

Foreword

This publication adds to the theoretical understanding of the economic analysis of the law of corporations. The governance of corporations, resulting from both private contractual arrangements and the law, varies significantly between different jurisdictions. Dissatisfaction with the existing theories to explain these differences motivated this research. The dissertation is an attempt to come up with a coherent theoretical framework that is able to explain the observed differences in corporate governance. It pulls together existing theories and provides new theoretical foundations whenever there is a perceived gap in the current theoretical understanding of corporate governance.

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