Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society

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Contents

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I

Of “Sect Man”

_The Modern Self and Civil Society in Max Weber_

AGENCY, CITIZENSHIP, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society was a vision largely forgotten during the “short twentieth century.” It sounded quaint and even irrelevant for the age of power politics, organized economy, and mass democracy, in which individual agency tended to be stifled by these gigantic institutions and processes that operated beyond one’s practical comprehension and engagement. This was a time when the centralized bureaucratic state, whether the totalitarian or welfare variant, dominated public life, while the economy of scale, whether capitalist or not, was welcomed with little questioning. Democratization surely constituted an irreversible trend of the century, and yet its universal appeal was intrinsically tied to passive citizenship, in its worst case, of a mass consumerist kind. Neither society, increasingly cramped between the state and market, nor civility and civic virtues, increasingly displaced by the sovereignty of individual citizens’ unreflective preferences, could claim much attention but in a romantic lament for their erosion. According to Eric Hobsbawm, the vision of civil society had no corresponding reality in the twentieth century and was merely reflective of a bygone era – that is, an “idealized nineteenth-century.”¹ The twentieth century was not to be remembered as the age of civil society.

Against this historical background, it comes rather as a surprise that its last decade witnessed the sudden triumph of civil society all over the world.\(^2\) The unanticipated collapse of the communist bloc, third world democratization, and the crisis of the Keynesian regimes were all lumped together and seen as evidence that civil society, long thought dormant, had finally reasserted itself over the overbearing states. Much hubris followed these historical developments – most notably, the ironical celebration of the Hegelian “end of history” that had finally dawned with the demise of the Hegelian state.

For a while, it was widely believed that civil society was the answer to the governance and legitimacy crises of the Hegelian state, since it would make the state less intrusive while more responsive to individual citizens’ daily concerns. This expectation was fueled by a formal-juridical understanding of civil society as embodying a set of determinate institutions that stand independent of or even in opposition to the state. Civil society was seen to consolidate a zone of institutionalized self-regulation, buttressed by the formal rule of law, which adjudicates the conflicts immanent in civil society and formed through spontaneous interaction among rights-bearing individuals religiously pursuing their own ends. Its inspiration came from, along with a Lockean liberalism, the social imagination of “commercial society” popularized by the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, and its model, a laissez-faire market where ideas and opinions would circulate throughout the society as freely as money. In this view, the state is also an institutional agent that faithfully services and implements the mandates given by civil society, one that confers legitimacy on the state and sometimes withdraws it. The alleged Hegelian end of history was to inaugurate a profoundly anti-Hegelian age in a double sense: first, the relationship between the state and civil society was to be completely reversed from the way in which Hegel postulated it, and second, formal juridical institutionalism of civil society was to trump the ethical formative principles of the state as Hegel saw them.

This reversal, of course, does not mean that the reinvigorated civil society would be indifferent to the question of good citizenship. Quite the contrary. For, within a clearly walled citadel in which to pursue

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freely their autonomously chosen ends, individuals would regain the ownership of their lives and an authentic sense of agency. In turn, reempowerment of individual agency would usher in a more participant citizenship that was to make the state (and market) more accountable; the increasing efficacy of the public participation that was to ensue would further motivate active engagement; and so would begin the benign cycle that would ultimately culminate in a more robust and efficacious liberal democratic regime. In other words, civil society was believed to be the harbinger of the public citizenship without which neither a healthy democratic self-governance nor the liberal moral ideals of individual autonomy, freedom, and agency could be realized to their fullest extent. Civil society sustains “conditions of liberty,” which (re)produce a uniquely modern kind of moral agency that Ernest Gellner called a “modal self.” The difference from Hegel’s project, then, lies less in a principled indifference to the moral matters in the public sphere than in the institutional framework advocated for the empowerment of individual agency. This ultimate ethical stage was reachable, according to the civil society advocates, through an institutionalization of local voluntary associational life free of paternalistic interference of even the benevolent state. The recent project of civil society, one might say, rejected a Platonic politics of the soul only to embrace a laissez-faire politics of the soul. Alexis de Tocqueville was to replace Hegel as the political theorist for our posthistorical age.

As the initial euphoria has subsided, however, a growing number of people are focusing on a different understanding of civil society that is conceived more explicitly in terms of human capabilities, both moral and political, than of legal and economic institutions. The new focus is predicated on a recognition that many of the optimistic consequences that were to ensue from a robust civil society did not materialize as

promised. Despite much talk of reform, the public still sees government as an alien, intrusive, and unresponsive power that is controlled by special interests, leaving even the regular voters feeling shut out, ill-informed, unrepresented, and manipulated. The consequent civic distress, apathy, and alienation show little sign of abating in Europe and North America; in fact, they are spreading to the newly democratized countries, where many greet them, along with the mass consumerism that accompanies them, as the \textit{cognito ultima} of “progress” and “modernity.” Politics seems as dysfunctional as ever. The civic virtues, mutual trust, and civility or, to be precise, the lack thereof continue to be sources of complaints everywhere and an occasion for the conservative (and liberal) jeremiad, especially in the United States and increasingly in Europe. Weaker family ties and fraying neighborhoods are loathed universally as the root cause for the evaporation of mutual trust and erosion of common identity, without which civic solidarity cannot be sustained. In much of the rest of the world, in fact, the similar apprehension about the disintegration of traditional cultural, religious, and communal values is growing more acute, even taking, in some places, a violent turn in a renewed anticolonial and antimodernist direction. Social disintegration is feared more than ever. The market, in the name of globalization, the new economy, and financial capitalism, has become unshackled, rapidly penetrating our lives to an extent hitherto unimagined. Refashioning society in the image of the market has so far generated only an unprecedented level of socioeconomic inequality, insecurity, and anxiety, both domestically and internationally.\footnote{W. Galston, “Political Economy and the Politics of Virtue: U.S. Public Philosophy at Century’s End,” in A. L. Allen and M. C. Regan, Jr. (eds.), \textit{Debating Democracy’s Discontents: Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 65–9.}

Under these circumstances, the simple presence of local voluntary associational life, no matter how autonomously instituted, and a laissez-faire politics of the soul, for all its implicit concern with good citizenship, do not seem to do much to ameliorate political dysfunction, social disintegration, and economic anxiety. Furthermore, civil society sometimes does more harm than good. Organized special interests and their vigorous activities are only deepening the general public’s sense of
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alienation from and mistrust of the political process; the neighborhood groups organized for gated communities can hardly be seen as making a positive contribution to the reinstatement of public commitment, mutual trust, and civic solidarity; economic globalization requires a new global regime for a better coordinated regulation of capital and trade flows, and yet an attempt to build such a regime is often frustrated for domestic political reasons that have to do with powerful workers’ unions. In order to jump-start the benign cycle of public engagement, efficacious government, and individual agency, then, a one-sidedly institutional approach does not seem sufficient; instead, we need to pay closer attention to the more substantive side of what civil society can and cannot do. In other words, the question to be raised about civil society seems less about the institutional maturity and autonomy of voluntary associational life than about the variegated civic educational effects that different voluntary associations exert on their individual members’ moral makeup. Civil society is in need of a reconceptualization that can allow it to address the question of citizenship and morality more directly. Nancy Rosenblum, one of the prominent theorists of contemporary civil society, observes that

[...] the orthodox preoccupation with associations as buffers against government and avenues to political participation, and with freedom of association as an aspect of personal liberty has been eclipsed. Today, the dominant perspective is moral: civil society is seen as a school of virtue where men and women develop the dispositions essential to liberal democracy.6

Theoretically at issue in this recent reorientation is a more profound and troubling question about the self-sustainability of procedural liberalism on its own terms. That is to say, can a liberal democratic regime sustain itself in a robust form while remaining neutral to the moral dispositions and civic virtues of its citizens? What is the role of civil society with regard to the continuing viability of a liberal democratic regime (statecraft) and the self-constitution of its citizens (soulcraft)? Cutting across the vast array of liberal-communitarian interlocutions, an increasing number of contemporary theorists of Tocquevillean persuasions converge on the following points: first, a liberal

democratic regime cannot be sustained in a robust form without certain kinds of virtues and characters in its citizens that can capacitate and motivate their active public engagement\(^7\); second, these types of agency are cultivated, reproduced, and reinforced through a local, voluntary associational life in a pluralistically organized civil society\(^8\); third, American civil society is in serious decline, which has prompted these neo-Tocquevilleans to call for a “softening,” if not a complete abandonment, of the liberal doctrine of neutrality and to encourage a stronger form of political and civic education of liberal citizens via a formative intervention in the organization and structure of civil society.\(^9\)

Criticizing the liberal reaffirmation of the strict separation of statecraft and soulcraft, in short, the neo-Tocquevillean position suggests a politics of civil society in which statecraft and soulcraft are combined to sustain a more robust liberal democratic regime.

Against this background, my book makes two claims about Weber’s political thought: one pertains to its affinity with the neo-Tocquevillean politics of civil society; the other, to its crucial distance. First, Weber agrees that the cultivation of a certain type of moral agent he called the “person of vocation” (Berufsmensch) is critical for the continuing vitality of the modern liberal democratic regime; that its virtues, dispositions, and characters can be fostered only in a peculiar context of civil society he called “sectlike society” (Sektengesellschaft); and that the decline of civil society and the concomitant degeneration of the liberal self must be restored as one of the central agendas for late modern


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politics. Statecraft and soulcraft are not separated in Weber’s politics of civil society, nor can they or should they be separated.

Second, however, Weber maintains that not just any “revivification of civil society” would be conducive to the empowerment of the modern liberal agency. For he is more sensitive than some contemporary Tocquevilleans to the fact that the simple presence of a vibrant associational life does not offer a coherent guarantee against what John Keane calls the problem of “uncivil society” or “bad civil society.” Not all forms of civil society are conducive to a robust liberal democratic regime; some are in fact detrimental to it. Through a genealogical reconstruction, instead, Weber seeks to resuscitate a peculiar mode of civil society as the site where his liberal politics of voluntary associational life and the unique ontology of modern self intersect and interact. It is this theoretically elaborated ideal type of civil society, cutting across his larger reflections on modernity and modernization, that stabilizes the critical vista from which Weber substantiates the morphology of civil society for a vibrant liberal democratic citizenship.

From this perspective, then, it need not surprise anyone that, when questioned in November 1918 about the liberal democratic reform of postwar defeated Germany, Weber replied in the following unambiguous terms:

Foremost among these, too, is the restoration of that prosaic moral “decency” [Anständigkeit] which, on the whole, we had and which we lost in the war – our most grievous loss. Massive problems of education, then. The method: only the “club” in the American sense [amerikanische Klubwesen] (and associations of every kind based on selective choice of members), starting with childhood and youth, no matter for what purpose.\(^\text{11}\)


\(^{11}\) Letter to Friedrich Crusius as quoted in W. Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 1890–1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 323. A complete letter is in Biography 647/636; E. Baumgarten (ed.), Max Weber: Werk und Person (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck, 1964) 536ff; and GPS (1st ed.) 482ff, all of which Mommsen claims to be mistranscribed. Material enclosed in parentheses in the quote is based on Mommsen’s claims. English rendering was altered to provide a more literal translation.
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My book can be summarized as an attempt to understand these somewhat unexpected references by Weber to a robust associational life, ethical characterology, and America, and to draw their implications for the contemporary politics of civil society.

READING WEBER: BETWEEN POLITICS AND SCIENCE

As an interpretation of Max Weber’s political thought, my book argues that Weber’s reflections on liberal modernity, once adequately reconstructed, disclose an “immanentist” critique anchored in the logic and promises of the liberal modern project itself rather than an authoritarian challenge to it. For this purpose, I aim to topically and genealogically reconstruct Weber’s political thought. First, this reconstruction is topical since various elements in Weber’s political thought will be reconfigured in such a way as to highlight a sustained contemplation of the two questions of the modern self and civil society. Second, it is genealogical since the main narrative thread will be propelled by examinations in successive order of early and late modes of modernity that are embedded in Weber’s social imagination. Obviously, this narrative order as well as the subject questions are conceptual artifices. They are artifices because Weber did not organize his ideas on modernity in such a genealogical order, even if one presumes an overarching architeconic and narrative unity in his vast opus. Nor did he explicitly privilege the self and civil society as his main themes. In fact, Weber’s main theme is still far from settled, and I do not intend to engage in this highly philological contention among Weber scholars. 12

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My book aims instead at an ideal typical reconstruction. It is an ideal type in the sense that any interpretative reconstruction unavoidably entails a hermeneutic accentuation predicated on the investigator’s subjective commitments, prejudices, and problematics, shutting down one avenue of interpretation while opening up another. Thus, for example, my examination does not intend to exhaustively follow up the crucial distinction Weber makes between different forms of rationality that can be instrumental in accounting for the problematic nature of the charismatic-caesarist leadership ideal in his political thought.13 Weber’s morphology of rationality certainly figures importantly in my investigation as well – yet in a rather different context of constitution of the modern self and empowerment of its agency. To that extent, my investigation relies on a one-sided reconstruction of Weber’s political thought. As Weber maintains that the unavoidable “one-sidedness” (Einseitigkeit) can be justified only by means of a clear elaboration and announcement of the subjective values (Wertideen) behind any ideal typical construction, then, I am certainly obliged to promulgate the subtexts in light of which my choice of strategy seemed expedient.

The most immediate subtext concerns Weber scholarship proper and, in particular, the continuing controversy among Weber scholars that was initiated by the publication of Wolfgang Mommsen’s now classic study Max Weber und die deutsche Politik (1959).14 Through meticulous analyses of Weber’s political writings, partisan speeches, and private letters, Mommsen exposed a side of Weber little known until then – a figure whose political ideas epitomize the illiberal nationalism of Wilhelmine Germany and foreshadow at least in part the


totalitarian dictatorship reminiscent of Hitler. Mommsen is essentially in agreement with Jürgen Habermas when the latter proclaims that Carl Schmitt, the crown jurist of National Socialism, is the “legitimate pupil” of Weber’s political thought.15

In brief, Mommsen’s critical examination consists of three points. First, Weber regarded traditional liberal democratic values as all but obsolete. Especially the natural rights theory had become, for Weber, outdated in the modern world, which enabled Mommsen to assert that Weber “de-normatized” liberal democracy. This was a critical revision of the liberal credo for Mommsen, since he believed that it prepared a way for Weber to discuss liberal political values and institutions solely in terms of “rational expediency.”16 Second, expediency for Weber was measured by serviceability to the enhancement of German national power. National imperialism was the ultimate political value Weber subscribed to consistently throughout his career, and all other values and institutional commitments were subject to it.17 Third, therefore, it should not be taken as a surprise or an aberration that Weber shifted the focus in his proposal for the German political reform from a liberal parliamentarianism to a charismatic caesarism. The new focus, if not its inevitable outcome, falls within the parameters of Weber’s political thought, which were delimited by the abandonment of liberal modernity and sanctification of irrational nationalism.

According to Mommsen, then, Weber signified a failure of German bourgeois liberalism, which was too willing to succumb to authoritarian politics in the face of the inmanent threat from the working class—an illustrative piece of evidence, in short, for the Sonderweg paradigm of postwar German historiography.18 Worse still, Weber paved the way

16 For the clearest statement of this position, see Mommsen (1984) 392–5, 396, 404.
17 Ibid. 322, 327, 395–6.
18 Mommsen’s revisionism indeed forms a part of generational rebellion in West German historiography that rejected the previous generation’s conservative paradigm (of Gerhart Ritter et al.). Spearheaded by Fritz Fischer and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the new paradigm problematized modern German history in terms of structurally determined
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for the demise of the Weimar Republic and ushered in the rise of National Socialism by first formulating and endorsing irrational mass politics capped by charismatic dictatorship as an antidote to the overblown fear of bureaucratic petrification.¹⁹

defects that are rooted in the discrepancy between economic modernity and political and social backwardness. Seen this way, modern German history is marked by the profound difference, or an aberrational path of development (Sonderweg), that sets it apart from the Anglophone experiences of modernization. One of the more salient features of this Sonderweg paradigm was the thesis of bourgeois recapitulation by the Junker establishment in which popular and illiberal national imperialism during the Wilhelmine period tends to be held responsible. It is natural that Mommsen’s iconoclastic reading of the representative bourgeois thinker of Wilhelmine politics, Weber, was also based on the dichotomy between liberalism and nationalism. For a contextualization of Mommsen’s contribution, see G. Eley, “Liberalism, Europe and the Bourgeoisie, 1860–1914,” in D. Blackbourne and R. Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie: Essays on the Social History of the German Middle Class from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century (London: Routlege, 1991) 295. For the discursive context of West German historiography, see R. Evans, Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987). For the programmatic critique of the Sonderweg paradigm, see G. Eley and D. Blackbourn, The Peculiarities of German History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

¹⁹ In fact, Mommsen’s criticism vacillates between these two different innuendos – that is, between Weber as a symptom of liberal crisis (i.e., the “liberal in despair” thesis) and as a root of its problems (i.e., the “pre-Schmitt” thesis). The second view is more pronounced in the 1959 study. Mommsen, however, gradually toned down his criticism as he turned more attention to Weber’s theoretical writings, veering in his subsequent works more toward the first position. See his Age of Bureaucracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) and The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). The second position was also reinforced by Raymond Aron and Herbert Marcuse, albeit from their different perspectives. Aron aimed criticism less at national imperialism than at the idolatry of power that brought Weber’s political thinking dangerously close to the worship of the state itself. Aron’s argument maintained that Weber’s obsession with nation cannot be accounted for apart from his belief that the state represents nation in the international power struggle. Embedded in a Nietzschean aestheticization of power and a Darwinian theory of struggle, Weber’s political ideas in fact celebrated the modern nation-states as effective media for the continuation of human struggle – a value in and of itself. According to Aron, in short, Weber was a profoundly illiberal thinker who posed a problem “to” modern liberalism. See R. Aron, “Max Weber and Power Politics,” in Stammer (1971). Continuing the line of Marxist critique of Weber first promulgated by Georg Lukács, Marcuse confirmed all this and concluded that Weber represented the perversion of capitalist rationality and liberal modernity. Weber’s genius and intellectual integrity were apparent to Marcuse, since his idea crystallized the historic turn by which the earlier Enlightenment formal rationality degenerated into a substantive irrationality that attended the authoritarian politics, exploitive economy, and refederalized society of late capitalism. For Marcuse, Weber was a bourgeois liberal thinker par excellence, and to that extent, the problematic nature of Weber’s political ideas was the
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The Mommsen thesis constitutes a subtext for my reconstruction not primarily because my aim is to refute Mommsen’s reading – that is, to write a liberal apologia for Weber. Although I will critically and substantively engage with it on a number of occasions, the awareness of Mommsen’s contribution is valuable to my project insofar as it contributes to the identification of pitfalls in examining Weber’s political thought. The virtues of the Mommsen thesis notwithstanding, its value lies more in the methodological weaknesses of his approach than in the strength of its contents and conclusions. In particular, I aim to expose two weak premises of the Mommsen thesis against which I will identify my approach. They are, first, an inconsistency between Weber’s political and scholarly writings, and second, Mommsen’s understanding of liberalism.

The first problem results from an exclusive attention to the political writings of Weber (mostly public speeches and partisan journalism) without systematically incorporating Weber’s more theoretical contributions. Weber’s comparative sociology of religion is all but completely ignored, and so is his analysis of rationalization. The sociological concepts of bureaucracy, charisma, and nation, key concepts that are potentially critical for Mommsen’s projects, are given only a sketchy elaboration in isolation from the Weber scholarship in general. Thus, contrary comments notwithstanding, Mommsen’s Weber appears in the end, in the absence of satisfactory incorporation of his theoretical views, to be schizophrenic in his political thinking – betraying an important inconsistency between the universal “scientific” value of the historical, sociological, and methodological contributions and the political ideas that were culmination of the problem “of” modern liberalism. See H. Marcuse, “Industrialization and Capitalism,” in Stammer (1971). For Lukács’s criticism of Weber, see G. Lukács, “Max Weber and German Sociology,” Economy and Society 1:4 (1972) 386–98. David Beetham managed to chart a middle course by arguing that Weber’s political thought represents one problematic aspect of bourgeois liberalism that overemphasizes the defiant, aristocratic, and elitist side of liberal individualism or “tendencies toward elective dictatorship that exist within liberal democracy” (“Introduction” to the second ed., 7). See D. Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1974). For a more succinct statement, see his “Max Weber and the Liberal Political Tradition,” European Journal of Sociology 30 (1989) 313–23. For the best example of recent scholarship on Weber’s politics, see P. Breiner, Max Weber and Democratic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
steepled in the particularistic considerations of Wilhelmine politics and society.20

Not only was Weber’s political thought, however, shaped by his passionate political involvements, but also the reverse: his studies in universal history and comparative historical sociology decisively informed his own political ideas, choices, and commitments. This can be argued with more persuasiveness in Weber’s case, for he was a politically driven thinker throughout his career; “His thinking,” observed Karl Jaspers, “was the reality of a man who was political in every fiber of his being.”21 Thus, for example, Weber’s association with a prominent left-liberal politician, Friedrich Naumann, and his National-sozialer Verein was based on their shared criticism of the political role of the Junker class, a theme Weber first formulated in the East Elbian studies. His ad hoc studies of the Russian Revolution of 1905 clearly reveal his understanding of the Russian situation in terms contrastive to earlier revolutions of comparable magnitude, that is, the Reformation, the English Civil War, and the American Revolution. These events clearly constitute part of the historical background for the main subject of Weber’s most famous scholarly contribution, the Protestant ethic thesis. The sociological concepts of charisma and bureaucracy are, needless to say, inseparably linked with Weber’s postwar writings on the reconstruction and democratization of Germany, in which criticism of omnipotent bureaucracy and the plebiscitary presidency as its antidote figure prominently. Without going into further detail, suffice it to say that Weber was a profoundly political thinker, if not a thinker exclusively of the political, whose political thought cannot be convincingly accounted for in isolation from his sociological and historical ideas, and vice versa.

The second weakness of Mommsen’s interpretation lies in his implicit understanding of liberal democracy. Mommsen’s premise is that liberal democracy depends on a substantive value orientation that is predicated on inalienable rights issuing from universal natural law as opposed to positive laws. According to Mommsen, for example, stripped of a firm normative foundation rooted in universal values, the Weimar “value-neutral democracy” was predestined to collapse.\(^{22}\) It is this criticism of formalism predicated on a fundamentalist understanding of liberal democracy that Mommsen shares with Leo Strauss’s well-known critique of Weber’s methodological distinction between value and fact.\(^{23}\) According to Strauss, the post-Nietzschean and Weberian transfiguration of virtue into value and the attendant dissociation from truth claims lead only to a radical form of nihilism and existentialist decisionism. Lacking the anchoring foundation of moral virtues that only philosophy, as understood by Strauss’s esoteric definition, can identify, the modern political society tends to plunge into a nihilistic maelstrom of amoral self-assertion and self-expression of the unreflective masses—an image curiously reminiscent of the last years of the Weimar Republic, to which Weber and his like gave birth and in which Strauss spent his formative years.\(^{24}\)

Aside from the theoretical problems associated with the fundamentalist understanding of liberalism per se, which fall beyond the scope


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of my investigation, Mommsen’s application of this approach poses two problems in understanding Weber’s political thought. The first problem is that Mommsen’s fundamentalist presupposition makes it difficult for him to investigate the question of Weber’s liberalism on a hermeneutically adequate level. For Weber, value fragmentation and pluralism constitute a starting point to which his political ideas are conceived as a response, not an end of his political thinking. Mommsen’s strike at this premise tends to misfire, since it cannot be properly accounted for in the context of political writings; rather, it requires a systematic inquiry into Weber’s methodological writings and sociology of religions, the lack of which constituted a loophole identified earlier as the first weakness of Mommsen’s argument. In this light, Strauss’s criticism is more sustained and consistent, since he at least focuses on Weber’s methodological premises. Also, although Mommsen can be justified insofar as his point is to criticize Weber’s misunderstanding or overblown fear of the discontents of modernity, such a recognition can hardly justify his subsequent claim that Weber’s value-neutral premises lead his political ideas directly to, or foreshadow, authoritarian conclusions. That is to say, the alleged transition from a value-free liberalism to the authoritarian conclusion in Weber’s political thinking cannot be made to appear so unmitigated as Mommsen posits.  

The second problem pertains more to the practice of drawing a laundry-list-like portrait of liberalism itself. Whether fundamentalist or not, this approach is predicated on identifying and enumerating premises, values, and institutions that in combination more or less exhaust our understanding of liberalism, against which to juxtapose, compare, contrast, or assimilate Weber’s political ideas.  

25 Needless to say, the sea of change that separates our time and Mommsen’s is so great that Mommsen’s kind of natural right liberalism is seen by some as ironically contributing to the demise of individual freedom and rights. From this perspective, a mild form of value relativism has been and should be an integral part of the contemporary liberal agenda. See, for example, R. Rorty, “Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism,” in his Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). A useful discussion of this issue is contained in C. Larmore, “Political Liberalism,” in his The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

26 See, for example, Regina Titunik’s liberal reading of Weber and critique of the Mommsen thesis, which nonetheless takes an ontological approach similar to that
Aside from my methodological suspicion of this kind of acontextual approach, such a project would inevitably draw on a more or less self-contained portrait of liberalism that falls outside the scope of Weber research. Unless one is prepared to discuss substantive problems in liberalism per se as Weber has relevance to them, it tends to result in a dubious caricature that can neither be falsified nor ascertained within the scope of Weber exegesis. And, of course, whether Weber appears liberal or not depends on how one draws liberalism.

In short, Mommsen’s reading reveals an odd mixture of highly contextualized analyses of Weber’s political writings grounded in Wilhelmine politics, on the one hand, and an acontextual, almost anti-historical evaluation of Weber’s political ideas in light of the fundamentalist understanding of liberalism, on the other. Missing between these two extreme poles is an examination of Weber’s political thought that is based on a careful analysis of the connection Weber draws between his comparative sociology and universal history, and political and partisan essays. My reexamination attempts to get around these two problems by putting Weber’s political ideas in the context of his own theoretical writings, thus avoiding a presumptuous value judgment based on a dubious characterization of liberalism as well as a reductionism to the