the phenomenological conception of consciousness—consciousness, which is always “consciousness of”, is not united and individualized by the I, but by the intentionality that determines it as such. Second, the I only appears at the level of humanity and is only one side of the Me, the active, intentional side. Third, the I Think can accompany our representations because it appears on a foundation of unity that it has not contributed to creating and it is this prior unity that makes it possible; that means that it appears on the foundation of what he would call in *L'Être et le néant* the “pre-reflective cogito” and that in *La Transcendance de l'égo* he called first degree consciousness or unreflected consciousness. Thereby the question is finally raised as to whether the personality necessarily accompanies consciousness, meaning whether one can conceive of absolutely impersonal consciousnesses.

So, in this early work Sartre's distinctive place within the phenomenological movement, which most particularly consists in distinguishing between three degrees of consciousness, was already emerging:

- the first degree, the unreflected and non-positional consciousness of oneself that is the consciousness of a transcendent object.
- the second degree, the reflecting consciousness, non-positional with respect to itself, but positional with respect to the reflected consciousness.

- the third degree, the second degree thetic act by virtue of which the reflecting consciousness becomes positional with regard to itself.

The Sartrean contribution here consists in the development of the first degree as an autonomous field, the two others being thematized by the German tradition. Since each consciousness is consciousness of consciousness, or as he would explain later in *L'Être et le néant*—(of) consciousness (non-positional consciousness of oneself), this conception would enable him to pass beyond the primacy of the reflected consciousness of the classical theories and that of Husserl, as well as the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious. In *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (1939), he would show in this regard that emotion is neither an isolated fact, which comes to consciousness from outside, nor a non-conscious entity, but rather consciousness itself—a consciousness of the world, which is unreflected in the beginning.¹⁶

In the two treatises that follow, *L'imagination* (1936) and *L'imaginaire* (1940), which constitute a sort of transition towards *L'Être et le néant*, Sartre develops and deepens the phenomenology of consciousness by arguing that the theory of the image is only possible from the perspective of Husserlian phenomenology. In opposition to the great metaphysical systems of the 17th–18th centuries, in particular those of Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume, he shows that the identity between the nature of the perception and the image leads to the identification of the image with the thing by robbing it of its specific character: “Giving images a sensory content is making them into a thing obeying the laws of things and not those of consciousness. One thus deprives the mind of any possibility of distinguishing it from other things of the world”.¹⁷ If, on the other hand, one starts from the theory of Husserl according to which consciousness is consciousness of something, the image proves to be different from transcendent objects. It is a physical reality and as such an intentional structure which refers back to a *hylé* (material content). Sartre's criticism of Husserl is that the *hylé* of the image differs from perceptions and that the image and the perception thus have different material contents.

This conception is studied in *L'imaginaire* where Sartre sets out the difference between image and perception in even more clear and distinct terms. He shows that since consciousness is intentional, the image is neither in consciousness, nor outside consciousness, but an intermediary: “The word image could therefore only designate the relationship of a consciousness to the object; in other words, its a certain way that the object has of appearing to the consciousness, or if one prefers, a certain

way that the consciousness has of giving itself an object".¹⁸ Sartre thereby addresses the distinction between perception, thought and image. Perception is a form of observation in which the object is given in profiles (*Abschattungen*). It is a serial grasping process leading to a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances. Thought, on the other hand, is a single act of the consciousness that takes a central position without re-establishing appearances. In the image, the object is given in profiles, but it is immediate knowledge and without follow-up; it is not learned—it is already knowledge. That is why "my perception can deceive me, but not my image".¹⁹ Images are quasi-observations that posit their objects as non-existent, as absent, as existing elsewhere or in abeyance. In this sense, they conceal a certain sort of *nothingness* because "the imaginative act is at once constituting, isolating and annihilating".²⁰ The imaging consciousness is a going beyond and annihilation of what is existing towards a lack, towards a void, all the while constituting a relation between what is present and absent, respectively, by situating human beings in the world. "It is the appearing of the imaginary before consciousness that enables one to grasp the annihilation of the world as its essential condition and primary structure."²¹ Thus the phenomenology of the imaging consciousness takes a central place among the great problems of *L'Être et le néant* and constitutes the prelude to them.

3. ONTOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Despite the fact that certain positions stated by Sartre in his early works would later be revised, all his life he would remain convinced that subjectivity is not *in* consciousness, since it *is* consciousness.²² What he definitively rejects from Husserlian thought in *L'Être et le néant*, and which would bring him closer to Heidegger, is no longer so much the reduction of consciousness to the transcendental Ego, but the identification of the phenomenon and its appearing. Although right from the first sentence he underscores that phenomenology "has achieved considerable progress by reducing the existent to the series of appearances manifesting it",²³ assuring by that operation immediate access to the world through phenomena, Sartre suggests that this is also wherein lies the great error of Husserl, who identified appearing with the being of the phenomenon. For that "is simply a way of picking new words to clothe the old '*esse est percipi*' of Berkeley. And that was indeed what Husserl would do, when, after having performed the phenomenological reduction, he would treat the noema as unreal and would declare that its '*esse*' was a '*percipi*'".²⁴ In this regard,

Sartre reproaches Husserl that "the idealism concerned with reducing being to the knowledge that one attains of it should in some way assure the being of knowledge beforehand".²⁵ But, the sole reality that Husserl acknowledges is that of noesis. However, the transphenomenal being of the subject does not assure *being* as the transphenomenal foundation of phenomena. This is why Sartre accuses Husserl of phenomenism,²⁶ which actually misses the main point of phenomenology.²⁷

Thus, although he insists upon the autonomy of the unreflected consciousness and upon the need to start from the cogito, in *L'Être et le néant* Sartre gives up the conception of the impersonal, transcendental field, considering it as insufficient for going beyond solipsism and idealism. To attain this goal new solutions are needed, which he above all saw in clearly setting out the difference between the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being, the ontological proof and the thematization of being in-itself.

In so far as it is *phenomenological*, Sartre's ontology relies, on the one hand, on the Husserlian conception of phenomenology involving the theses on:

1. the immediate givenness of reality through phenomena;
2. the description of phenomenal realities as "the things themselves", meaning as fundamental objects of phenomenology;
3. the study of the cogito as "thought of . . . something";

and on the other hand, on the Heideggerian conception of phenomenology as questioning the being of being (*l'être de l'étant*) in light of phenomena, which always show themselves as what they are. Sartre believed, just as Heidegger did, that ontology can only exist as phenomenology and it is as *ontology* that the Sartrean conception accords a central role to the fundamental question (*die Fundamentalfrage*) of the meaning of being: "What is the meaning of being in so far as it includes within it these two radically distinct regions?"²⁸ This question also shows that it is a question of a reformulation of Heidegger's ontological difference between being (*être, Sein*) and being (*étant, Seiendes*) into a difference between being in-itself and being for-itself. But what Sartre most particularly tries to show is that the meaning of being (*l'être*) as a common basis of the two forms of being (*l'être*) is an absolute, ideal, non-existent totality that he would call *όλον*—a point of view rather different from that of *Sein und Zeit*.

The ongoing pursuit of realism explains the fact that of all the phenomenologies, Sartre's is ontologically the most radical with respect to the concept of ontic reality.

First of all, the ontic character of human reality is not simply, “of ontological *being (être)*” (Heidegger).²⁹ Next, if Husserl and Heidegger excluded metaphysical problems from philosophy, Sartre rather showed how the cogito as transcendence itself requires the analysis of that *towards which* it is transcending, *in what regard* it differs and *in relation to what* it constitutes itself as Itself or ipseity. It is for this reason that he rejects, on one hand, the Husserlian method of reduction which according to him leads to a speculative and fictive ontology identical to the formal structures of the transcendental I; and, on the other hand, the direct move of Heidegger to the question about the meaning of Being, disregarding the cogito and thereby arriving at a unreflected ontology. Thus, though phenomenological, Sartre’s approach in *L’Être et le néant* is neither Husserlian, nor Heideggerian—the transcendental reduction is rejected, description or hermeneutics is appreciably modified. It is no longer a matter of a simple description of the transcendental *Erlebnis*, but of a hermeneutics of Being, to which the *Erlebnis* refers, of a hermeneutics of the in-itself and of the for-itself. Unlike Heidegger’s fundamental ontology approach, Sartrean description is not a description of being in terms of *Da-Sein*, but an ontological differentiation in terms of the prior analysis of the phenomenon.

By distinguishing existence from essence and being from appearing, Sartre shows that being is not reducible to appearing since it is rather the condition of it. It is, therefore, being-to-unveil and not being-unveiled. That signifies that the being of the phenomenon is not reducible to the phenomenon of being either, that the latter is “ontological”, that it requires the transphenomenality of being. This transphenomenal necessity becomes apparent, according to Sartre, because the phenomenon as “known” refers us to the process of knowledge, which for its part refers us to knowing subjects in so far as they *are* and not in so far as they are known. The discovery of unreflected consciousness as the foundation of reflection, the primacy of the pre-reflective cogito respectively, shows that it is not essence that precedes existence and posits it as such, but that consciousness is prior to nothingness and “extricates itself from” being.³⁰ This first principle of the philosophy of existence, which would be later stated by Sartre in the well-known formula “existence precedes essence”,³¹ is grounded in his unique conception of subjectivity.

By the theory of the pre-reflexive cogito, as opposed to the transcendental I of Kant and Husserl, which prohibits the reduction of the consciousness to the hyletic layer, Sartre shows that subjectivity is consciousness of consciousness, meaning the psychophysical me, situated in the

world and transcending itself towards the world. It is this concept of subjectivity that makes it possible to carry out the ontological proof, which becomes necessary given that the transphenomenality of being cannot be drawn from the transphenomenality of the cogito. “Consciousness is consciousness of something: that means that transcendence is a constitutive structure of consciousness, meaning that consciousness is borne on a being that is not it. This is what we call the ontological proof.”³²

Subjectivity, which is *absolute* in so far as consciousness exists by itself, can only be constructed in front of something unveiled, something transcendent. This is why Sartre considers that the Heideggerian definition of *Dasein* had to be expanded to include the contrast between human reality (the for-itself) and the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon (the in-itself). Thereby, if for Heidegger *Dasein* is ontically characterized by the fact that for this being (*étant*) it is a *question* in its being (*être*) of this being (*être*),³³ for Sartre “consciousness is a being (*être*) for which in its being (*être*) it is a question of this being (*être*) in so far as this being (*être*) involves a being (*être*) other than it”.³⁴ In other words, consciousness involves in its being (*être*) an unconscious and transphenomenal being (*être*), which is found *facing it* in the revealing intuition. This head-on confrontation by the consciousness necessarily leads to the foundation of the ontology of intentionality—being-in-itself.

With the distinction between phenomenon and being (*être*) and the carrying out of the ontological proof, Sartre established the ontological difference and outlined the two regions of being—the in-itself and the for-itself—which now had to be described and defined as such. The famous formula that Sartre used to define the in-itself as opposed to the for-itself is conceived in these terms: “Being (*l’être*) is. Being (*l’être*) is in-itself. Being (*l’être*) is what it is”.³⁵ But what does that mean?

“Being is” signifies that being can neither be derived from something possible, nor from something necessary, that it is contingent and thereby “superfluous”. It cannot be derived from the possible because what is possible is a structure of the for-itself, but neither can it be reduced to necessity because that involves a connection between ideal propositions.

“Being is in-itself” signifies both that being is not created, because divine subjectivity cannot bring objectivity into existence and that it is not *causa sui*, since it is not activity. “Active” and “passive” are human concepts designating ways of being human, aiming for a given goal. This is why being in-itself is neither passive, nor active, but indeterminate—any determination comes to it through consciousness.