

ARISTOTLE ON TRUTH

Aristotle's theory of truth, which has been the most influential account of the concept of truth from Antiquity onwards, spans several areas of philosophy: philosophy of language, logic, ontology, and epistemology. In this book, the first dedicated to this topic, Paolo Crivelli discusses all the main aspects of Aristotle's views on truth and falsehood. He analyses in detail the main relevant passages, addresses some well-known problems of Aristotelian semantics, and assesses Aristotle's theory from the point of view of modern analytic philosophy. In the process he discusses most of the literature on Aristotle's semantic theory to have appeared in the last two centuries. His book vindicates and clarifies the often repeated claim that Aristotle's is a correspondence theory of truth. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers working in both ancient philosophy and modern philosophy of language.

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To the memory of my father
Renzo Crivelli
and to my mother
Katherine Lester Crivelli



Acknowledgements

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Notes on the text

'LSJ' abbreviates the Liddell, Scott, Jones Greek-English lexicon.

I refer to Aristotelian passages by the line numbers as they are printed in Bekker's original edition: these in some cases differ from the 'Bekker lines' of widespread editions (e.g., 101^b38 of Ross's edition of the *Topics* is 101^b39 of Bekker's original edition). Similarly, I follow Bekker's numbering of the chapters within each book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

For Greek authors I use LSJ's standard abbreviations. For authors other than Aristotle, I normally use the critical editions on which LSJ relies. For Latin authors, I employ abbreviations which are easy to decode and I use standard critical editions.

'Cf.' at the beginning of a footnote indicates that the passages subsequently referred to express views close to those formulated in the portion of the main text to which the footnote pertains. If I disagree with an author, I say so explicitly (I never use 'cf.' to refer to one or more passages that formulate views with which I disagree).

I use quotation marks for three purposes: (i) to mention linguistic expressions, e.g. the word 'dog' is a noun; (ii) to indicate that a certain linguistic expression is being used in some special or unusual sense, e.g. Homer is a 'philosopher'; (iii) to quote a portion of text from some author, e.g. Aristotle says that 'sentences are true in the same way as the objects' (*Int.* 9, 19^a33). I use double quotation marks ("and") only when what would otherwise be occurrences of single quotation marks would be embedded within single quotation marks.



Abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works

APo. Posterior Analytics
APr. Prior Analytics
Cael. de Caelo
Cat. Categories

de An. de Anima

Div. Somn. de Divinatione per Somnia

EE Eudemian Ethics EN Nicomachean Ethics

GA de Generatione Animalium GC de Generatione et Corruptione

HA Historia Animalium

Insomn. de Insomniis
Int. de Interpretatione
Long. de Longaevitate
MM Magna Moralia
Mem. de Memoria
Metaph. Metaphysics

PA de Partibus Animalium

Ph. Physics
Po. Poetics
Pol. Politics
Pr. Problems
Rh. Rhetoric

SE Sophistici Elenchi

Sens. de Sensu

Somn. Vig. de Somno et Vigilia

Top. Topics
Xen. de Xenophane